

THE GREAT CRUSADE



JOSEPH THEODORE DICKMAN

C. F. George
1927

Duquesne University:



Gift of
Richard Wolfe

THE GREAT CRUSADE



Photograph by Doty, Battle Creek, Michigan

J. T. Dickman

THE GREAT CRUSADE

A NARRATIVE OF THE WORLD WAR


BY

JOSEPH T. DICKMAN

MAJOR GENERAL, AMERICAN ARMY
COMMANDING THIRD ARMY

FOREWORD BY

GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING




WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

NEW YORK :: 1927 :: LONDON
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

D570.3
3d
D4

940.4
~~11553~~

COPYRIGHT, 1927, BY
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO THE YOUNG AMERICANS

WHOSE COURAGE, FORTITUDE, LOYALTY AND DEVOTION TO
DUTY MADE POSSIBLE THE ACHIEVEMENTS ON THE BATTLE-
FIELDS OF FRANCE WHICH SHED LUSTER ON AMERICAN
ARMS AND PREPARED A GLORIOUS PLACE IN HISTORY FOR THE

THIRD DIVISION

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED IN GRATITUDE AND AFFECTION

MAR 25 1959

FOREWORD

In writing a brief preface to *The Great Crusade*, I cannot refrain from saying a word regarding the author. Our paths have occasionally run parallel in such a way as to give me opportunity to know the man. We were both in Cuba in '98, and he was later Inspector General on my Staff in the southern Philippines. So I can speak not only from a knowledge of his reputation in the Army, but also from personal acquaintance.

It is the common verdict among his associates of the old Army that his career from the time he graduated at the Military Academy to the close of the World War has been outstanding. During his forty-five years of active life in the Army, he has participated in every war and campaign. His services both in staff and line, whether in peace or war, have been marked by constant devotion to duty. Always a diligent student, he has occupied the position of instructor in organization, tactics, or military history, in several of our schools for officers.

Thus he came into the World War well equipped by study and experience for the responsibilities of high command. In July, 1918, the German advance against his front was halted by a regiment of his division in a most brilliant action. His Corps in the battle of Saint Mihiel and in the grilling struggle of the Meuse-Argonne performed distinguished service. After the Armistice, under circumstances requiring tact and discretion, he commanded our Army of Occupation on the Rhine for several months with marked efficiency.

The story of these activities is interesting and instructive. The history of the World War must rest primarily upon official records. But the personal narratives of participants, especially of those who, like the author, played an important part in the tragedy must supply the element of human interest. General Dickman's experience and observations are clearly and frankly told. His book will be a valuable contribution to the record of achievements of American arms. It will no doubt engage the attention of the general reader and will attract the military student seeking to profit by the experience of others.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD, BY GENERAL JOHN J. PERSHING	vii
 CHAPTER	
I. LAKE CHAMPLAIN	1
II. CAMP GREENE	14
III. CHÂTEAUVILLAIN	31
IV. CHÂTEAU-THIERRY: 1. DEFENSIVE	49
V. CHÂTEAU-THIERRY: 2. DEFENSIVE	79
VI. CHÂTEAU-THIERRY: OFFENSIVE .	114
VII. ST. MIHIEL	131
VIII. MEUSE-ARGONNE	162
IX. TO THE RHINE	195
X. ON THE RHINE	221
XI. COMMENTS	255
ORGANIZATION	255
DISCIPLINE	263
BELLEAU WOOD	267
SEDAN	272
FUTURE EMERGENCIES	275
THE GREAT CRUSADE	276

CONTENTS

PAGE

APPENDICES

I. REVIEW OF JULY 4, 1918: ADDRESS OF M. PHILIPPE CHOCARNE, PRE- FECT OF THE AISNE . . .	279
II. REVUE DU 4 JUILLET, 1918: SPEECH DU GÉNÉRAL J. T. DICKMAN, RE- MERCIAINT M. LE PRÉFET DU DÉ- PARTMENT DE L' AISNE . . .	281
III. ORGANIZATION FOR THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION	283
IV. DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM OF NOVEM- BER 5, 1918, WITH REFERENCE TO ADVANCE ON SEDAN	285
V. MEMORANDUM WITH REFERENCE TO BOUNDARIES ON NOVEMBER 6, 1918	287
VI. PROTEST BY GENERAL LAIGUELOT, FRENCH ARMY	289
VII. TELEGRAMS REFERRING TO ARMIS- TICE	290
VIII. ORGANIZATION OF THE THIRD ARMY	292
IX. EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF GEN- ERAL RAGUENEAU	294
INDEX	301

ILLUSTRATIONS

J. T. Dickman	<i>Frontispiece</i>	
		PAGE
Governor Bickett, North Carolina; General Dickman, 3d Division; Colonel Ballantyne, 1st Maine Heavy Artillery; Captain Boucher, French Army	<i>facing</i>	20
Headquarters, 3d Division, Château la Doultre, June-July, 1918, <i>facing</i>		68
Headquarters, I Corps, Côtes de Forimont	<i>facing</i>	68
German Crossing of the Marne and Plan of Attack, July 15, 1918 . . .		85
Operations of the 3d Division . . .		108
The 3d Division in Attack North of the Marne, July, 1918		121
Bridge of Gasoline Drums Built at Mézy, July, 1918, by the 6th U. S. Engineers	<i>facing</i>	122
Questioning German Prisoners after Belleau Wood Attack . . .	<i>facing</i>	122

THE GREAT CRUSADE

I

LAKE CHAMPLAIN

IN the picturesque and historic region of Lake Champlain, with the Green Mountains on the eastern and the Adirondacks on the western horizon, the regiments of the Regular Army stationed near its shores were leading an ideal existence during the three years preceding our entry into the Great War. Winter sports and indoor training prepared the young and active soldiers for the drills, target practice, marches, maneuvers, and other exercises of the summer season. Cordial relations were maintained with the good people of the neighboring cities, social entertainments were encouraged—a more peaceful scene could scarcely be imagined.

Prior to the winter of 1916-17 we gave little serious thought to the question of becoming involved in the great conflict raging in Eu-

rope. Our national administration was known to be ultra-pacific and its policy had apparently been approved in the November elections. The Mexicans had been unable to kick the Colossus of the North into a fight, and the *Lusitania* incident had passed without the consequences ordinarily to be expected.

There was no lack of professional interest in the course of events. As early as August 3, 1914, just before England's declaration of war, the author wrote a letter which was published in the *Free Press* of Burlington, Vermont. It is reproduced on account of its interesting predictions.

It is to be hoped that the powers of conception of the writers who, a few days ago, considered a great war in Europe not only impossible, but inconceivable, have developed sufficiently to permit them to realize the magnitude of the great struggle about to be initiated. By comparison, the contending forces of the wars of Frederick the Great and of the Napoleonic era dwindle to mere handfuls. In the most important battles of our Civil War there were less than 100,000 combatants on a side. In the general conflagration im-

pending the nations concerned can place in the field no less than 15,000,000 trained soldiers of the various arms. It is likely that on the open fields of eastern Prussia and the north of France there will be battles in which a million men will be engaged in mortal combat at the same time.

There will be fierce fighting in the air, underground in sieges, and beneath the waters of the ocean. The cheapness of human life is likely to be illustrated on an enormous scale.

The military student and observer is entering upon a most interesting period. Modern theories of organization, strategy and tactics, and all the developments of technical science in their application to war, will be put to a severe test. Many questions which have been in dispute for generations will probably receive a final answer.

At this season of the year the armies of Europe have completed their training and are at the maximum of efficiency. Instead of the annual maneuvers they will have the real thing.

The composition of the military units and the methods of fighting are practically the same in all European armies; it

may be said that they have been standardized. Discipline and physical endurance will more often than ever before be of decisive importance in battle.

Extensive use will be made of aviation, and the relative merits of the dirigible balloon and the aeroplane will be shown. The vast armament of modern field artillery will have ample opportunity to establish its claims to preponderating influence on the field of battle.

The probable theaters of operations afford favorable terrain for the employment of masses of cavalry. The cavalry battles will be of absorbing interest to American officers. Will these great conflicts be decided by the *arme blanche*? To what extent will recourse be had to the rifle and the American method of fighting against infantry? Will the lance as the queen of weapons prove its superiority over the long sword?

The financial resources of the Triple Entente are greatly in excess of those of the Dual Alliance. France and England are the wealthiest countries in Europe, and Russia is in good financial condition, thanks to its enormous territory and population. Austria is a financial cripple,

and the German war chest will not reach far in this titanic struggle.

The food supplies of England and France are safe through their control of the sea, and Russia can draw upon her own vast resources.

The strategical advantages of the general situation on land are with the Dual Alliance: they have the interior lines. Wonderful use will be made of the German railways.

The offensive campaign against Serbia is likely to be converted into one of pure defense and delay, the large Austrian armies being urgently needed elsewhere.

The plans of campaign have, of course, been worked out long ago by the German general staff. It would not be a bad guess to say that they contemplate a swift blow against France with the bulk of the Kaiser's army, a delaying force against the Russians, to be rapidly reinforced by the Austrians, and a containing force against the Serbs. The assistance of England with half a million soldiers would be of great importance, for it might serve to prolong the war in the north of France until the German resources of money and food are exhausted, or until the advance

of the Russians takes off the pressure. It is impossible to support the huge armies of modern times by the seizure of the food supplies of invaded territory, even in so rich a country as France, except for brief periods and with uninterrupted progress.

We obtained a large map from the general staff in Washington, and with colored pins marked thereon the progress of armies on the various theaters of operation; but participation in the war, except, possibly, through naval operations, did not enter our minds. Little did we dream that our cozy garrison of Fort Ethan Allen was soon to become one of the initial points in the hegira of a great American army to transatlantic fields of action. This was because we did not realize that the numerous pacific gestures of our government made our entry into the war inevitable. Fully informed of our military inefficiency and complete lack of preparation, the Germans eventually became convinced of our unwillingness to fight under any provocation, and governed themselves accordingly. Thus, what the most persistent propaganda on the greatest scale in history had been unable to accomplish, was

finally brought about by the stupidity of the Kaiser's *entourage*, encouraged by the supineness of our government.

However, there were some who saw the cloud on the horizon. No one had a clearer vision of the possibilities of the situation than General Leonard Wood, our commander at Governor's Island. Realizing that the first and greatest need of any system of education is teachers—for military instruction, officers—he conceived the plan of giving elementary training to intelligent young men in connection with a short period of camp life, so as to fit them for the duties of regimental officers in case of a national emergency. He enlisted the interest of presidents of prominent universities and stimulated the application of volunteers for training throughout the country. Putting his preaching and earnest pleading for some measure of preparation into practice, he utilized the best means available within his limited authority for the development of the "Plattsburg" idea. Every summer the regiments of the Regular Army stationed in the Champlain valley were assembled in a camp at Plattsburg, New York, in order to provide the necessary facilities for the more advanced instruc-

tion, and an expert from West Point, Captain Koehler, was called upon to direct the mass training in athletics. We recall with pleasure the marches of concentration along the shores and around the foot of Lake Champlain, by way of Lacolle and Rouse's Point. What true cavalryman would not have been thrilled by the sight of all the horses of an entire regiment slaking their thirst at the same time in the crystal waters of the bay near North Hero! We did not wait for permission to pass through foreign territory to be arranged through the sluggish channels of the State Department. The British Empire was at war, and the local Canadian authorities were not putting any obstacles in the way of the training of American troops.

The work of the training camps was wonderful. Even the skeptics who had contended that trained and disciplined troops could not be produced in less than two years, were surprised at the results. It soon became evident that intelligence, diligence and the will to win go a long way in transforming young recruits into soldiers fit for war.

The course of events confirmed the correctness of the Plattsburg idea, which had been

developed in an official atmosphere distinctly hostile. Its adoption by the government, on a large scale, became imperative when war was declared; but this recognition did not help the personal fortunes of those who had been its principal advocates. The king can do no wrong!

The progress of the war seemed to make little difference in our daily life. We saw no signs of preparation against a not improbable involvement in the world conflict. No plans were drawn up by our General Staff for the contingency of war with the Central Powers, although excellent reports on army organization had been received from our military attachés in Europe as early as February, 1915.

It is not likely that the War Plans Division of the General Staff completely ignored the most important duty for which it had been created. The lips of the officers, of course, are sealed and the details of this question may never be divulged, but the presumption is very strong that the study of plans for war actually was commenced, and then was stopped by orders from the highest authority, who probably looked upon work of this kind, highly confidential though it was, as a military ges-

ture not to be tolerated. The most devout Dunker or Dukhobor would have been pleased to learn of such an exhibition of applied pacifism.

There was, however, one case of indirect influence on our fortunes by the war which may be worth mentioning. General Funston made repeated and urgent requests for the assignment of the 2d Cavalry to duty on the Mexican frontier. All of them were denied, and after the sixth application the general received an intimation to ask no more. Afterwards we learned that the presence of mobile troops of the Regular Army near our northern frontier was regarded with satisfaction by the British government as a measure of protection for the International Railways which had been disturbed by threats and some actual damage.

There is no better illustration of the lack of preparation of our government for a great armed conflict than the fact that two new weapons, the Browning Machine Gun and the Browning Automatic Rifle, were not adopted until nearly two months after the declaration of war. These arms did not become available in quantity until about seventeen months later, a few weeks before the armistice.

The Board on Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles, convened by the War Department in 1916, was to meet again on the last of April, 1917, having conceded to the inventors more than six months in which to produce weapons, in duplicate, for the firing tests. A few days before the date fixed, Mr. Bascom Little, civilian member of the Board, met me at Springfield, Mass. Some young officers on duty at the Armory remarked, in conversation, that the program adopted was a very thorough one and would keep the Board busy for six months. It occurred to me at once to ask Mr. Little, who was personally acquainted with the Secretary of War, to take the next train for Washington and urge the Secretary to put "skids under the board" and expedite its decision.

When the Board met a telegram had arrived directing prompt action and a report within one month. The President of the Board never found out why the Secretary demanded such unusual speed, but the tests of the fifteen types of guns submitted were completed and the report rendered at the end of the prescribed time. Yet this was seven weeks after our declaration of war!

In the early spring of 1917 naval detachments and 6-inch guns were placed on board American passenger ships as a defense against submarines. The people in the Green Mountain country organized a committee of Public Safety which pledged the credit of the state and entered into contracts for equipment, after they found that the United States government could do nothing for them.

In the classes of officers and ladies formed in midwinter for the study of foreign languages, the pupils, in addition to Spanish, gave preference to German because it was the language of the prospective enemy, and because many of the officers already had a fair knowledge of French. This choice turned out to be a mistake, for a year later, in France, we found ourselves in a situation similar to that of officers of the French Army who, while serving on the General Staff, had acquired a speaking knowledge of German, by order. They had failed to study English, and we had neglected our French; very few of the American officers could converse in French, and hardly any of the French higher officers could speak English. Hence, when they met on official occasions and at social functions, as they did

almost daily, there were highly entertaining reciprocal barrages of linguistic atrocities. There was practically no occasion for the use of the German language except by interpreters—of whom great numbers were available in the Allied Armies—in the examination of prisoners.

In the summer of 1917 the 2d Regiment of Cavalry, which had a fine record of more than eighty years, beginning with the Florida War in 1835, was divided into three equal parts, in compliance with orders from the War Department, in order to form two additional regiments. This was an unpleasant duty, but it was performed impartially. The two new regiments, designated as the 18th and 19th Cavalry, afterwards to be changed to the 76th and 77th Regiments of Field Artillery, were soon encamped on the drill grounds, recruits were assigned and training was commenced without delay.

In the latter part of August we bade farewell to the green hills and bucolic surroundings of our Vermont home, to the excursions on the lake, and to the exhilarating gallops across country. We were off for a scene of greater activity.

II

CAMP GREENE

UPON arrival at Battle Creek, Michigan, on August 25, 1917, my first large command, the 85th Division, was in process of organization. The government had acquired a tract of about twelve square miles, lying between Battle Creek and the village of Augusta, nine miles to the west. The terrain was quite diversified and included hill country of glacial formation, several small lakes and some marshes. The greater part of the tract was level and had been under cultivation. The soil was sandy and the drainage good. The highway from Battle Creek to Kalamazoo passed through the tract, and two railroads were conveniently accessible. These were favorable conditions for a training area, and they contributed materially to the rate of instruction of the troops.

The construction of barracks, office buildings, storehouses, hospitals, etc., was well under way. Target ranges for infantry,

machine guns and artillery were completed during October. With a little stimulation by the purchase of heating stoves and window sash in open market, and guidance as to concentration of construction work, the barracks of the cantonment, which was called Camp Custer, were completed as needed and made comfortable before the arrival of severe winter weather, in spite of scandalous profiteering by the labor forces.

The contingents of the draft were guided to the receiving station, where the men were immediately examined by medical officers. The sick were sent to the hospital, and suspicious cases were segregated until freedom from disease could be established. The health of the command thus was safeguarded, and it remained good to the end.

The division soon took shape and, under intensive training, had acquired a fair degree of efficiency, when large drafts were ordered to the 32d Division in Texas, for early service abroad. On another occasion the experts of the various crafts were culled out to be sent across the Atlantic to assist in the construction of the base and line of communications in France. There also was some uncertainty as

to the formation of the larger units, especially the depot organizations. It began to look as if our division was to be devoted principally to the filling up of other divisions and the furnishing of replacements. These factors naturally had a discouraging effect and delayed the completion of preparation for field service.

In the latter part of November a telegram from the War Department directed me to report in person to General W. H. Carter, in Chicago, for consultation. This was camouflage, for instead of a consultation there was a board of medical officers to determine my fitness for service in the field. Next morning telegraphic orders directed me to proceed to Camp Greene, North Carolina, to assume command of the 3d (Regular) Division at that point. My work of three months with the 85th Division, and my pleasant associations with the people of Battle Creek and Kalamazoo, thus were abruptly terminated; but as the transfer was a definite indication of early service in France, this was no time for regrets.

More than twelve years before the war a recommendation was made to the General Staff that a committee be designated for an exhaustive study of the subject of camp sites

for the assembly and training of large bodies of troops, with a view to tentative selection of a number of places satisfying the more important conditions of castrametation and instruction. Nothing came of it, for the time had not arrived—if, indeed, it ever will—when considerations of the health and comfort of large numbers of soldiers, and efficiency of government service, could outweigh the demands of influential politicians for patronage.

As a result of this neglect we had some deplorable camp sites when an emergency came, notably the one at Texas City, which was flooded, and the one at Charlotte, North Carolina, which bogged down in the mire of winter. In the latter place, Camp Greene, more than 50,000 men were subjected to months of discomfort and some actual suffering, and for weeks at a time training was impossible. The conditions were so bad that the camp commander asked for pack-trains so as to insure the delivery of food to the regiments, teams of six mules being hardly able to draw empty army wagons through the mud. The police of the camp, transfer of the sick to the hospitals, and the transportation of fuel and supplies, presented serious difficulties. A canton-

ment in the wintry North, with comfortable barracks, and hard frozen ground for training, was considered in many respects preferable to a tent camp in the raw and rainy climate and deep red mud of the so-called "Sunny South."

The Mayor of Charlotte, Mr. F. R. McNinch, and his associates in the city government, sympathized with us and did everything possible to relieve the situation, but it was not until February 23 that the repairs of the Tuckaseegee road were completed, giving us one good highway into the city.

The 3d and 4th Divisions (Regulars) and some other units were in training at Camp Greene, a total of about 60,000 men. While in command of the entire camp, my immediate concern was with the 3d Division,¹ whose infantry regiments and machine-gun battalions were present in the camp; the remaining units of this division were scattered over a wide area and did not join until after arrival in France—some as late as the eve of battle, July 14, 1918.

¹ THIRD DIVISION.

At Camp Greene, N. C.

Fifth Infantry Brigade: 4th Infantry; 7th Infantry;
8th M. G. Battalion.

Sixth Infantry Brigade: 30th Infantry; 38th Infantry;
9th M. G. Battalion.

In the training we had the assistance of ten British and five French officers who were specialists in the grenade, bayonet fighting, trench mortars, field fortification, gas, etc. Great attention had been devoted to instruction in defensive warfare, grenades and the bayonet being considered equal to if not superior in value to rifle fire. This looked like false doctrine and was a departure from the traditional American dependence on skill with the rifle. No time was lost in changing this system of instruction. A course in rifle firing for all the combat troops was started under the supervision of Colonel Cromwell Stacey; trench warfare was relegated to second place, and the command required to specialize in discipline, marching, target practice, and development of the spirit of the offensive. A letter from the Commander-in-Chief in France soon confirmed

Third Field Artillery Brigade: 10th Regiment, Douglas, Arizona; 18th Regiment, Fort Bliss, Texas; 76th Regiment, Hattiesburg, Miss.

Seventh M. G. Battalion.

Sixth Engineer Regiment: Washington Barracks, D. C.

Fifth Field Signal Battalion: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Military Police, Supply Train and Ammunition Train:
Chickamauga Park, Ga.

Sanitary Train, Ambulance Companies and Field Hospitals: Fort Clark and Leon Springs, Texas.

this policy. Evidently he intended to go after the enemy and not continue waiting for them to attack. Good progress was made along all the lines of training before the ground became too soft under the prolonged rains of winter.

A discussion arose in the local paper in regard to discipline and military courtesy. The editor of the *Charlotte News and Observer* seemed to prefer the *camaraderie* of the French Army to the American system of discipline, which was based on that of the Regular Army and West Point, and advocated social equality between officers and enlisted men when not within the limits of the camp. In addition to leading articles by the editor, numerous letters appeared in the *Observer*. A senator from North Carolina addressed the Secretary of War on the subject, and quite a campaign was started for the modification of our system of discipline. The reply of the Secretary never was communicated to us, but we were apprehensive of interference. Finally the editor sent me a long letter setting forth his opinions and requesting an expression as to my attitude on the subject. This was a good opportunity for imparting my views to the command and settling the controversy, as far as they were con-



Photo by Geo. A. Seitz, Syracuse, N. Y.

(Left to Right) GOVERNOR BICKETT, NORTH CAROLINA; GENERAL DICKMAN, 3^D DIVISION; COLONEL BALLANTYNE, 1ST MAINE HEAVY ARTILLERY; CAPTAIN BOUCHER, FRENCH ARMY

cerned. Accordingly, the following letter was submitted for publication:

Headquarters, Camp Greene,
Charlotte, N. C.
December 24, 1917

The *Charlotte Daily News*,
Charlotte, N. C.

Recalling the story of the celebrated French critic who fell asleep during the rehearsal of a new play, and when asked for his vote stated that sleep is an opinion, I have thought that profound silence on my part during the controversy raging in your columns on the question of the social relations between officers and soldiers, would be accepted as a sufficient indication of my views. However, since you seem to insist upon it, I have no hesitation in being more explicit.

Custom of the service, from time immemorial, has discouraged social relations between officers and soldiers. A number of reasons could be advanced in favor of this part of the system, but I realize that it would be unprofitable to dwell upon them under present conditions.

This is no time to concern ourselves with the supposed desires of officers, or the

alleged aspirations of a small part of the soldiers, or even the social embarrassments of the people referred to in your letter. There is only one consideration that is worth while, and that is the building of a fighting machine that will defeat the enemy and end the war.

When this war is won, and officers and soldiers return to the people whence they came, they can slap each other's backs, live in the same room, drink out of the same cup, and run for office on the same ticket to their hearts' content; but just now we must take advantage of every feature that will contribute to the efficiency of the army, even if it be irksome and unpleasant.

Brushing aside all minor considerations there remains only the simple question, Is restriction of social intercourse between officers and soldiers conducive to discipline?

Experienced officers of the National Guard and Volunteer Forces have no difficulty in answering this question; they know the rock on which discipline so often has split. Large employers of labor, such as managers of railroads and steamship lines, also know the value of discipline;

liquor was banished by them long before it was driven from the army.

Nothing contributes more powerfully to the establishment of sound discipline than treatment of the men that is absolutely impartial and just. If the captain at social functions is intimate with some of the privates, can he be impartial in the duties of the camp?

And even if, as an exceptional character, such should be the case, would the others believe it? A feeling of resentment against discrimination and favoritism would be almost sure to arise. The safest rule is to have no friends to reward and no enemies to punish.

My conclusion from this one reason alone is that the custom of non-intercourse, socially, between officers and soldiers, is a good one and should be adhered to. If you don't believe it, ask any good soldier.

He who sows discord in our ranks is a comfort to the Kaiser.

To army inspectors, to visiting officers of the American and foreign armies, and, in fact, to civilians of some experience, the neatness, military bearing and courtesy of officers and soldiers afford a con-

tinuing indication of the degree of instruction and efficiency of a command.

In order to counteract any erroneous impressions that might have been caused by this open discussion, a selected officer was designated in each battalion as special inspector and charged with supervision over the enforcement of regulations referring to neatness and military courtesy.

At the Selwyn Hotel, Charlotte, four husky athletes were observed at dinner. All of them appeared to be below twenty-five years of age, were six-footers in stature, and averaged one hundred and ninety pounds in weight. The fact that they wore a uniform closely resembling that of army officers, and bore on their sleeves the insignia of the Y.M.C.A., did not create a favorable impression.

So many religious and other bodies endeavored to establish welfare organizations with the army that the War Department was obliged to call a halt and limit its authorization to the Y.M.C.A., K. of C., Salvation Army, and Jewish Welfare Board. One officially controlled national welfare organization, in addition to the Red Cross, would have been

sufficient. Although a disappointment to slackers, it would have saved our people a lot of money, and also would have obviated sarcastic remarks on the other side.

The instruction offered by some of the foreign officers was of so elementary a character that we could not help suspecting that they had never heard of our system of military schools, culminating in the Army War College, and that their knowledge of the United States consisted principally of impressions gained from wild west shows, with their ponies, Indians and cowboys. This ignorance, to a considerable extent, was reciprocal, for few of us realized that a large part of continental Europe was centuries behind the times.

No attempt was made to stimulate the combativeness of our soldiers by stirring up exaggerated hatred, by depreciating the enemy's fighting qualities, or by vain boasting. However, to confirm their confidence in their own prowess and to heighten their morale, the men were told the facts, that after more than three years of fighting the enemy had expended his best soldiers and that the survivors were tired of the war; that his depleted ranks contained many young boys and men well past the prime

of life; that for individual contests the young American soldiers had many advantages; that, therefore, the nearer the Germans could come to us, or we to them, the better we would like it; and that the American Army was going to assume a vigorous offensive at an early date.

Just before Christmas, 1917, the following letter was published in the *Observer*; it furnishes further evidence of the efforts made by the Commanding General to secure coöperation and a good spirit throughout the camp.

Camp Greene, Charlotte, N. C.

December 21, 1917

Taking advantage of the courtesies offered by the *Observer*, the Camp Commander extends cordial greetings to the officers, soldiers, and others on government service at Camp Greene, with compliments of the season and best wishes for good cheer and enjoyment during the holidays.

The enterprise on which we expect to embark in the near future calls for the highest exercise of our mental and physical powers—first in the preparation, then in the execution. Our government has made a good start by the careful selection

of officers and the enrolment of young men in the prime of life measuring up to prescribed physical standards.

The professional instruction of officers, and the physical development and training in the use of weapons for the men, will continue, both here and abroad, until the military units are deemed competent to cope with the enemy on even terms.

In taking up the new life, the young officers and soldiers no doubt encountered features for which, at first, there did not appear to be adequate reasons; but, as training progressed, all were found to fit into the general scheme devised for the efficiency of the whole course of instruction.

The Articles of War and customs of the service are the result of centuries of experience, and therefore should not be lightly disregarded on the advice of persons devoid of knowledge of the profession of arms.

Soldiers are judged by appearances, that is, by their set-up or bearing, the neatness of their uniform, and their attention to military courtesy. To the experienced eye the bearing of soldiers shows their training and physical condition; the

uniform throws a light on the sufficiency of equipment, and, together with the observance of military courtesies, furnishes a good indication as to the spirit and discipline of a command. In order that our soldiers may not suffer in comparison with those of other armies in France, our Commanding General over there has requested that special attention be devoted to these features.

In the entire military and naval establishments of the United States there is only one man who is not required to rise in the presence of superiors, or to initiate a salute on meeting them, and that is the President. The obligation to return a salute is as binding as that to render it, and obviously officers are more frequently called upon than the men in the performance of this duty. Proper deference to superiors is enjoined at all times, and in all places, without regard to the imaginary lines serving as boundaries of camps or cantonments. The exercise of a little tact on the part of officers will relieve the awkwardness of situations which may arise accidentally through ignorance of military proprieties.

Officers who are competent, considerate

and just, will seldom have trouble with discipline in their commands. One who is not looked up to by his men cannot be an efficient leader. It will be found that the soldiers themselves are the last persons to ask that officers lower their standard of official dignity.

In campaign the officer will have to exert himself to keep up with the intelligence, enterprise and bravery of the American soldier. Any amount of necessary hardship may be demanded of him, provided he sees that his officers are willing to share it.

The solicitude of officers for the welfare of their men, and the regard of the latter for their leaders, are a sealed book for those who have never worn the uniform. In this materialistic and selfish age such sentiments are becoming only too rare. There is no greater satisfaction in this life than that enjoyed by the officer who knows that he has the unbounded confidence of his subordinates.

When these strenuous times are over and we all return to our homes, there will exist an abiding affection among all, officers and soldiers alike, who continued faithful in the performance of duty.

The course of technical instruction at Camp Greene, and the rules for the guidance of officers and soldiers, helped to lay the foundation for the subsequent efficiency of the 3d Division; and they bore fruit in mutual appreciation and cordial relations between the military and the people and their local authorities.

Soon after New Year's there were increasing indications of early departure for France. During a visit to Washington it was found that the Secretary of War had issued specific instructions to send the troops away from Camp Greene, on account of the continuation of conditions which made training impossible. As no places were designated for them to go to, and as our transfer to Europe could not be far off, the order was held up at my request.

At 5.00 P.M., February 26, Mayor McNinch of Charlotte came to say good-by, and at 9.00 P.M. our headquarters detachment, including myself, boarded the train of the Southern Railway for New York.

Thus we passed out of the academic stage of the war.

III

CHÂTEAUVILLAIN

AT noon, March 4, 1918, the great ship on which we had embarked cleared the "Hook" after more than three hours of the combined efforts of nine powerful tugs, devoted to its passage down the bay. Formerly the *Vaterland*, now the *Leviathan*, but familiarly known to soldiers of Hebrew ancestry as the *Levi Nathan*, this floating city carried nine thousand military passengers and a crew of seventeen hundred. The destination of the vessel was not made known, and the only clue we had to its course was the daily advancement of the clock and changes in temperature. There was no convoy, reliance being placed on the speed of the ship and a zigzag course for protection against submarines.

Several hundred miles southwest of Ireland we were met by seven American destroyers as an escort into Liverpool, where we arrived on the twelfth, without incident. The naval offi-

cers on board told us that the *Vaterland*, while in charge of the Shipping Board, was looted unmercifully by laborers and officials alike, and that furnishings and equipment to the value of more than a million dollars had been carried off; and that there was also the usual profiteering by labor, which would not work except at high prices and overtime.

We heard ominous stories about the treatment of American sailors in Ireland, of how the American flag was hissed and our men stoned in the streets of the cities so that shore leave had to be denied. It was reported that the labor unions in England had assumed a threatening attitude towards the government, and that it was difficult to get ships recoaled and cargo moved.

A general air of pessimism and lack of confidence in the outcome of the war seemed to pervade the country. The Colonials and the Tommies looked down upon each other, and hence did not get along well together. Friction was also reported between the Americans and the English, the latter stating that the Americans had delayed coming across for fear of being licked, to which the Americans retorted that the British were already whipped,

and that they had hurried over to help them out.

After a dinner in the Hotel Rubens, in London, the waiter was unable to figure out the share of each guest in a party of seven. The problem also was too much for the lady clerk at the office, and we finally had to make our own division; but it afforded a very satisfactory demonstration of the cumbersome character of the British currency, and an argument for adoption of a decimal system.

There was a story in circulation that the Germans made a special effort to "get" the *Vaterland*, that fifty submarines were assigned to the job, and that only a fog and the escort of destroyers enabled us to escape. This is another illustration of the fact that good stories seldom fail to put in their appearance in places where it is certain that they will fit well.

The British army was known to be three hundred thousand men short and unable to obtain replacements, unless the home defense army of over one million men could be drawn upon. A plan advocated at this time was to utilize the American battalions immediately and, under pretext of necessity for training and experience, to incorporate them in the

British divisions in order to bring them up to war strength. Our attaché reported that the French also were "all in."

Although the outlook was far from cheerful, these tales did not affect us seriously. We made due allowance for war conditions and were undisturbed in our belief that there could not be a successful outcome of the war for the Kaiser until he had defeated the four million young Americans on the way, or ready to come over, and whose arrival his submarines did not seem able to prevent; that a local success, or even the fall of Paris, would not mean the surrender of Uncle Sam.

On the train at Boulogne a French army officer seized one of the compartments which had been assigned to our party, and locked the door. A French lady was put into another of our compartments with four of our officers, her husband sleeping on the floor of the corridor outside the door. Mr. Lundh, Secretary of the Norwegian legation, had an apartment all to himself, but he very kindly asked me to share it with him. After a night of discomfort we arrived in Paris in the morning of the sixteenth. This was our first contact with the French official class. We received a poor im-

pression as to the efficiency of this particular railroad, and of the courtesy of its management. However, we made allowances for the confusion and stress of war, and for the fact that the enemy's lines were not far away.

In Paris we lunched with the American Provost Marshal General, Lewis, and General Ph—— of the British Army, who confirmed the rumor that a peace offer is to be made. The Germans are to surrender Belgium, sell their colonies and use the proceeds in restoring Belgium; a buffer state is to be made of Alsace and Lorraine, and the Germans are to have a free hand in Russia. He also stated that the French are very pessimistic, but that he thinks that the object in part is to induce the British to occupy a larger part of the trench system, and to speed up the American ships and troops. Also that the English and Americans are paying for everything, including rent for the trenches, and are being worked to a finish. Again we refused to join in the general pessimism.

Paris was darker than even London. Conspicuous notices in the hotels indicated the safest places in case of air raids.

After arrival at Chaumont, the Headquar-

ters of the American Expeditionary Forces, on March 17, and an interview with Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, and General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, the 3d Division was assigned to the Ninth Area for billeting and training. The territory thus made available extended twenty miles from north to south and fifteen miles from east to west, and occupied the west central portion of the Department of Haute-Marne, about ten miles west of Chaumont. The country was of rolling character, with cultivation in the lowlands and extensive forests on the high ground and hilltops. Two small streams taking their rise in the plateau of Langres flowed through this area, the Aujon passing through the center and the Aube along the western boundary. There were in this territory forty-six small towns and villages, of which Châteauvillain and Arc-en-Barrois were the largest, affording rather scanty facilities for billeting of twenty thousand officers and soldiers; but the three hundred square miles of surface furnished admirable terrain for training and tactical exercises.

Chaumont, *chef-lieu* of the Department of Haute-Marne, is a typical French town of the

provinces. The architecture shows traces of Spanish influence and in some places reminds one of Cuba and the Philippines. At the time of Spanish dominion in the Netherlands this town probably was on one of the land routes; anyway, there are stores making a specialty of Spanish goods, and itinerant peddlers from Spain penetrated this far into the north of France—not without the suspicion that many of them were German spies.

A group of large stone buildings around a rectangle in the edge of Chaumont, known as Damremont Barracks, had been set aside by the French government for use as Headquarters of the American Army, and apparently provided sufficient office space. A number of portable buildings, called Adrian Barracks, were set up in the vicinity for residential and other purposes.

A staff school had been established at Langres, a town about twenty miles south-southeast from Chaumont, where selected officers were required to study the American system of organization and staff administration in its latest developments, with incidental consideration of the French staff system.

The history of this region runs back to long

before the Christian era. The position on the high ground at Langres was greatly strengthened by the massive walls erected by Julius Cæsar, and twelve macadamized roads, some of them still in use, radiating from that city, were built by his legions during interludes between military operations.

The records are said to show that this region has, since the time of Cæsar, been invaded forty-two times by the Germans. This may explain why those who can afford the cost of construction have a *cave voûtée*, or bomb-proof cellar, corresponding to the cyclone cellar of Kansas, to which the owner and his friends retire when the shells begin to fly. The recent great increase in the caliber of field artillery indicates quite clearly the necessity of a change in the type of cellar, if protection is to be secured in future wars.

Rapid inspection of the towns of the training area, and visits to the departments at General Headquarters, took up the next few days. On the 21st of March the Headquarters of the 3d Division were established in the town of Châteauvillain. Office facilities were found to be poor, but sufficient, temporarily.

At this time it was stated in official circles

that the Germans, in addition to superiority in the air, had about twenty per cent superiority in man power. It is generally accepted that, other things being equal, a superiority of at least twenty per cent is necessary for carrying on a successful offensive. This would require an increase of about fifty per cent in the numerical strength of the Allied Forces. Assuming the Germans as incapable of further increase, and the British and French as "all in," the requisite increase of the Allied Forces could come from only one source, namely, the United States of America. The arrival of 1,500,000 Americans, therefore, was necessary to furnish a fair prospect of success in pushing forward to a considerable distance. As these would all be only partially trained and inexperienced in war, and as the fighting qualities of the Yankee soldiers had yet to be demonstrated, it is small wonder that our Allies failed to take a rosy view of the situation at this time when, moreover, owing to lack of shipping, our arrivals had not yet reached large proportions.

As soldiers from the four continents of the Eastern Hemisphere arrived at the Western Front, the higher staffs already there, of

course, made estimates of their probable military value. To experienced observers many indications as to prospective efficiency were available before the actual test of battle. It is told of a newly arrived division that the British Staff took notice of certain deficiencies in its means of communication, and in a spirit of co-operation and encouragement sent a carefully selected basket of highly trained war pigeons to the incoming staff, with a courteous letter of welcome signed by the Chief of Staff himself. In a few days there came a faultlessly worded and beautifully written reply of acknowledgment and appreciation, stating that they had enjoyed the pigeons very much! It seemed evident that the recipients of the pigeons were better versed in gastronomical than in strategical and tactical lore. In the case of the American troops about to arrive, the most that our Allies would concede at this time was an attitude of hopefulness as to quality, as well as to quantity and promptness of arrival.

It was somewhat surprising to find so great a portion of the country in forest, or untouched by the plow. The high ground in many cases was unsuitable for cultivation, and the towns

clung to their *forêts domaniales*. With primitive methods of tilling the soil and harvesting the crops the lack of labor was severely felt. Introduction of modern agricultural machinery and scientific methods of treating the soil would permit great extension of the cultivated areas.

There is more game and better shooting in the heart of France than in most of our states. Under the leadership of M. Pol Antoine, of Chaumont, several boar hunts in the large forests of our neighborhood were organized. There was no seasonal restriction on the shooting of the boar, for this beast multiplies rapidly and is very destructive of crops. In the silence of the forest, when the wind was in a favorable direction, we could hear distinctly the booming of the great guns in battle, more than one hundred miles to the northwest. This gave us all a moment of pause and serious reflection. The most enjoyable part of the hunt to me was the hunt breakfast served at some farm or hunting lodge, at about eleven o'clock. Good food, stories, and wines circulated freely in a cordial and congenial company.

In other ways cordial relations were established with the French people. My billet was

in the house of Madame Frossard, a relative of the French general of the war of 1870. We took our meals, for a time, in the house of the Mayor, M. Péron. One of the many lovely spots in France which will never fade from our memory is the garden of M. Cousin, in the heart of Châteauvillain. Residing on the bank of the Aujon, the owner diverted part of its clear waters for purposes of irrigation and to provide fish weirs, frog hatcheries and trout ponds. On account of its favorable location in a sheltered valley he was able to raise fruits and vegetables far north of their usual habitat; but at this season of the year the garden served principally as a hiding place for valuables and stores of Chablis and Château-Yquem. M. Cousin said that the supplies were hidden in accordance with a chart which he had memorized, and that the Germans would never be able to find any of them. Of course, we did not look when he went out to dig in the garden—not for potatoes, but for vinous refreshment.

It was gratifying to receive from all parts of the area reports of the friendly relations existing between our officers and soldiers and the French people. It is certain that we left

behind us an enduring and favorable impression of the young American soldier from beyond the seas.

One by one the various features of the organization and instruction of the division were taken up as the troop units arrived and the means of transportation and equipment became available. As our training area was close to Army Headquarters and on the road to Paris, it was realized that we would come under the daily observation of officers of high rank of our own and other armies, and that, naturally, we would be judged by appearances. We also were not unmindful of the importance which our Commander-in-Chief attached to those outward signs which furnished him with indications as to the state of discipline and efficiency of a command. So here was an unusual opportunity for starting the division off on the right foot by acquiring a preliminary reputation for neatness, soldierly bearing and attention to military courtesy. Previous instructions issued at Camp Greene were repeated and enlarged upon, and with the coöperation of regimental and other commanders, excellent results were achieved in a short time. Favorable unofficial remarks

of observers soon began to drift back to us, to the general satisfaction of all ranks.

In the month of April a number of Y.M.C.A. officials were moving about in our training area, and the division commander was called upon frequently to open new Y huts with an address. Two ladies belonging to this organization arrived from Paris in an expensive French limousine, and they were assigned to billets which had been reserved for officers. The Y furnished its own equipment, and at the rate money was being spent we feared that \$70,000,000 raised by drives in the United States would not last long. The French were too polite to comment on the *Y-grecques*, as they called them, but when one of them was introduced as major to a French *Commandant* (major), the latter did not take to it very kindly, aware, presumably, that the Y huts had the same functions as the French *foyers du soldat*.

By the twenty-first of April the Infantry Regiments of the Division, 4th, 7th, 30th, and 38th, had arrived; on the 28th we were furnished with the final training schedule from Army Headquarters.

On the second of May delivery was made

of the horses for the division, obtained from the French authorities. The animals were run down in flesh and otherwise in poor condition, due apparently to hard service and short forage. There were no stables in the area and there was no lumber for the construction of shelters. These conditions presented another serious problem, namely, how to render these animals fit for field service. By the construction of well-drained picket lines so as to provide a dry footing; by the erection of wind-breaks and shelters of pine boughs to mitigate the inclemencies of the weather; by most stringent orders in regard to feeding, watering, grooming, and exercise; and by the unremitting supervision and inspections of the division commander, a great improvement was effected in a few weeks, and another feather in the cap added to the reputation of the 3d Division.

On May 8 it was my good fortune to witness a terrain exercise, as part of the training schedule of the 32d Division, commanded by Major General W. G. Haan, with headquarters at Prauthoy. The exercise was conducted under the supervision of the Corps Commander and his staff and was held in the re-

gion southeast of Langres. The American doughboys from Michigan and Wisconsin did not know that they were tramping the very fields on which the legions of Julius Cæsar, in the year 52 B.C., defeated and pursued the hosts of Vercingetorix, the most noted of the chieftains of Gaul who ever rose against the power of Rome.

Favorable weather enabled the division to make rapid progress in its training schedule, which was to culminate in a number of field exercises intended principally for practice in communications, or liaison, and in the exercise of command by the chiefs of the different units, including the division commander. The last of these exercises was staged in the valley of the Aube, south of Dinteville, on May 24, and was held under the eye of General Pershing and the supervision of his staff.

The progress of events now became rapid. The French were driven from the Chemin des Dames, and the Germans were headed for Paris. The 3d Division was destined for a quiet sector north of Toul, in conformity with the practice of giving the divisions some trench experience before ordering them to the active front. My preliminary reconnaissance with a

view to relieving the 26th Division took place at Boucq on May 28; but recall came by telephone in a few hours and our destination was changed to the Vosges, between Thann and St. Dié, movement to begin May 31.

However, the torrential progress of the Germans and their rapid approach to the Marne, in the region of Château-Thierry, made another change necessary, and the 3d Division was told to prepare for immediate field service. All surplus property was stored, and the division found itself under French command, to help in stemming the tide of invasion. In the afternoon of May 30 the 7th Machine Gun Battalion left in its own motors for Condé-en-Brie, with orders to proceed at speed; the Infantry Brigades were entrained at Bricon and Latrécey; and the first post of command (P. C.) of the Division in the field, was designated as Condé-en-Brie, about one hundred miles to the northwest.

With gas masks, steel helmets, pistols, maps, and other paraphernalia of the panoply of war stowed in our Cadillac, we started for the front in the early morning of May 31, and proceeded via Bar-sur-Aube, Brienne, Arcis, Anglure, Sézanne and Montmirail. North of Sézanne

the roads were filled with refugees of every age and description, including soldiers, who were hurrying south as if Attila, the Scourge of God, himself were on their trail.

At Montmirail where we entered a café in a futile endeavor to secure a bite of lunch, we found three ladies in the uniform of the Red Cross, Miss Wiborg of New York, Lady A—— of England, and an old friend, Mrs. Herbert G. Squiers, who was in charge of the American Red Cross Hospital at Montmirail, and whom we had last seen at an entertainment given by her on the marble steamboat built on the shore of the artificial lake near the Summer Palace of the Empress Dowager of China, in the fall of 1900. The town was almost completely deserted, and these ladies stated that they were the only ones left to care for two hundred wounded who had been abandoned in the general panic. French officers advised our men to turn back, saying that it was useless to try to stop the Germans whose artillery shells already were exploding in the town of Condé-en-Brie, a few miles to the north. These were pictures of grim war!

IV

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

1. DEFENSIVE

WHEN the 7th Machine Gun Battalion of the 3d Division arrived at Condé-en-Brie, at about noon of May 31, the confusion of the general retreat was so great that it was difficult to locate the front and to find the higher commanders. After some delay, General Renouard, commander of a French Division, assumed the responsibility of ordering the battalion to Château-Thierry.

From the high ground at the town of Nesles, a little over one mile south of Château-Thierry, where the battalion arrived with most of its guns but only half of its personnel, at 3.30 P.M., a preliminary reconnaissance was made and the guns then promptly assigned to positions along the south bank of the Marne, except two guns under Lieutenant Bissell, which were stationed at the first crossroads just north of the main bridge in Château-Thierry, so as

to command the approaches from the north and east. By daylight of June 1 all available guns were in their final positions under cover, Company A with eight guns defending the main or wagon bridge, and Company B with nine guns covering the approaches to the railroad bridge, about five hundred yards to the east. The Germans at this time were already in the northern edge of the town.

French troops passed through our lines all day of June 1. At the same time there was sniping and machine-gun and artillery fire going on, but this was but the prelude to the strong attacks launched late in the day. Some of the fighting had reached the bridge itself when it was blown up at 10.00 P.M., destroying friend and foe alike. All our machine guns were then turned on the approaches to the bridge and on the Germans massed in the square for the attack, causing rapid dispersal of their forces. Subsequent attacks also were turned back without difficulty.

Lieutenant Bissell and his platoon, cut off by the explosion, made their way to the railroad bridge, a difficult feat in the night, and while preparing to swim the river were rescued through the intelligence and bravery of Lieu-

tenant Cobbey who heard their call from the far end of the bridge and went out to meet them and guide them in.

In the early morning of June 1 a column of German troops advancing in dense formation and without precautions, on the road west of Brasles, was surprised by fire and dispersed. An attack made immediately after Lieutenant Bissell's return across the railroad bridge was readily repulsed; other attacks shared the same fate. In the night of June 3-4 the railroad bridge also was blown up, thus severing all connection with the north bank.

For these exploits the battalion received credit in the following citation:

Under command of Major Taylor, barred to the enemy the passage of the MARNE. In the course of violent combat, particularly the 31st of May and the 1st of June, 1918, it disputed foot by foot with the Germans the northern outskirts of Château-Thierry, covered itself with incomparable glory, thanks to its valor and its skill, costing the enemy sanguinary losses.

PÉTAÏN
Marshal of France

However, the home papers, referring to this action, in many cases gave the credit to the Marines, and published the saying: "With the help of God and a few Marines we stopped the Germans at Château-Thierry."

In the official *History of the United States Marine Corps in the World War* no claim is made of participation by marines in the fighting at Château-Thierry on this or any other occasion. At the time when the Germans were attacking the bridges at Château-Thierry, much larger forces continued to advance on a wide front towards the south and west, on their way towards Paris, until halted by the deployment of the 2d Division along the general line Bois des Clerembauts—Lucy-le-Bocage—Marigny, the right being across the Paris road about five miles west of Château-Thierry. So that, while a few hundred machine gunners of the 3d Division delayed the Germans in the northern outskirts of Château-Thierry, gained time for the withdrawal of the outnumbered French troops, and prevented crossing of the bridges until they could be blown up, to the entire 2d Division, including not "a few" but all of the marines, belongs the

credit of stopping the general advance of the enemy in that part of the Château-Thierry sector nearest to Paris.

As the Marne empties into the Seine south of Paris, the destruction of the bridges turned out to be to the advantage of the Germans in that it added to the security of their left flank in their advance on the French capital, which could be reached without crossing the river.

The operations of three American divisions in rapid succession, the 1st capturing Cantigny May 28, the 3d stopping the Germans at Château-Thierry June 1, and the 2d barring the Château-Thierry road to Paris, exerted a wonderful influence on French morale. *Enfin, voici les Américains!*

The movement of the 7th Machine Gun Battalion from La Ferté-sur-Aube to Nesles, via Condé-en-Brie, presented many evidences of lack of experience and of inefficiency and weakness. However, the intelligence and initiative of the second officer in command, Captain Charles F. Houghton, and the zeal, courage and endurance of the junior officers and men, made good nearly all of the deficiencies and brought about a successful and highly creditable outcome of the operation as a whole.

After one day at Condé-en-Brie, the Headquarters of the 3d Division was moved to Viels-Maisons, which was also the post of command of General de Mondesir, commanding the XXXVIIIth French Corps, to which we had been assigned. My residence, temporarily, was in the house of M. Boyer, who had recently gone south on a vacation, and who had been thoughtful enough to leave his safe unlocked so as to save the clumsy German soldiers the trouble of opening it with dynamite.

In conformity with the French policy of giving the American divisions instruction and experience, our regiments and battalions were scattered, laterally, over a wide area, extending from Courthiézy on the east to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre on the west; and they performed a variety of duties, such as occupying front line positions, guarding bridges, and constructing trench systems and other defensive works.

During the first two weeks in June our regiments, and even smaller units, were subjected to frequent shifting of position. The 4th Infantry underwent five changes, and the 7th Infantry four; the other regiments had less of this annoyance.

On the eleventh of June the 7th Infantry,

which had been on duty in the Courthiézy-Reuilly sector, was assembled at Condé-en-Brie, moved to Saacy and set to work on a bridgehead north of the Marne, between Nanteuil and Les Jardinets. On the fifteenth the Commanding General of the Sixth French Army assigned the regiment to the 2d American Division, and its 1st Battalion relieved two battalions of marines in the northern part of the Bois de Belleau. On the sixteenth the 2d Battalion relieved the marines between the Bois de Belleau and Bouresches; and on the seventeenth the 3d Battalion went into line south of Torcy. Thus all three battalions of the regiment were in front line, from Bouresches to Torcy, and under command of a colonel of marines.

The 1st Battalion faced the Germans in the northern edge of the woods, where, from a densely overgrown and strongly organized rocky ridge, they had conducted a successful defense for over a week. The marines did not have sufficient remaining strength to carry the position and had been withdrawn for recuperation and replacements.

The attacks launched against this position by the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the

mornings of the nineteenth and twentieth of June, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Frank H. Adams, were unsuccessful, the casualties amounting to twenty-five per cent. In the meantime the 3d Battalion made an advance of one kilometer to a position about six hundred yards south of Torcy with but little loss, for which it received the commendation of the temporary regimental commander.

The principal causes for this lack of success, which did not constitute a reflection of the valor of the 1st Battalion, may be briefly stated as follows:

- (a) Training incomplete,
- (b) First time in action,
- (c) Not familiar with the country,
hence difficulty of orientation
and coöperation,
- (d) Inadequate artillery preparation,
far below what was
promised and expected.

The contribution of the 7th Infantry to the casualties of Belleau Wood amounted to 51 killed, 265 wounded and 34 missing; total, 350, nearly all in the 1st Battalion. The experience gained was of value and received application in a great battle three weeks later.

The lines intact, or slightly advanced, were relinquished on the twenty-first, and the re-constituted marines completed the capture of Belleau Wood, after an intensive artillery preparation, four days later, on June 25, and occupied the northern edge on the twenty-sixth.

The disruption of the 3d Division and scattering of its units over a wide area, under foreign superiors, while carrying out the policy of the French high command, afforded neither instruction nor profitable experience. It was bad military ethics and was bound to leave sore spots. It placed the regiments at a disadvantage among strangers, retarded the development of the division, delayed the construction of defensive works, and reflected on the regimental and higher commanders and staff.

But, the emergency was very great, and nothing could be gained by protest or controversy. We could only bide our time.

On June 3 about one hundred prisoners were paraded in the public square at Viels-Maisons. At the command of an Alsatian officer they performed the "Parademarsch" or goose step; although tired, footsore and dejected they did

it very well. This form of humor seemed to appeal to the audience, who did not realize that it was a wonderful display of spirit and discipline.

On June 6 General Duchesne, Commander of the Sixth French Army, ordered that the 3d Division be given a sector in the line. This indicated lack of unanimity among the higher-ups as to the policy to be pursued with reference to the American divisions, and foreshadowed an early change. We remained only a few hours in the first post of command indicated for us under the new arrangement by the Corps Chief of Staff. The place, Ferme les Alloix, is remembered on account of the lack of space for an American division, and for the presence of a huge, saturated and redolent manure pile in the center of the courtyard. We did not settle, but established ourselves in the large buildings of Les Grands Bordeaux, where the accommodations, though crude, were ample.

Work now commenced in earnest on the organization of the 3d Division sector, which eventually was to extend from the eastern suburbs of Château-Thierry to a point about six hundred yards west of Varennes, along the

south bank of the Marne. Following the meanderings of the river this would give us a front line of about seven miles. The 4th Infantry, after shifting about a good deal, got its battalions together and settled down in the regimental sector east of Château-Thierry, about June 19. The 7th Infantry was relieved from duty with the 2d Division and entered the 3d Division sector about July 1, taking position east of the 4th Infantry, with Headquarters at Le Rocq farm. These two regiments, together with the 8th Machine Gun Battalion, formed the 5th Brigade, commanded by General Sladen, with Headquarters at La Malmaison.

The 30th Infantry, which had been in support on Mont de Bonneil, and in action at Hill 304 and at Vaux, came back about June 11 and took charge of the river front from Fossoy to Mézy, the latter inclusive, with Headquarters in the Bois d'Aigremont. The 38th Infantry, after one month in the Gland sub-sector, occupied the Surmelin valley, July 3, its front extending from the railroad station at Mézy, inclusive, to the eastern limit of the Division. The 6th Brigade, commanded by General Crawford, was composed of these two

regiments and the 9th Machine Gun Battalion, and had its Headquarters at Montbazin.

The 6th Engineers arrived on the eleventh of June and established headquarters at Viffort. All the principal units of the division, except the artillery, thus were in what seemed to be definite positions before the fourth of July.

At Château La Doultre, to which we had moved our Headquarters on June 11, we were surprised to find sanitary facilities, electric lights and modern comforts. The proprietor, M. Fournier, was living, for his health, on the island of Porquerolles, in the Mediterranean. So we made our arrangements with the caretaker in regard to the property, which was practically intact. Our Corps Commander had very kindly advised us against this place on account of proximity of some heavy batteries, but the attractions outweighed the dangers. The revenues of the estate came in part from a mine in Mexico, "Las Dos Estrellas." M. Fournier had traveled extensively, which accounted for the modern equipment of his residence.

During the month of June there were many minor incidents which kept up the interest of the command, such as combats in the air, fore-

ing down or burning of balloons, frequent *alertes* or warnings of attack, and expeditions across the river for the purpose of securing prisoners and identifications. Noteworthy among the latter were the three expeditions of Captain F. M. Lasseigne, on June 14, 15, and 17, the last bringing in five prisoners. Other acts of bravery worth mentioning were those of Lieutenant F. A. Owens, 4th Infantry; Lieutenant W. H. Haynes, 38th Infantry; and Lieutenant W. R. Flannery, 7th Infantry, who, single-handed, rescued a wounded French soldier in hiding in the bushes on the opposite bank, and swam back with him to safety.

The northern boundary of the sector was formed by the canalized river Marne which, though only about fifty yards wide, is quite deep and therefore a serious obstacle to advancing troops. Coming from the east the river turns at Reuilly, and after flowing north for two miles, swings again to the west and south in the bends of Jaulgonne and Chartèves, after which there is a sweep of two miles to the south from Mont St. Père to Gland, thus forming a double-headed salient towards the north, about two miles deep and four miles

across at the base, on the line of Gland—Reuilly. The hills on the north bank of the deep valley of the Marne rise to a height of more than 400 feet and are generally wooded, thus affording excellent cover for the concealment of large bodies of troops. On the south side the high ground is further back, attaining the altitude of 550 feet above the river on the plateau of Le Rocq. In the bends there are level areas of more than a square mile each, south of Chartèves and Jaulgonne, and gently rising ground between Crezancy and Fossoy. After coming up out of the valley, the terrain to the south is practically level and most of it under cultivation, with occasional patches of woods, the largest being the Bois d'Aigremont and the Bois de la Jute.

In the eastern part of the sector the deep valley of Surmelin creek, flowing north from Condé-en-Brie to Mézy, bisects the salient and separates the wooded heights south of Varennes from the plateau of Le Rocq.

The Paris-Nancy railroad runs south of and parallel to the river, and there is a good wagon road on each bank. A branch railroad passes up the Surmelin valley, towards Montmirail from Mézy, and a highway and another good

road lead to Condé-en-Brie. As there are no other railroads and highways, between Château-Thierry and Dormans, towards the south, the Surmelin valley forms a sort of gateway of high strategical importance to an invading force from the north, aiming at Paris. The open plateau of Le Rocq provides an excellent place for assembly and deployment of troops after completion of a successful crossing. The railroad embankment and tracks furnish a mark for a rendezvous position which could not be missed in the darkest night. A glance at the map will show that the south bank of the river, all around the salient, can be subjected to enfilade and reverse fire from batteries on high ground in the Forêts de Barbillon and de Ris.

The general situation, therefore, presented favorable conditions for an offensive operation on the part of the enemy, excepting the obstacle of the river. But, it was thought that no defenders could remain on its banks under a concentrated fire of artillery, machine guns and *Minenwerfer*. A more serious obstacle was the open field of fire to the south which had to be crossed by the invaders, and the many facilities for the establishment of strong points

afforded by the terrain upon approach to the foot of the slopes.

The width of the sector was about five miles from west to east, in a straight line; but the front along the sinuosities of the river had a length of about seven miles. It was divided into four regimental sectors in which the regiments were placed side by side, arranged in the following order from west to east: 4th, 7th, 30th and 38th.

We soon realized that the French divisions with which we were associated were not counted among the best, being depleted in strength and weak in morale. Their previous record, as told to us by French officers, was not such as to inspire confidence and set a good example to our men.

The personal baggage of Major Spencer and Lieutenant Colonel Hitt was rifled in an unguarded moment at Condé-en-Brie on May 31. The packs of our machine gunners were looted at Château-Thierry during the fight with the Germans. The entire dinner of the 7th Machine Gun Battalion was stolen while the men were paraded and listening to the publication of drastic orders by the Commander of the 10th Colonial Division on the

subject of looting. On the twelfth of June the Corps Commander, General de Mondesir, inspected one of the best houses in Crezancy which had been occupied by colonial troops, and found so wanton a destruction of private property that he could not withhold an expression of disgust. It was common talk that the French peasants and villagers were less afraid of the Germans than of their own Colonials. Were these the troops to give instruction and experience in war to the young American soldier? The above incidents are related to show that the discipline of troops does not necessarily improve with the length of their service.

Towards the end of June many of our officers began to wonder if the time had not come to speak up about the formation of American corps and armies. They felt that Cantigny, Château-Thierry and Belleau Wood had shown that the American soldier was not devoid of fighting qualities, and that the discipline and control of the American forces in France during the past year had been good. We were told to wait a little, and assured that the proper organization of the American forces could not be delayed much longer.

Under the direction of our engineer officers, and with the assistance of engineer troops, the construction of defensive works, such as rifle pits, shelter trenches, dugouts, emplacements and strong points was undertaken and prosecuted with a fair degree of success. It cannot be said that the American soldier was, at any time, enthusiastic about trench warfare and the work of preparation preliminary thereto, but he did become convinced that a hole in the ground is the only means of securing partial protection from modern artillery concentrations, reaching back to a depth of ten miles.

Early in July a number of cordial letters were received with reference to our national holiday. The following is a translation of one from our Corps Commander:

July 3d, 1918

*From General de Mondesir,
Commanding XXXVIII Army Corps.
To the Commanding General,
3d Division, U. S.*

MY DEAR COMRADE:

I constitute myself the spokesman of all my troops to assure you of the fraternal sympathy with which we join in the sentiments awakened in American hearts by

the anniversary of the Day of Independence.

Already more than one of our dear and generous comrades, who came from so great a distance for this *new crusade*, have fallen upon the soil of our country. The association of combat is transformed into friendship under the fire of battle. There the brave appreciate each other!

We all address to the great American Army, and through it to the great American Nation, our salutations as brothers in arms, happy and proud to see them fighting at our side for the liberty of nations.

L. DE MONDESIR

On the fourth of July the 7th Machine Gun Battalion was paraded in La Grande Forêt, about two miles north of Viels-Maisons. After a review the Corps Commander, General de Mondesir, conferred a number of croix de guerre on machine gunners who had distinguished themselves in the action of June 1 at Château-Thierry. The Prefect of the Department of the Aisne made a brief but inspiring address, with expressions of praise and gratitude (Appendix I). In my reply (Appendix II), reference was made to the feel-

ing of gratitude existing in the American nation for the assistance rendered by the French people in the cause of our independence at a critical time, followed by the statement that now, when France was in distress, America, her big brother, had arrived to deliver powerful blows to drive the invading hordes beyond the Rhine; that we are here and are going to stay to the end.

The first of the great blows for France prophesied in my address was not long in coming, for it fell eleven days later, on July 15.

Inspection of the lines became interesting as the work progressed, and also when the enemy took to sniping at small groups with field artillery. This obliged us to go in Indian file, with distances of about fifty paces, and automobiles were required to stay well back so as not to draw fire.

Under the guidance of that brave officer, sterling character and genial comrade, Colonel de Poumayrac, and his able assistant, Major Bruant, our division machine-gun officer, Major Davidson, worked out the location of our machine guns with such skill that the arrangement was adopted as a model by the Staff



HEADQUARTERS, 3D DIVISION, CHÂTEAU LA DOULTRE
JUNE-JULY, 1918



HEADQUARTERS, I CORPS, CÔTES DE FORIMONT

(Left to Right) Major John G. MacDonnell, Captain Dumont, General Dickman

School at Langres. There were several emplacements for each gun and an extra one for the day of battle, known only to the platoon commander.

The enemy had a remarkably efficient system of securing information, and an expert personnel to make the data available to his troops. The principal sources were spies, newspaper clippings, interrogation of prisoners, observation from stationary balloons and observation posts with powerful telescopes, photographs from airplanes, listening-in with delicate instruments on telephones and wireless, and flash and sound ranging. On the day of battle, July 15, we captured German maps showing all our trenches, battery positions, dugouts, command posts, dressing stations and ammunition dumps. He even published circulars stating the strength of opposing units, with names of commanders, and making an estimate of their fighting qualities. For example:

June 22d, 1918. Prisoners of the 3d American Division. Fighting value: The 3d American Division is engaged on the front for the first time. The men have

a healthy and vigorous appearance; their raid in the Belleau Woods was carried out with audacity. The division is to be considered altogether as a good one, whose fighting value will increase with wider experience in warfare.

Judged by the events of a few weeks later, it is admitted that this estimate was not without merit.

The defensive organization of the division was in three lines. First, the Railroad Line, including positions on the river bank; second, the Aqueduct Line, indicated in a general way by the aqueduct of the Paris water supply system which followed the contour separating the plain from the hill slopes; third, the Woods Line, along the military crest of the breaks from the Le Rocq plateau towards the river. A fourth line, called the Army Line, extended from Grande Heurtebise, via Bochage, to north of Courboin and Coufremaux. There were also several *bretelle*, or switch lines, from which it was intended to face the enemy in case he effected a crossing and advanced to the plateau. Some of these switch lines were unfortunately located, for they were subjected to enfilade fire by the enemy's batteries.

Stated in a general way, the Infantry regiments occupied these positions with one battalion in the first two lines, one in the Woods Line and one in reserve. There was no reserve for the Division, except three companies of the 7th Infantry in the *bretelle* from Le Rocq to Bochage.

The 10th Field Artillery at Le Mousset and Grèves farm, supported the 6th Brigade; the 76th Field Artillery, with Headquarters at Les Petits Bordeaux, supported the 5th Brigade; the 18th Field Artillery (155 mm. howitzers) was scattered in various positions throughout the area. The 3d Field Artillery Brigade, under General Cruikshank, with Headquarters at Viffort, included in its command one battalion of 155's, three battalions of 75's, and one battery of 105's, French artillery.

The American batteries tested the firing data obtained by the French, and arranged for barrage signals and double lines of communication with the Infantry. Battle emplacements were prepared and occupied every night at midnight, but no firing therefrom was permitted. Further details in the distribution of troops are shown on the map.

The Corps Commander was very much interested in the construction of defensive works, and in personal letters urged increased activity in that respect. He said: "the bombardments to which the 2d Division, U. S., has been subjected are as *nothing* compared with the one surely in store for you . . . perhaps to-morrow. It is a mathematical certainty; the projectiles will be counted, not by hundreds, but by tens of thousands."

In his anxiety to protect our young soldiers he asked me to send some officers every day to look at the trench work of our neighbor, the 125th French Division. He did not know how sadly deficient those trenches were. My preliminary inspection revealed beautiful maps, in colors, at Division Headquarters, but the trenches were mostly "contemplated," or *en proyecto*, as the Spanish would say. In fact, why dig elaborate trenches if you don't intend to defend them? We did not undeceive our kindly chief but daily sent six officers to look at the maps and . . . trusted to our own engineers.

During the first two weeks in July we had many rumors, which caused an *alerte* nearly every night. At one time it was reported that

the Germans were coming over to help us celebrate the Fourth of July; but nothing came of it excepting a little increase in fireworks.

Our Corps Commander continued to be worried. He asked me repeatedly whether the young and inexperienced American soldiers would stand the gaff, would remain in their positions under heavy artillery fire. He said "when the German barrage comes down it will be *formidable*," and the tone in which he said it left no doubt as to his convictions on the subject. He was assured that we would stay there (*nous resterons là*).

There seemed to be some difference of opinion among French generals as to the best method of conducting a defense. Many of them, including General Gouraud, held that the front line should be occupied only lightly and that the main defense should be made farther back, after the enemy was committed to his attack. General Degoutte, our Army Commander, however, came to our headquarters on the eleventh, and after consultation with the Corps Commander, said that the Marne "must be defended with one foot in the water," and ordered heavy reënforcement of our front line. As discovery of a heavy line of

battle on the river bank would lead to its immediate destruction by the enemy's batteries delivering a concentrated enfilading and reverse fire from the hills on the north bank, this plan was recognized as a violation of fundamental principles and utterly erroneous.

Our Corps Commander, of course, could not demur, although it was a former pupil who now was giving him orders; but after departure of the Army Commander the American frame of mind was brought out by an offer to let 10,000 Germans come across to the railroad unmolested, so confident were we of ability to destroy them on the plain more than one mile deep between the railroad and the aqueduct, and long before they could reach our main line on the crest of the plateau. The proposition created a sensation at Corps Headquarters and, of course, was rejected, the reason given being that it was too dangerous; but the principal object of the bit of bravado had only been to convince our Allies that the American rifleman was not under intimidation and did not fear a contest with the Kaiser's veteran infantry. At all events, as no explicit and urgent instructions in writing were issued, execution of the order was delayed and

no material change made in our dispositions at the time.

The construction of defensive works, or organization of the ground in our sector, was seriously interfered with by frequent shifting of the units and nightly *alertes* resulting from the nervousness and lack of fixity of purpose of the French command; and while fairly good in places, there was a general absence of head cover. Rifle pits, fox holes, slit trenches and strong points afforded protection in the advanced lines, but no continuous line of trenches for the Woods Line had been developed, and the fire trenches provided only scanty shelter. A mistaken notion existed as to the amount of protection to be derived from forest growth. The frightful havoc of high explosive shell of large caliber striking in timbered areas had not been experienced.

It was known that the enemy's artillery had been heavily reënforced. Every point of importance in our sector had been registered upon.

Though nothing could be seen in the daytime, our observers repeatedly reported movements and sounds at night indicating preparations for crossing the Marne. Our intelligence

section predicted that the passage would take place upstream from Gland, and that the event was only a question of days.

Division orders were issued outlining the defense. It was prescribed that all units hold the positions assigned to them, and that lost ground be regained at once by counter attack. This stubborn defense was to begin at the most advanced line and to continue regardless of the progress of the enemy to the flanks and rear.

In order to reciprocate the French courtesies of the Fourth of July, and to give fitting recognition to Bastille Day, we arranged for a dinner at our headquarters in honor of the Corps Commander and his staff. But, during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth the situation became more and more threatening, and several of the French generals sent in polite notes withdrawing their acceptances. While prepared to break up at any moment, we refused to be stampeded, and finished our dinner as per menu and schedule; but what did the French think of our attitude under the circumstances? Did they admire our confidence, or did they pity our ignorance?

Incidentally, we also failed to pack up the

Headquarters office equipment and our personal effects and to load them on trucks, ready for a swift move to the south or west. This may have been regarded as additional evidence of our lack of experience; but, what would our watchful Commander-in-Chief have done to a subordinate giving such exhibitions of weakness and lack of confidence on the eve of battle? His separation from command and his journey towards the south would have been so swift that the hinterland of Algeria would have furnished his first safe stopping place.

One of my aids, Captain Edward F. Smith, had repeatedly hinted at a tour of service with troops, and when finally he made a direct request, was ordered to temporary duty with the 38th Infantry. Colonel McAlexander gave him an assignment, and thus it came about that for a time, before, during and after the battle of July 15, he was in command of Company L of that regiment. He later returned to his staff duties, better satisfied to have had battle experience with combat troops.

Such acts can be considered only as commendable; and as long as America has patriotic young men who thus seek the post of danger, the pacifist will not plead in vain for protec-

tion of his life and property in the times of other great emergencies.

With the enormous amount of transportation required to supply the needs of the huge armies of modern wars, traffic regulations and road discipline are of the highest importance. This was readily understood and appreciated by all, and our soldiers soon obeyed the rules as well as our Allies; still, there were occasional infractions.

Our Corps Commander was especially insistent on these subjects. One day, after an extended talk at our Headquarters, the general, continuing his tour of inspection, came across an American driver who had stopped on a narrow side road, with the front wheels near the ditch, but with the tail of his truck almost blocking the road, and was calmly indulging himself in a comfortable shave! The general's indignation is difficult to imagine. *Parbleu! Milles tonnerres! Nom d'un nom! La route est sacrée!*

The driver, from the hills of Tennessee, did not understand a word of French, but the sign language was unmistakable. He caught on and parked his truck in parallel, with the off wheels in the ditch.

V

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

2. DEFENSIVE

ON the 15th of July, 1918, the general line of the Allied Armies ran from the vicinity of Dunkirk on the English Channel south, by Bethune, to Montdidier; thence southeast to Château-Thierry; thence east, by Reims, to Verdun; thence south along the western face of the St. Mihiel salient; thence east and southeast, by St. Dié, to the Swiss frontier at Basel.

Sixteen American divisions were scattered along this line, but six of them were in position to envelop that part of the Château-Thierry salient which projected in the direction of Paris.

During the first fortnight of July the Allies were still on the defensive, but a change was approaching with giant strides. The spurt in sailing of troops, which started in May, had

developed until now American soldiers were arriving in Europe at the average rate of 10,000 a day. The attainment of the numerical superiority deemed necessary for the assumption of a general offensive was seen to be a question of a few months only; some additional time would, of course, be needed to complete the training of the latest arrivals. So far, several of the American divisions had shown fine combat qualities, but none of the newer units had as yet been under serious fire.

At this time the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch, who had been assigned to the unified command on May 28, already had in hand a powerful reserve, called by him a "mass of maneuver," located near the western flank of the Château-Thierry salient, with which to deliver a counter-stroke at the opportune moment; but a general offensive was not yet in contemplation.

The Germans, undoubtedly aware of the impending increase of the Allied Forces, realized that this was the time for them to strike; and they therefore initiated what they called the "Friedenssturm," or peace offensive, to bring the war to a close. Widening of the Château-Thierry salient was a necessary preliminary to

a further advance towards Paris. All their endeavors in the west had been successfully resisted, and it was foreseen that their next effort would be towards the south and east, across the Marne.

Late in the evening of July 14 a message was received from Corps Headquarters stating that a raid far to the east had resulted in the capture of some German soldiers who were on the way to their battle positions, and that authentic information indicated that a general attack was to begin at midnight. This remarkable piece of good fortune came to us in the nick of time. By ordering all our batteries to open with fire of offensive counter preparation at once we were able, at midnight, to precede the great German bombardment by about ten minutes, to play havoc with the enemy's preparations for crossing the Marne, and to inflict terrible losses on his troops approaching the places of embarkation. The night was very dark, but the accuracy of our data enabled us to deliver a very destructive fire on the north bank, on the principal avenues of approach, and on suspected places of assembly of troops.

At about ten minutes after midnight the German batteries opposite the 3d Division,

more than eighty in number, commenced firing with gas and high explosive shell of various calibers, and thus initiated what proved to be the last German offensive of the World War. This bombardment, which lasted about three hours, extended over the entire front and reached into the rear areas to a depth of fully seven miles. At 12:15 shells of larger caliber were exploding in the vicinity of Division Headquarters. Every wood and grove was thoroughly searched, and an intense fire concentrated on all houses, villages, and points of the defensive system which had been observed by the enemy.

Along the river this artillery fire lifted and moved forward about 300 yards to permit the first detachments of infantry to cross in boats and advance to the railroad track, but continued with unabated fury on the other lines and on avenues of communication till 10.00 A.M. At 3.50 A.M. the German batteries started on the schedule of a heavy rolling barrage, with distances of about 165 yards and time intervals of from seven to twelve minutes, according to the difficulties of the terrain. The infantry lines of attack were to follow this barrage and reach the vicinity of Courboin, five

miles to the south, about an hour before noon.

From captured documents and replies of prisoners the German plan of attack was reproduced, in its main features, by the French staff, about as follows:

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

ATTACK DIVISIONS

10th Division { 398th Infantry
6th Grenadiers
47th Infantry . . . In support

Crossings

Gland to Mont St. Père
Mont St. Père to Chartèves

36th Division { 5th Grenadiers
128th Infantry
175th Infantry . . . In support

Crossings

Jaulgonne
Courtemont to Reuilly

Detachments of machine-gun sharpshooters and elements of Army Pioneers reënforced these attack divisions.

A period of intensive training in the region of Fère-en-Tardenois, with practice in following the rolling barrage, and rehearsals on the Vesle in the handling of pontoons and the crossing of streams, preceded the operation.

The 10th Landwehr Division held the sector from Gland to Chartèves prior to July 15. The attack divisions of shock troops were to pass through this fourth rate division.

TIME TABLE OF THE GERMAN PLAN OF ATTACK,
JULY 15, A.M.

- 12.10 Artillery begins fire of preparation.
- 1.55 Pontoons are placed in the water.
- 2.10 The first infantry units cross.
- 2.30 The Infantry reaches the railroad embankment.
- 3.50 Beginning of the rolling barrage.
The Infantry advances to the attack.

After the Infantry, crossing in boats, had gained a footing on the south bank, a heavy smoke screen was to be spread over the entire



GERMAN CROSSING OF THE MARNE AND PLAN OF ATTACK,
JULY 15, 1918

Crossings of the Marne are marked by broken lines. The shading north of the railroad, between Le Rû Chailly and Mézy, indicates the starting position for the general assault. Arrows show directions of advance and attack. The heavy shaded line from Blesmes to Courboin marks the position to be reached by 11.00 A.M., July 15th. The line of dots indicates outposts.

valley to favor the operation of pontoon ferries, the construction of the pontoon bridges, and the crossing of masses of infantry in broad daylight, so as to occupy the "storm position" extending from Le Rû Chailly to the mouth of Surmelin creek, along the railroad embankment, before the time for the starting of the rolling barrage.

The 398th Infantry was to push south in the region east of Fossoy with local attacks to the west against Fossoy and its château; the 6th Grenadiers, supported by the 47th Infantry, similarly to the west of Crezancy, which was to be attacked on its western and southern sides; the 5th Grenadiers, supported by the 175th Infantry, was to seize the Surmelin valley. The heaviest forces, very properly, were to be directed against the key of the position, the Bois d'Aigremont. In the wake of the rolling barrage the general line, extending from Blesmes to Courboin, was to be reached by 11.00 A.M., with control of the Le Rocq plateau.

This was a fine plan, with all the details well worked out; but, the adversary had received reinforcements whose unknown fighting qualities were underestimated.

THE DAY OF BATTLE

The enemy did not attempt a crossing in front of the 4th or the 7th Infantry, but his bombardment of the 5th Brigade sector was quite up to the average, with a little extra gas. During the night the projectiles came down with special intensity on Le Rocq, on the battalion command post in the woods about half a mile to the northwest, and on Fossoy.

Seventh Infantry.—At 7.00 A.M. a force of three companies of the 398th German Infantry launched an attack against Fossoy, held by the 7th U. S. Infantry, which, though severely pounded by the bombardment, was ready for action. Coming from the adjoining sector, the enemy advanced south through the wheat fields on both sides of the railroad, against the right flank of the 3d Battalion, holding the railroad and aqueduct lines. This assault was met by the platoons of Lieutenants E. W. Gray and A. H. Baker. The men of these two units could not be restrained but advanced to meet the attack and died fighting among the Germans, whose progress they stopped. Both officers were wounded; Lieutenant Gray was captured. Private Clarence

Hensley, of Company I, continued firing his automatic rifle until ammunition and crew were gone, and then charged with the rest of his platoon. A broken gun barrel and the bodies of Germans near him told the story of his last fight.

The platoon of Lieutenant R. G. Butcher, in a ravine just across the railroad, was isolated by the direction of the German attack but continued to fight desperately. No Germans succeeded in passing its position.

The delay caused by the heroic resistance of the three platoons, which were destroyed, gained time for the formation of a new line extending from Fossoy to the Bois d'Aigremont, so as to face the Germans. The latter were so discouraged by their severe losses, by the appearance of relatively large American forces in their front, and by the lack of news from the 6th Grenadier regiment, supposed to be on their left, that they indefinitely postponed their journey "nach Paris," and the 7th Infantry sector remained permanently closed to the German advance.

At 3.00 P.M. a counter attack in the direction of Le Rû Chailly was launched by the 1st Battalion. Across an open field, under airplane

observation and direct artillery and machine-gun fire, very severe losses were encountered. Two companies reached the Paris-Metz road and took position south and east of Fossoy; the other company remained in the Bois d'Aigremont.

Late in the evening patrols sent into the adjoining sector found no enemy except wounded. Next morning two companies occupied La Bretonnerie and Le Rû Chailly, and sent patrols to Mézy and Crezancy. Throughout the sixteenth the 7th Infantry was on the railroad as far as Mézy, the enemy having withdrawn all his forces across the river. All this was fine work by the 7th Infantry, ably commanded by Colonel Thomas M. Anderson.

The 30th Infantry.—On the fourteenth of July the 1st Battalion and Company K were in the advance lines, with B and C on the river, A, D, and K in the woods north and northwest of Crezancy. The 3d Battalion (less K), and A and C of the 38th Infantry, held the Bois d'Aigremont; the 2d Battalion was in reserve. The platoons of Savage, Kingery, Gay and Marsh were on the river, from Le Rû Chailly to Mézy. The other four platoons of

B and C were further back, mostly south of the railroad.

Next morning at daylight Lieutenant Marsh, in Mézy, found that he was surrounded by groups of Germans, about one-half of the 6th Grenadiers having crossed east and west of the town with but slight loss. This American platoon did not think of surrender, but fighting from house to house forced its way out of the town and joined Captain Wooldridge's company of the 38th Infantry at the railroad station east of the town, with eighteen survivors out of the original strength of sixty men. The enemy in endeavoring to take up the position assigned to him suffered heavy loss from the fire of Company G, 38th Infantry, and from various platoons, or parts of platoons of the 30th Infantry in the vicinity. The other half of the Grenadier regiment had already been badly defeated by the 38th Infantry while attempting a crossing farther east. By 7.00 A.M. the remnants of the Grenadier regiment, with exception of some groups west of Mézy, were back on the north bank, down and out.

Lieutenant Savage was killed within a few feet of the river's edge, and his platoon even-

tually was overwhelmed by the 398th Infantry (German) which crossed south of Mont St. Père and placed all three of its battalions on the railroad. One of these battalions had been reduced to the size of a company by our artillery fire while preparing to cross. After a good deal of fighting this regiment overcame Lieutenant McElligot and his two machine guns on the railroad viaduct, surrounded and captured Le Rû Chailly, and defeated the platoons of Baker, Gray and Butcher on the right flank of the 7th Infantry. At 9.00 A.M. the enemy had a line extending from the northern edge of Fossoy to the edge of the woods east of La Bretonnerie. Here they were stopped by the new deployment of the 7th Infantry on their right, the fire of Company A, 30th Infantry, on their front, and a counter attack by Captain Wooldridge's command, from the rock piles in Mézy, on their left. Lieutenant Ryan's platoon of Company A allowed the Germans to approach within fifty yards and then opened rapid fire by surprise, with astonishing effect. With both flanks menaced, no support in sight, and no news from the 6th Grenadiers supposed to be on their left, the attack of the 398th Regiment

also was ended. Return to the railroad embankment was ordered at 11.00 A.M. and completed at 2.00 P.M.

The platoons of Kingery and Turner near the dam found themselves cut off. While trying to make their way out they ran into the Germans on the railroad, were badly shot up and lost a number by capture, Lieutenant Kingery being mortally wounded. The remnants continued east and finally reached Company D, north of Crezancy.

The 47th Infantry (German) had a hard time in Mont St. Père on account of the American artillery and machine-gun fire. Finally three companies got across on the pontoon bridge and were marching south in column on the road towards Mézy when discovered by Lieutenant Gay's platoon and the troops in Mézy. These Americans opened fire at a range of about three hundred yards with rifles, machine guns, and rifle grenades. The Germans took to the wheat field, where—but let *them* tell it—"On account of the high wheat, the troops could fire only in the standing position; whoever showed his face over the ears was almost always hit. All six machine guns immediately assumed the highest possible firing

position and opened fire. Since the enemy (Americans) was apparently well dug in and probably sitting on trees as well, and the wheat being too high even for the highest firing position of the machine guns, no effect was obtained despite the concentrated fire and the ample use of ammunition. A further advance was useless without the support of escort artillery and trench mortars which were not on hand. The attack of the battalion therefore slackened and came finally to a standstill, since the men were hit, by the enemy riflemen sitting on the trees, even when crawling. Whoever of the battalion could crawl back, did so and took up a position on the northern bank of the Marne." (Battle report of the 1st Battalion Forty-seventh Infantry, on July 15-16.) This retreat across the Marne commenced at about 5.00 A.M. The other two battalions of this regiment were in Mont St. Père and Chartèves trying to find cover from the American artillery fire.

Although Lieutenant Gay had defeated a German battalion, he was driven out of his position by the fire of American artillery, ordered on account of inaccurate information which reached regimental headquarters. On

his way south he fought and captured seventy-five Germans near the railroad, and later accepted the surrender of another group hiding in a ditch. With about one hundred and fifty prisoners he made his way to the rear.

The platoons of the 30th Infantry having departed from the river front, two battalions of the 47th Infantry (German) crossed the river, one at about noon and the other late in the evening. Thus at 7.00 P.M. of the fifteenth the Germans had two regiments in the "storm position" behind the railroad embankment from Le Rû Chailly to Mézy. But, notwithstanding some local successes by overwhelming numbers, their general attack had failed completely. They were fifteen hours behind the schedule of their rolling barrage and their situation was hopeless. At 9.30 P.M. the division commander ordered withdrawal, which was accomplished during the night. It was the beginning of the end of the war.

At 9.00 A.M. of the fifteenth, Colonel E. L. Butts and Lieutenant Colonel Cromwell Stacey made a personal reconnaissance under heavy fire of the lines along the northern and western edges of the Bois d'Aigremont. They gained the impression that the German attack

was not making progress. In the afternoon it became definitely known that the attack had failed in the 30th Infantry sector. Two German regiments had come to a standstill, a few hundred yards south of the river, in a position where it was impossible for them to remain.

The arrival of three companies of the 4th Infantry in the Bois d'Aigremont added to our confidence in the situation.

The casualties of the 30th Infantry in this action amounted to 25 officers and 1,400 men, mostly from artillery fire.

Colonel E. L. Butts, commanding the 30th Infantry, made a correct estimate of the situation, had good ideas about location of trenches and other defensive works, refused to be stampeded by alarming reports in the night, and handled his command, consisting at times of twenty companies, with courage, ability and sound judgment.

The 30th Infantry was decorated with the Croix de Guerre, with Palm, and received the following citation:

An old regiment of the American Army, which, under the energetic and able command of its chief, Colonel E. L.

Butts, showed itself faithful to its traditions in sustaining the principal shock of the German attack of the 15th of July, 1918, on the front of the Corps to which it was attached. Under a most violent bombardment which caused heavy losses, it held in spite of all the enemy assault, and reëstablished integrally its positions, taking more than two hundred prisoners.

The 38th Infantry.—The 2d Battalion, Major Guy I. Rowe, commanding, held the railroad east of Mézy, Companies G, H and E being in line, with platoons on the river bank. Company F was in a position facing east and forming a refused right flank, with a good field of fire to the north of Varennes and up the Marne as far as Barzy. Companies B and D, in support, were at Paroy and Launay, respectively. Companies A and C were with the 30th Infantry. Three companies were in line north of Connigis, and the remaining company of the 3d Battalion was in the woods west of the regimental post of command, at Courtelin. The Machine Gun Company was distributed in depth, northward from Connigis.

The enemy delivered a destructive fire on

the front lines, and under cover of a smoke screen attempted to cross. All his efforts in front of Companies H and E were disastrously defeated. On the left, in front of Company G, which was farther back from the river, the Germans finally got over and secured a footing after an hour of fighting, with severe losses to themselves and the destruction of two American platoons. Large numbers had already crossed west of Mézy and worked around to the south of the town. This placed Company G in a critical situation, and the fighting assumed the fiercest character. A counter attack by a platoon under command of Lieutenant Phillips had gained time for an extension to the left and junction with remnants of 30th Infantry platoons. Gathering up all available men, Captain Wooldridge formed a command of about two hundred rifles and settled down among the rock piles of Mézy, resolved to hold out to the last man. In three counter attacks he captured nearly three hundred prisoners and sent them to the rear under guard.

The sector east of the 38th Infantry was occupied by detachments of the 125th French Division. They took their departure soon after

the first indications of an attack and kept going until they reached Celles-les-Condé, fully five miles to the south. The 36th German division crossed with little opposition, captured Varennes and was sweeping south when stopped by the fire of Company F, 38th U. S. Infantry. The withdrawal of the French exposed the entire right flank of the 38th Infantry sector. In consequence, the forward battalion, for many hours, had enemy forces on both flanks as well as in front.

Company F, in the position so correctly and fortunately selected by the regimental commander, was ably handled by Captain Thomas C. Reid and delivered an effective fire on the ground surrounding the town of Varennes. One platoon under Lieutenants Eberlin and Cramer made repeated bayonet charges against German groups in the French sector, to break up establishment of machine guns in positions to fire on our flank and rear. The nature of the fighting in this battalion may be judged by the number of casualties, which amounted to 12 officers and 461 men, out of a total of 32 officers and 930 men.

Under the additional inducement of artillery fire the enemy withdrew to the cover of

the railroad embankment north of Varennes, strengthened his right flank, and secured liaison with the 175th Infantry on his left. One of his companies became isolated and wandered south on the hills for several miles; only a few of them got back under cover of darkness.

At about 9.00 A.M. the two supporting companies, B and D, under command of Major Harry J. Keely, leaving detachments in Paroy and Launay, climbed the hill towards Moulin Ruiné to protect the right flank. The 3d Battalion, in reserve, had been on the Woods Line since 6.00 A.M. At 11.00 A.M. Major Lough sent Companies I and K to protect his flank and to close the gap from the Woods Line to the support battalion, but shortly afterwards they were returned to their former position on the Woods Line. This was practically the last battle movement on this day. At 4.30 P.M. the order was given to withdraw the advanced elements to the Aqueduct Line to shorten the front held and to provide for the reorganization of the greatly depleted companies.

The Adjutant of the 5th Grenadiers says: "Grenadier Regiment No. 6, which advanced on our right, got across the river in strong

force, but then encountered superior numbers of the enemy, and was destroyed. A large part of the regiment is marching as prisoners through the Surmelin valley, which it had orders to attack." True enough, there was a marked superiority, not in numbers, but in fighting spirit, leadership, and skill with the rifle.

An inspection of the 38th Infantry in the training area at Cour L'Evêque, made by me on the 16th of May, revealed Captain Wooldrige as an enthusiast in minor tactical exercises involving attack formations. Two months later the 15th of July gave him more realization than he could possibly have hoped for.

The losses sustained by the 38th Infantry were only slightly less than those of the 30th, amounting in all to about forty per cent of the combat strength.

The energy and ability of the regimental commander, Colonel U. G. McAlexander, and of his second in command, Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Adams, were demonstrated in the defense of the sector, the measures taken to protect the right flank, and the skill with which the units of the command were maneuvered under fire. Both these officers received

the Distinguished Service Cross for their part in stopping the German advance, as did Major Rowe, Captain Wooldridge, and Lieutenants Haynes, Younger and Wood.

In his final report, the Commander-in-Chief paid this tribute to the valor of our troops: "A single regiment of the 3d Division wrote one of the most brilliant pages in the annals of military history in preventing the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either side the Germans, who had gained a footing, pressed forward."

The colors of the 38th Infantry, also, were decorated with the Croix de Guerre, with Palm, and the regiment received the following citation:

*The 38th Regiment of American
Infantry:*

A superior regiment which, under the energetic and able command of its chief, Colonel McAlexander, gave proof of unshakable tenacity in the course of the German onset of the 15th of July, 1918. Attacked in front and outflanked on the right and left for several kilometers, it remained, in spite of everything, on the

bank of the Marne, faithful to its mission, and repulsed the enemy, superior in number, taking from him more than two hundred prisoners.

The wording of the citation indicates the reason for the adoption by the regiment of the appellation "The Rock of the Marne."

The 3d Field Artillery Brigade.—At 11.30 P.M., July 14, the batteries of this brigade were in position (except three batteries of the 18th Field Artillery which were on the road coming up) and had secured the necessary firing data. At 11.45 all the guns in position, as well as the French guns still in the 3d Division sector, commenced the fire of offensive counter preparation. The German bombardment, beginning about 25 minutes later, searched practically all of our emplacements with gas and high explosive shell, and promptly disabled four guns of the 18th Field Artillery, which were caught on the road.

The 76th Field Artillery continued firing O. C. P. until noon, and thereafter delivered harassing and barrage fire until the twentieth. The 18th Field Artillery fired on boats and bridges and answered calls for fire until the

German withdrawal. The 10th Field Artillery, after firing O. C. P. during the night, made many changes of target between Mézy and Varennes in response to calls. Shortage of ammunition was partly made up by drawing from French batteries in the vicinity which were not firing. Battery B delivered effective fire against German troops on the high ground north of Janvier farm and added materially to the protection of the right flank of the sector. Captain Brigham's Battery A at Janvier farm also ran out of ammunition at daybreak. The French Infantry had taken up a position in rear of the battery, and the advancing Germans could be seen six hundred yards from the right flank. Caught in the rifle and machine-gun firing of these forces the battery remained in position for two hours and then disabled its pieces and withdrew. The French guns on both flanks had long before been silenced by the enemy's shell fire.

By the fire of this brigade one battalion of the 175th German Infantry in the southern edge of the Bois de Jaulgonne, and one battalion of the 398th Infantry (German) debouching from the Bois de Barbillon, were seriously disorganized and reduced in strength.

Fire delivered into the French sector on our right greatly hampered the enemy's formations in the vicinity of Varennes, enabled Company F to repel all advances in that quarter, and practically put one German regiment out of action in the region of Les Etangs farm on Hill 231.

In this their first battle the officers and men not only delivered a highly accurate and effective fire and handled their batteries in accordance with the best practice of modern Field Artillery Tactics, but also exhibited in a marked degree qualities of bravery, energy, endurance, and devotion to duty under a prolonged and heavy fire.

The most conspicuous example of heroic conduct was that of First Lieutenant George P. Hays, who as liaison officer to the 30th Infantry, made more than a dozen trips in the night, across the fire-swept plain, half a mile wide, to the artillery headquarters at Grèves farm. He lost seven horses during these trips, and finally was himself seriously wounded. A Congressional medal of honor was his reward.

The 3d Artillery Brigade, under the able and inspiring leadership of its commander, Brigadier General William M. Cruikshank,

must share equally with the Infantry the glory of stopping the great German "Peace Offensive" of July, 1918.

Division Headquarters.—After relaying the information of the coming attack and ordering fire of counter preparation, the conduct of the fighting passed into the hands of the subordinate commanders, each one to employ the means at his disposal, including artillery and reserves, in accordance with his judgment and the developments of combat. A very small reserve for the Division was held for use at critical points, and later it was possible to draw on the 4th Infantry, which was not engaged. The principal activity of Headquarters was the reestablishment of lines of communication, forwarding of ammunition and supplies, evacuation of the wounded, and observation of the progress of the engagement in our own and adjoining sectors.

As soon as it was found that there was no attack on our left my attention was concentrated on the right flank. Information received from our liaison officer at Condé-en-Brie of the withdrawal of the 125th French Division gave cause for worry, for the presence of a large force of the enemy in rear of


our right flank might readily develop into a serious situation. During the entire day of July 15 no further information was received concerning developments in that quarter, and not a word came from Corps Headquarters. Communication was so fitful and uncertain that it was likely to fail at a most important juncture. In view of the uncertainties of the situation on our right, which exposed us to great danger, and in order to be on the safe side, Colonel McAlexander was authorized by me, in a second conversation with him over the telephone, at about 4.30 P.M., to draw in his outlying units to the Aqueduct Line and make preparation for the defense of the western slopes of the Surmelin valley, at the same time reorganizing the companies which had suffered the most. A battalion of the 4th Infantry had already been sent to the Bois d'Aigremont. With reserves of the 7th and 30th Infantry this gave us a strong mobile force on interior lines, available for counter attack in case of further threatening progress by the enemy on our right.

Definite information came soon thereafter that the German attack had broken down completely on the front of the 3d Division. East

of the Surmelin valley the enemy's troops had been much more successful. Everywhere on the front between Château-Thierry and Reims, more than twenty-five miles, the German divisions had made huge gains. In some places the penetration had reached a depth of five miles, and the necessary troops to stop the gap were not yet in place. East of Reims a great check had been delivered to the German "Friedenssturm" by the Fourth French Army, but on the front southwest of Reims the 3d American Division was the only one of seven divisions to hold its lines.

The German Corps issued orders for an attack towards the west for the purpose of capturing the eastern slope of the Surmelin valley, which was to become their line of resistance, with outposts on the stream itself. This was the situation about 6.00 P.M. July 15. During the night they sent patrols into Paroy and Moulins. Instructions from higher authority had emphasized the importance of the capture of the Bois d'Aigremont as the key-point of the position.

Repeated requests were made to the Corps Commander for a regiment, or even two battalions, to assist in making a counter attack



OPERATIONS OF THE 3D DIVISION
Second Battle of the Marne, July 15, 1918

from St. Eugène towards Reuilly, in order to secure a more effective fire on the crossings of the Marne as far as Dormans, and to round up the Germans south of the river. A counter attack by the 73d French Division, with tanks,

had made but slight gains in bitter fighting in the vicinity of St. Aignan. Finally, authority was granted to utilize a part of the 4th Infantry from our left, but before they could get started word came that the last German had recrossed the Marne, without molestation.

The 600 prisoners captured by the 30th and 38th Infantry were handed over to the nearest American military police in the back area. These, it turned out, were on duty with a French division, so we lost our prisoners for a while, but we eventually recovered all of them except the officers.

One of the first prisoners captured in our raids across the Marne was asked if the German soldiers knew that there were Americans in their front, south of the river. He said: "We saw men with dark faces in brown uniform and were told that they were Americans." They had seen some French Colonials whom we relieved early in June, and the joke was on us. The statement to the prisoner reminded me of the Proclamation of the Archbishop of Iloilo who, during the Philippine campaign, called upon the natives to rise up and resist the invasion of Panay by the red American

savages. Official prevarication by European governments caused surprise and aroused our indignation during the Spanish-American War; now, under the euphonious name of "propaganda," it is a well-recognized weapon of war, especially effective with compatriots of the late P. T. Barnum.

The Corps Commander, naturally, was very much elated over the unexpected outcome of the battle. He went into ecstasies over the wonderful physical vigor and enthusiasm of the young American soldier. He failed to mention their bravery, fighting spirit, initiative, endurance, discipline, or skill with weapons of all kinds. It was faint praise, but in the excitement of the moment he probably forgot about the other factors contributing to the victory.

The artillery concentration for this battle was the greatest in history. No less than 2,000 batteries of all calibers were in action between Château-Thierry and the Argonne Forest, an average of one gun for every 20 yards of the line.

Our estimate of the strength of the position in the sectors of the 7th and 30th Infantry proved to be correct; no Germans succeeded

in crossing the road from Fossoy to Crezancy.

In studying the distribution of troops with reference to the bends of the Marne it should be noted that the 30th Infantry had a longer front than any other regiment of the Division, and that its position formed a salient towards the enemy; thus a penetration near either flank at once placed the enemy in rear of the entire front line. In the 38th Infantry the situation was the reverse, for its position formed a sort of reëntrant towards the enemy who, in crossing at or near the right flank, came immediately under the enfilading fire of our troops. These factors had an important bearing on the situation of the units along the river bank and on the character of the fighting resulting therefrom.

Lieutenant Kurt Hesse, Adjutant of the 5th Grenadier Regiment, says:

In the afternoon of July 15th we managed to improve our line a little; for the enemy along the Marne, probably because he feared being turned on both flanks, moved his positions back slightly. But this made no change in the general result of the day, which was

The heaviest defeat of the war!

It was only necessary to go down the northern slopes of the Marne. Never have I seen so many dead men, never such frightful battle scenes. The Americans, lying in a grain field in a semi-circle, allowed two companies to approach within 30 to 50 paces and then shot practically all of them down in heaps. This enemy had nerve; we must give him credit for that; but he also displayed a savage roughness. "The Americans kill everybody!" was the cry of terror of July 15th, which for a long time stuck in the bones of our men. In our home country people joked about the deficient instruction of this enemy, about "American bluff," and other things. Theirs is the principal responsibility for the fact that of the troops led into action on July 15th, more than 60 per cent were left dead or wounded, lying on the field of battle.

Appreciation of the services of the 3d Division is shown in the following telegram from General Foch to General Pershing, transmitted July 16th.

La troisième Division d'Infanterie

Américaine vient par sa vigoureuse et efficace contre-attaque du 15 d'ajouter une belle page à celles qu'ont écrites ses devancières, les première et deuxième divisions.

The effects of the victory were electrical and far-reaching. With Heine on the run, the American soldier felt more confident than ever. All thought of moving the seat of government from Paris was abandoned. Our war-worn Allies passed from gloom to exultation and confidence in ultimate success. Some of the newer and only partially trained American divisions had undergone a successful test in battle. The Germans had lost the offensive; it was their last large attack in the war. The Allied High Command could now undertake the general offensive with confidence.

With no desire to add to the vast throng of those who "won the war," and no ambition to become the pampered pets of publicity, the survivors of this battle nevertheless feel that in the early morning of July 15, 1918, the 3d Division, thereafter to be known as the Marne Division, raised the Stars and Stripes to greet the rising sun of Victory.

VI

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY

OFFENSIVE

DURING the afternoon and evening of the fifteenth of July the two German regiments hugging the railroad embankment just south of the Marne, between Le Rû Chailly and Mézy, did not attempt to dig in and consolidate their position. They had suffered very severe losses, the American line of resistance appeared to be intact, and an attempt to cross the open fields to the south held out very little prospect of success, without reorganization and strong reënforcement. With the arrival of daylight on the sixteenth, a heavy artillery fire would probably be concentrated on the position, and bridges across the river would be destroyed as soon as erected. So these two regiments, under cover of darkness, returned to the north bank while the going still was fairly good, and the Commander of the 3d Division was able to report that

"On the front of the 3d Division there are no Germans south of the Marne, except the dead."

During the sixteenth of July there was but little change in our dispositions. The 2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry, of the 28th Division, was sent to the Bois d'Aigremont; Company F of the 6th Engineers had gone to the 7th Infantry on the fifteenth. General Sladen was ordered to clean up around Fossoy and to the north.

Captain Henri Royer, French liaison officer, was sent to the 125th French Division with request that they advance sufficiently to take the pressure off the flanks of the 38th Infantry and enable that regiment to resume all its original positions.

On the seventeenth another battalion of the 111th Infantry came into the 30th Infantry sector. The situation still was considered dangerous on account of the German positions to the east. All our artillery was ordered to open fire at 5.00 A.M. Not knowing of good objectives, we concluded that it was intended to divert attention from operations in some other field.

During the eighteenth reports kept coming

in concerning the great progress of the Allies in the region to the northwest. In our sector artillery fire of the enemy was quite active. On the way to Le Rocq and return, and between Courboin and Viffort, shells burst over our heads. The remainder of the 30th Infantry was taken out of the line and sent to La Chapelle for recuperation, and the 111th Infantry took over the entire sector of the 30th Infantry.

Reports received on the nineteenth concerning the work of the 1st and 2d Divisions of our Army in the drive against Soissons continued to be highly interesting and gratifying.

A counter attack east of the Surmelin valley by three French divisions on the morning of the twentieth, turned out to be somewhat of a blow in the air, for the retreating Germans were followed with caution, the pursuing infantry being protected by a rolling barrage, and in some cases by tanks.

In a personal letter of July 10, General de Mondesir stated: "I have patiently reconstituted your division entire, and I am sure that you feel grateful to me for it." This indicated that he never approved of the policy he had been obliged to carry out, and which had de-

prived me of command of the 3d Division as a tactical unit for over a month—until a few days before the battle.

The Chief of Staff of our corps was a cross-grained little Frenchman, known to his comrades as L'Ours, or the Bear. By causing frequent changes in the stations of our troops, and in various other ways, he made life a burden to the American "shavetail." Our administrative and supply staff were at times in disagreement with the French, and it required constant watching on my part and conversations with the corps commander to mitigate the annoyances and keep peace in the family. As our officers gained in experience they began to understand the things which caused the trouble. The French, on the other hand, must have realized the growing superiority of the American soldier, and that their own prestige was slipping; this did not tend to improve their temper.

While it was possible, during the great crisis, to keep this friction within bounds, it became apparent, soon after the victory in which the division had distinguished itself, that the days of tutelage, patronage and condescension had passed, that the atmosphere had

changed, and that intercourse would have to be on somewhat different lines. Unfortunately, our division Chief of Staff, Colonel Robert H. C. Kelton, who was a highly efficient officer as well as a forceful character, got into a controversy with the Chief of Staff of the corps, which culminated in a rupture. Complaint was made to G. H. Q., our Chief of Staff was investigated by an inspector, and although cleared, it left a bad feeling. Of course, there could be no question as to obedience of orders, yet it was felt that the psychological moment had arrived for release of the division from intimate association with a French command, and for assignment to an American organization; all the more so since our protector, General de Mondesir, was to take advantage of a long leave of absence. Under a combination of circumstances such as those related, the spirit of "The Great Crusade," which had animated all the members of the division, was oozing rapidly.

The region north of the Marne, between Jaulgonne and Le Charmel, into which the operations of the division were about to extend, may be divided into three parts. On the west side there is the Forêt de Fère, on the

east the Forêt de Ris. In the middle there is a strip of open country over one mile wide, extending from Jaulgonne to Le Charmel, a distance of about three miles. The valley of Argentol creek, with two parallel roads to Le Charmel, lies along the eastern side of this clearing. The ground rises to four hundred feet above the Marne at the head of Argentol creek, north of the town of Le Charmel, affording a succession of artillery positions commanding the roads in the Argentol valley, all the way down to the Marne. There are ideal locations for machine guns in the edges of the forests and in small patches of woods in the clearing itself. As the troops naturally would attempt to move over the open ground rather than through the more difficult forest, which is without good roads, the advance on Le Charmel presented a serious problem, in which it was likely that heavy loss would be incurred. The commanders, therefore, were instructed to operate largely in the woods in order to get rid of the flanking fire of machine guns before endeavoring to carry the positions in the open. Maneuvering in the woods requires special practice, and heretofore we had had very little experience in that kind of work.

On a visit to Saulchery our Corps Commander, General de Mondesir, was found to be very much excited. He wanted all the troops to cross the Marne at once, even if they had to swim. The great success of Marshal Foch's counter attack at Soissons, in which the 1st and 2d American Divisions and the Moroccan Division delivered the principal thrust, had made the Château-Thierry salient untenable for the Germans. It was important to attack the enemy so as to accelerate his departure and prevent him from carrying off all his supplies and equipment and the vast stores of artillery ammunition accumulated for the advance on Paris. Instructions had probably been received from higher authority to push the enemy to the limit.

According to General Pougin, commanding the 39th French Division, six batteries of German artillery arrived opposite the mouth of the Surmelin valley on the day before the battle of July 15. He says that 100,000 projectiles were abandoned in the Forêt de Ris, and that all the indications pointed to the existence of a German plan for a determined advance on Paris by way of the Surmelin valley and Montmirail.



THE THIRD DIVISION IN ATTACK NORTH OF THE MARNE,
JULY, 1918

One of the first questions asked of us after crossing the Marne was whether it was true that Chicago would rebuild Château-Thierry,

the idea being that American cities were going to adopt towns in the north of France and take charge of their reconstruction. Evidently there already was complete confidence in ultimate victory, and the questions indicated a receptive state of mind in regard to propaganda for reparations and cancellation of national debts.

Crossing the Marne.—From the defensive the division now passed to the offensive, and all possible speed was made in reaching the north bank of the river for the purpose of attacking the enemy.

The 4th Infantry crossed the Marne on pontoon bridges at Chierry on the twenty-first of July. One battalion advanced up the river to Mont St. Père and Chartèves, clearing out the enemy's machine guns and thus facilitating crossing of other troops at those points; the other two battalions spent the night in the Bois de Barbillon.

The 6th Engineers ¹ engaged very actively

¹ The 6th Engineers laid footbridges at Fossoy and Mézy on July 22, and a pontoon bridge at the latter place on the same day. They constructed a heavy trestle bridge at Mézy, July 23 to 27, and took up the pontoon bridge at Mézy on the 27th and rebuilt it at Jaulgonne, most of the work being done under fire.



BRIDGE OF GASOLINE DRUMS BUILT AT MÉZY, JULY, 1918, BY
THE 6TH U. S. ENGINEERS



QUESTIONING GERMAN PRISONERS AFTER BELLEAU WOOD ATTACK
Colonel McCloskey General Harbord (with helmet)

in the construction of various kinds of bridges across the river.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, crossed in boats, near Fossoy, on the twenty-first, and advanced on La Tieulerie farm. The other two battalions crossed next morning on a pontoon bridge north of Fossoy, the 2d Battalion starting for La Théodorie farm.

The 38th Infantry crossed at Mézy on the twenty-second; the 30th Infantry, in support followed on the twenty-third.

Le Charmel.—The 38th Infantry advanced to Les Franquets in the forenoon of July 22; the 1st Battalion reached Le Charmel but could not hold the place, having advanced too fast.

The 4th Infantry passed through the Forêt de Fère on the twenty-fourth, and in severe fighting reached a point about one mile southwest of Le Charmel; the regiment captured and occupied this town the next day.

The 7th Infantry, passing through the Forêt de Fère reached the Jaulgonne road north of Argentol on the twenty-fifth. In an attack on the Château of Le Charmel, on the twenty-sixth, the regiment suffered serious casualties.

The 30th Infantry took Les Franquets on the twenty-fourth, reached the woods south of Le Charmel, and dug in. The other half of the regiment advanced through the Forêt de Ris, north of Barzy, and after contending against severe machine-gun and artillery fire, finally reached the ravine south of the Château of Le Charmel in the afternoon of the twenty-fifth. The regiment then was withdrawn to St. Eugene for recuperation. As the 7th Infantry also had suffered severe loss, both north and south of the Marne, the greater part of the work of the 5th Brigade now fell on the 4th Infantry. Patrols of this regiment entered the Château of Le Charmel in the afternoon of the twenty-seventh; two of its battalions pushed on towards Ronchères.

The Command Posts of the 3d Division were established in succession at Gland, Mont St. Père and Le Charmel Château. All these places and the roads leading thereto repeatedly came under the fire of the enemy. Life at Mont St. Père was far from pleasant. Nearly all the houses were in ruins; the railroad artillery a few hundred yards away, across the Marne, fired over our heads with ear-splitting reports; the enemy's artil-

lery still was trying for the bridges in our vicinity; and the German airplanes took turns at machine gunning and bomb dropping.

The Corps Chief of Staff ordered our Headquarters to Ronchères while it still was held by the enemy, evidence of which came very forcibly when the sergeant of the Signal Corps, in charge of a party sent ahead to put up a telephone, was captured in that town.

In the chapel of the Château at Le Charmel, which served as our Headquarters, there were several boxes of potato-masher grenades. Nobody appeared to have sufficient curiosity to disturb them for souvenirs. We had heard many stories of secret mines and of explosions caused by moving innocent looking articles, and everybody was on guard.

General Sladen was directed to push the attack. The 4th Infantry captured Ronchères on the twenty-eighth and continued to advance towards the Ourcq. The 7th Infantry, in support, reached Villardelle and La Fosse farm. The Germans blew up their last bridge across the Ourcq.

Generals Haan and Winans, of the 32d Division, came to our command post on the twenty-ninth to make arrangements for the

relief of the 3d Division. This took place on the twenty-ninth and thirtieth, the 4th Infantry then being in position and ready to storm the Bois de Grimpette.

General Haan and staff arrived at 7.00 A.M. of the thirtieth, while our headquarters was under artillery fire. As our staff officers were about to step into automobiles to convey them to safer regions, a field clerk was seen wandering about looking for a seat, and finally he called out "Where do I go?" The Chief of Staff told him that there was a place for him in a truck near by. An exploding shell at this time stimulated his impatience so that he exclaimed: "Oh, h—l, that bus is too slow for me!" This particular individual never will be accused of lingering at a headquarters near the front when no longer needed.

By evening of the thirtieth the entire division was south of the Marne for rest and recuperation, with Division Headquarters at Chierry. The sector assigned to the division was very restricted in extent. The villages and farms of that locality were in ruins, and water was very scarce on the plateau. The accommodations were less than half of what we had during the defensive occupation. Captain Royer,

our liaison officer, was sent to General de Mondesir to make a strong representation of the necessities of the division, with the result that our area was more than doubled, and extended into a region where the great bombardment had caused but little damage. This was the last dig the Corps Chief of Staff had at the 3d Division, for we were notified on the thirty-first of membership in the III American Corps, under command of General Bullard.

The handsome residence at Chierry serving as the Command Post of the 3d Division was the property of M. and Mme. Oudin. They made me a visit and were delighted to find their home in such excellent condition, there being only one small shell hole in the roof, although the building was between the lines of the contending armies. They begged me to notify them of my departure a few days in advance, so that they could be on hand to keep out intruders. This was very gratifying and quite different from the conduct of the proprietress of a new villa near by which had escaped without a scratch, but, unfortunately, was occupied for a time by French Colonial troops, who wrought the usual havoc. After

the Colonials departed the place was assigned to the Twenty-seventh American Ambulance Company for temporary use. The men of this company brought back the furniture, replaced the mattresses, put the scattered documents back into closets, repaired the plumbing, thoroughly cleaned and disinfected the building and made it sanitary and habitable. Madame H——, the rich owner, was loud in her complaints—greatly to the disgust of her friends who feared that some of the Americans might understand her—and afterwards presented claims against the American government to the amount of 30,000 francs for damage done by *American troops*. This had a familiar sound and reminded me of some exaggerated claims which had come to my notice during service on our western plains. The size of the claim, of course, was stimulated by the knowledge that Uncle Sam was good pay and an easy mark.

The reputation of the American Army now was well established. The 42d Division had done very well in the defense east of Reims; the 3d Division held the Germans on the Marne; and the 1st and 2d Divisions furnished four-fifths of the attacking infantry in the

spearhead of the great drive towards Soissons; the 4th and 26th Divisions also rendered important service in this counter offensive. There was a general feeling of complete confidence in the successful outcome of the war.

The 6th Brigade, commanded by General Charles Crawford, was ordered to the valley of the Vesle on August 2. The *camions* promised for 9.00 P.M. did not arrive until 4.30 A.M., and then there were enough for only a little over half of the command—due probably to some staff officer's lack of knowledge of the size of an American brigade. The troops after being awake all night made an unfavorable start.

Bad fortune seemed to pursue this brigade during the eight-day period of its service on the Vesle. The weather was bad, the brigade commander was reprimanded by a French general, and the regiments were repeatedly ordered to make difficult attacks, without proper artillery preparation. There was confusion on account of change in orders and brevity of time between issue and execution. It was unfortunate that a brigade which had rendered such great service should now be treated with so little consideration and become the subject of criticism.

One of the French generals, known as "the Butcher," was quite free with orders imposing conditions of service and setting tasks for American troops which he knew were out of the question with his own veterans, of whom General Bullard wrote: "When required they went through the form of executing an attack, but they put no push into it. . . . Attacks would start in due form, but the French troops had the wisdom always to stop before annihilation. In this they were most skillful. Long experience had taught them how to save themselves." The young American soldiers had no inclination to hold back, and were not skillful in evading orders. This may explain why, under command of French generals, they drew so many of the difficult jobs.

It does not seem reasonable to believe that the 30th and 38th Infantry had, in a few weeks, deteriorated so greatly as to become justly deserving of criticism. The inevitable conclusion is that there must have been something wrong with the way in which they were commanded. It was a great day when they were definitely withdrawn and transferred to another area.

VII

ST. MIHIEL

DURING the period, in the early part of August, 1918, when the 3d Division was in a rest area, my time was largely taken up with visits of inspection. At the Le Rocq farm there was a remount depot and a hospital for horses. Our animals had suffered severely during the great bombardment. These faithful servants had neither trenches nor dugouts to shelter them from the fury of the storms of projectiles. They could not duck or run away, and in addition to the killed, the crippled had to be put out of their misery after the battle. Of the survivors nearly 600 were in the hospital, mostly with shrapnel wounds.

It was an exceptional pleasure to visit several of the villages in company with an old friend of Plattsburg days, Bishop Brent, then in the uniform of a chaplain of our army.

Orders were received on the twelfth of August for the movement of the 3d Division to


Gondrecourt by rail. My personal order came a few days later; and pursuant thereto, after stopping for a day to see old friends at Châteauvillain, where the 6th Division then was in training, the eighteenth of the month found me in command of the IV Corps, with Headquarters at Toul.

The residence of M. Denis, on the southeast side of the square, was assigned to me for a billet. The interior, with a marble staircase, life-size portraits and numerous oil paintings, was very handsome. But, no bathing facilities went with my part of the house, which was not unusual in France, so they were improvised in the Philippine style. By punching holes in the bottom of one of the five-gallon containers of the Standard Oil Company and slinging it from a post in the back yard, a shower bath, screened off with a tent fly, was rigged up. As both the weather and the water were chilly, the natives expected to see me come down with pneumonia at an early date.

The first thing of interest to happen was a visit from a group of the enemy's bomb-dropping airplanes. This turned out to be almost a daily occurrence and the novelty soon wore off. The blowing of whistles, ringing of bells, beat-

ing of gongs, and firing of anti-aircraft artillery, principally from Fort St. Michel on the hills northwest of the city, caused a terrific *vacarme*; but the good *Toulois* had long ago become accustomed to these raids and accepted them as a matter of course. Evidences of damage by bombs could be seen in several places, but on the whole they were not as fatal as the automobiles of some American cities.

After renewing acquaintance with the senior officers of my own and the adjoining American corps, many pleasant hours were spent in the company of French officials and commanding generals of the vicinity, among them General Passaga at Nancy and General Gérard at Flavigny. The sub-prefect of the Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle and Mme. Bilange honored me with a breakfast, in company with a number of high officials of the French government. Mme. Bilange was found to have been an American girl from Chicago, pronounced *Sheik'-ah-go* over here. We could not help reflecting on the uncomfortable and anxious times such persons with a double allegiance must have experienced during the period before the Kaiser finally forced us into the war, and the almost equally ex-



REDUCTION OF THE ST. MIHIEL SALIENT, SEPTEMBER, 1918

tended delay after our declaration of war before an appreciable number of American soldiers made their appearance on the soil of France.

Colonel Courboin, Commandant of Fort St. Michel, was kind enough to show us through his establishment. The fort, situated on high ground, affords an excellent view of the surrounding country. It contains strong casemates for a garrison of a thousand men and

emplacements for numerous anti-aircraft guns of various calibers. A great deal of shooting was indulged in, especially at night. This may have had a good moral effect, but it did not seem to hamper the enemy's operations to any great extent. It is probable, however, that it kept him from flying low enough to be sure of making hits on special targets, such as ammunition dumps and battery positions.

Theater of operations.—The country between the Meuse and the Moselle, north of Toul, is known as the Woivre. Its depth from north to south, Conflans to Toul, is 25 miles; across, from Verdun to Metz, 35 miles; and from St. Mihiel across to Pont-à-Mousson, 25 miles. Along the western side there is a strip of hill country about five miles wide called the Côtes de Meuse; on the eastern side there are the bluffs of the Moselle; and between the two, what is called the Plain of the Woivre. For 15 miles north of Toul this is a plain only in places, most of it being undulating and diversified with rolling country and ravines. In the southwest corner there is a group of ponds and marshes drained by a creek called the Rupt de Mad, flowing northeast across the district by way of Thiaucourt. North of the

center we find the lake region of La Chaussée. The most conspicuous feature is Mont Sec, a hill about 12 miles northwest of Toul, detached from the Côtes de Meuse and rising several hundred feet above the plain.

From an agricultural point of view the Woivre is a poor country. The soil is indifferent and a large part of the district, especially the hill country and the low ground, is covered with a forest growth of little value. Surrounded by the towns of Verdun, St. Mihiel, Toul, Pont-à-Mousson, Metz, Conflans and Étain, the interior shows only small villages.

The St. Mihiel salient.—The advance of the Germans from Metz in September, 1914, became stabilized on lines known as the St. Mihiel salient, which had been held for nearly four years, with little change, resisting the attacks made against them by the French. This projecting triangular district had for its base the line through Étain southeast to the Moselle, at a point about 12 miles south of Metz, a distance of about 35 miles. The western face was formed by the line from Fort Douaumont to the vicinity of Les Épargnes; thence south,

diagonally across the Côtes de Meuse and up the valley of the Meuse to Camp des Romains; total length, 25 miles. The southern face extended from Camp des Romains in a general easterly direction to the Moselle at Norroy; distance, 25 miles.

These lines were everywhere strongly fortified in accordance with the highest refinements of the modern art of field fortification: numerous bands of barbed wire entanglement; carefully selected positions for field guns, *Minenwerfer* and machine guns; concrete pill boxes and dugouts; tunnels in the hills; narrow-gauge railroads and wonderful observation posts. In the interior the German troops led a very comfortable life. In the Bois de Nonsard, for example, they had cottages and club houses for officers and men, tennis courts, training tracks for saddle horses, office buildings, bath houses and theaters. In well-cultivated gardens they raised their own vegetables, and they even raised children—some of them being over three years old when we forced their fathers to move.

An operation against the St. Mihiel salient had been under consideration for some time.

It was one of the earliest projects entertained by the American Commander-in-Chief, but it had to be postponed on account of the May drive from the Chemin des Dames. At a conference at Bombon, July 24, 1917, Marshal Foch and the American, British and French Commanders-in-Chief being present, the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was allotted to the American Army. The reasons for the desirability of this operation were stated by General Pershing as follows:

- (1) The salient flanks operations based on Verdun or Nancy,
- (2) The hills furnish excellent observation posts to the enemy,
- (3) The railroad through Commercy is necessary for operations on this front.

During the winter of 1917-18 the Allies had received definite information that the Germans would attempt to force a victory in the spring of 1918. The French and British governments then made arrangements with the United States to expedite the transport of American troops. Some of the divisions were to be trained in rear of the British, and the remainder in rear of the French armies. By the first of June there were over 660,000

American soldiers in France—one depot and eighteen combat divisions.

The series of German successes in the spring of 1918 culminated in the drive beginning May 27, reaching the Marne between Château-Thierry and Dormans at the end of that month. This again brought the enemy near to Paris and cut the important Paris-Nancy railroad. The 2d and 3d American Divisions played a dramatic part in bringing this drive to a stop.

The Allies were now playing for time to allow the rapidly growing American strength to develop. The Germans, on the other hand, sought to deliver the finishing blow. But their offensive between Montdidier and Noyon, June 9 to 13, had not gone well. Their last great attack, on July 15, from Château-Thierry east, was soon stopped, and in some places disastrously defeated, the 3d and 42d Divisions exercising an important influence on the outcome of the battles.

Having in view the tempting strategical objective of the German main line of supply skirting the southern extremity of Holland, Lorraine was decided upon as the future theater of operations for the American Army, and

the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient, logically, came to be its first big operation. This salient had been a constant menace to Allied operations in that part of France for four years. It covered the mines of the Briey basin and controlled several important French railroads. Towards the end of July conditions seemed opportune for the development of the plans for the formation of an American army under its own commander, the taking over of an American sector, and the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient.

While the Americans had rapidly absorbed military information made available by the French and British, they all along had entertained, from the private to the Commander-in-Chief, fighting theories of their own, quite different from those of trench warfare which had paralyzed the offensive spirit of the Allies. They had no intention of being satisfied with parrying the thrusts of the enemy; they were determined to deliver blows on their own account. The American divisions, therefore, were recalled from their emergency assignment to the French and British and formed into the First American Army. On the thirtieth of August they took over from the Second and



MARSHAL FOCH AND GENERAL PERSHING

Eighth French Armies the positions facing the Germans in the St. Mihiel salient. As early as August 26 a draft of a Corps order for an attack on the lines east of St. Mihiel was taken to Army Headquarters at Neufchâteau by Colonel Heintzelman, Chief of Staff of the IV Corps.

The immense fields of wire known to exist in front of the enemy's lines gave me much concern. One method proposed of overcoming this obstacle was by means of portable sections of wire matting, which were to form a kind of bridge over the entanglement for the passage of the attacking doughboys. A demonstration at Vaucouleurs on September 8 was fairly successful.

The next day there was an exhibition of the operation of five French tanks at Autreville. These machines, in addition to dealing effectively with machine-gun nests, were counted upon to go through fields of wire, unless the rains should make the soil of the Woevre too soft and slippery. However, our principal reliance was placed on wire cutters, and arrangements were made to secure a large supply of the powerful two-handed kind to assist in clearing the way for the advance.

The only cavalry in the IV Corps was a squadron of the 2d Cavalry, comfortably located in barracks and stables at Dommartin, a mile east of Toul. A review of the squadron was held and an inspection of its equipment made, partly to show the troopers that their former colonel had not forgotten them among the large forces of the other arms now under his command.

Information came that the Ordnance Department had received some Browning Automatic Rifles, but that not enough were on hand to make issues. At my request four of these new weapons were obtained for experimental purposes and they were immediately issued to the squadron.

On stabilized lines the firing generally was limited to sniping with rifles, machine guns and light field artillery, to occasional shots of registration for guns of all calibers, and to harassing fire on cross roads. It was a very quiet sector indeed where the song bird ventured a note, or the distant and suggestive call of the cuckoo could be heard. During such lulls the soldier on guard in the trenches had time for reflection and he found a never-failing source of diversion in the movements of airplanes and

balloons. Would the descending balloon win in the race to the ground, or would the operators be forced to jump in order to escape a fiery death? The faintest hum attracted his attention, but very often he failed to locate the source until the azure empyrean suddenly became strewn with tiny white clouds, like balls of cotton studding a field of blue, showing the burst of shrapnel fired by anti-aircraft artillery, almost too far up to be heard. While the hostile airplanes at times seemed to be surrounded by these bursts, it was very seldom that they incurred any damage.

One of the difficult things to teach new troops is the avoidance of exposure, not only on account of the unnecessary personal danger, but also, in many cases, to avoid betrayal of the plans of the High Command. At one time a division recently arrived in the Marbache sector was suffering daily casualties from artillery fire, at about noon, although the sector was rather quiet at other times. One of the enemy's aviators had discovered that the American soldiers formed long lines in the streets while waiting for their turns to be served with the midday meal at the company kitchens. This exposure furnished good op-

portunities for artillery concentrations which the enemy was not slow in utilizing. Eventually our local Commanding Officer realized that this artillery activity was not a mere coincidence, so he ordered that the men come up in groups of four, the rest remaining behind a wall or other cover until ready to be served.

This worked very well, but a few days later two airplanes were seen high up overhead, circling as if maneuvering for attack. Lower and lower they came and both opened fire. Everybody rushed out into the street to see whether the German or the Frenchman was going to win the fight. Still descending and firing, one of them pretended to be crippled and did the falling leaf stunt. When about 200 feet from the ground, both darted to one side, and a heavy concentration came down. Two German aviators had staged a sham battle in the air to bring out all the rubbernecks!

The former Chief of Staff of this division protests that the story is not strictly true in all its details; but, as the Italian proverb would say, it at least is "well invented."

The American lines of supply were so laid out, at an early date, as to avoid Paris, passing

to the south by way of Tours and Bourges, and converging in the region of Neufchâteau, which was centrally located with reference to points of importance like Nancy, Toul, Metz and the Argonne.

The original plan of the American Commander-in-Chief contemplated a strategical operation of the highest importance, namely, a break in the enemy's line and a deep advance at a point seriously menacing the line of communications so vital to the existence of his army. When the Meuse-Argonne operation was decided upon by the Allied High Command, the reduction of the St. Mihiel salient was considered as preliminary thereto and thus became a secondary and limited operation to flatten out the salient and to liberate the enclosed territory and several important lines of railroad.

An advance due north, west of Metz and beyond the range of its guns, would have been the strategically logical continuation of the offensive after reduction of the salient, for the German lines of communication passing south of Holland would thereby be menaced in less than a day's march; but the Allied High Command decided otherwise.

On the western face of the salient the more vulnerable part of the line lay in the vicinity of Les Éparges. On account of the hill country at the western end, and the difficult terrain near the Moselle at the eastern end, the most suitable place for attack of the southern face was found in the center, through the German positions on the low heights south of the valley of the Rupt de Mad. Two roads towards the north, one through Regniéville and Thiaucourt, the other through Flirey, Pannes and St. Benoit, favored this movement.

Instructions from First Army Headquarters indicated the line Les Éparges—Vigneulles—Thiaucourt as the objective of the First American Army.

- (1) The principal attack was to start from the Limey-Seicheprey plateau.
- (2) A secondary attack was to start from the region of Les Éparges—Mouilly, with direction southeast so as to cut off the Germans on the Heights of the Meuse and in the salient.
- (3) Connecting units between these two attacks were to exert pressure on the enemy in pursuit.

The principal attack was to be made by nine American divisions; the secondary attack by two American and one French division; and the holding attack by a French corps of three divisions.

The Germans had established a succession of strongly fortified defensive lines, with many bands of wire. Their command, as organized, was divided into three groups: the Gorze Group, with three divisions, held the line east of Loupmont to the Moselle; the Mihiel Group, with two divisions, held the center; and the Combres Group, with three divisions, occupied most of the west face. There were six divisions in reserve.

Many of the German divisions were low in numbers, and not rated high in morale. It had been recognized for some time that the force occupying the salient was too weak to hold it against a strong attack, and repeated requests had been made for reënforcements. The Commanding General anticipated orders asked for from higher authority by giving directions, on September 10, that the withdrawal be completed by 4.00 A.M. of September 12—a time quite insufficient for the removal of ordnance and valuable stores and the carrying

out of important demolitions: actual withdrawal of the German troops did not begin until about noon of the twelfth, when the rapid progress of the attacks threatened capture of the entire force south of Vigneulles.

The American concentration commenced on the twenty-eighth of August. As secrecy was highly important the movements were made by night, the marches being about ten miles per day for foot troops and fifteen miles for vehicles. In the daytime the troops were concealed in woods and buildings. In this way our forces opposite both sides of the salient were increased to about 600,000 men, but dispositions on the outpost line were not changed until the last day, to prevent identifications. Although the Germans expected an attack, it came sooner and much stronger than they had anticipated.

In the IV Corps a large part of the artillery was concealed in the extensive Forêt de la Reine. In the winter or early spring it would have been impossible to hide such masses of guns on account of the absence of foliage.

There was some discussion as to the relative advantages of attacking with or without artillery preparation, but it was finally decided,

by the First Army Commander, to precede the advance of our lines by a thorough bombardment lasting four hours, beginning at 1.00 A.M., September 12.¹ The I and IV Corps were to jump off at 5.00 A.M.; the French Colonials south of St. Mihiel, at 6.00 A.M.; the V Corps at 8.00 A.M.; and the French Colonials north of St. Mihiel at 9.00 A. M. Neither the I nor the IV Corps was to retard its progress on account of possible delays in the adjoining corps.

The objective of the first day was the line Vilcey—Jaulney—Nonsard—northwestern edge of the Bois Raté, with an intermediate first phase on the heights south of the Madine brook and Rupt de Mad. The second day line was to be Xammes—St. Benoit—Mont Sec,—thus forming a curve to meet the V Corps and

¹ The total of the artillery for our army was 2,975 guns. For the anti-aircraft service we had 30 searchlights, 34 guns and 76 machine guns.

The equipment of the Air Service for the Army consisted of 701 pursuit planes, 366 observation planes, 323 day bombardment planes, 91 night bombardment planes, and 21 balloons.

As the day for action drew near the various headquarters moved closer to the front.

Army Headquarters to Ligny-en-Barrois;

I Corps remained at Saizerais—already up;

IV Corps to Menil-la-Tour, to the dugout on September 10;

V Corps to Ancemont.

pinch out the St. Mihiel salient. The troops then were to advance to the Army line, Bois le Prêtre — Xammes — Hattonville — Trésauvaux, with exploitation two to three miles farther.

There was to be no artillery fire on the bridges across the Rupt de Mad, as they would be needed by our tanks, and the use of gas was limited so as not to interfere with infantry occupation.

Plans of the IV Corps.—The IV Corps was to attack on a front of about six miles, from Limey to Richécourt, with the 89th, 42d, and 1st Divisions in line from east to west, each with a front of about two miles.

The first phase of the attack called for an advance of three miles to the heights south of the Madine brook and Rupt de Mad. The second phase required further progress of two miles towards the north to a position extending from north of Nonsard to a point half a mile south of Xammes.

As the corps axis for the second day was to change to the northwest, with direction on Vigneulles and St. Benoit, so as to pinch off the salient, the left (1st) division of the IV Corps was to swing towards the northwest and west,

attacking in the new directions; the other two divisions were to continue progress in a northerly direction.

The 89th Division was to attack on the front from Limey to Flirey, turning the Bois de Mort Mare on both flanks; the reunited brigades were to advance north by way of Euvezin, Bouillonville and Xammes.

The 42d Division was to attack on the front Flirey—Seicheprey, through Essey as first phase, and Pannes as first day objective.

The 1st Division was to advance on the front Seicheprey—Richecourt, with direction on Vigneulles, refusing its left as progress was made to the north, preparatory to the swinging of the corps axis to the northwest. On the first day line the right brigade was to face northwest, and the left brigade almost west.

The 3d Division, as corps reserve, had gone into the Forêt de la Reine during the night of September 11-12.

THE BATTLE

Some of the French generals had gone to the hills of Boucq to observe the great bombardment from the walls of the château. This was too far from Corps headquarters, where a busy

time was in prospect; but a position on high ground about two hundred yards in advance of the Corps dugout enabled me to witness, for about an hour, a display of fireworks never to be seen except in a great war. More than two thousand fiery mouths belched forth their vehicles of destruction against the enemy who scarcely made a reply.

Promptly at 1.00 A.M., September 12, the battle commenced when our artillery opened an intense fire of preparation which was intended to damage the German wire, destroy many of the enemy's machine guns, and drive his troops to cover. On the southern face of the salient this artillery fire continued until 5.00 A.M., and the infantry of the corps front then moved out under a powerful barrage. The attack came as a tactical surprise to the Germans who were thrown into the utmost confusion. Mustard gas fired on occupied woods and cross roads contributed to the disorder; large trains of transportation were caught on the roads and destroyed.

Much of the wire was found to be old and insecure. The enemy was demoralized by our artillery fire and the rapid advance of our troops, and made but weak resistance. Num-

bers came out of dugouts and gave themselves up. Occasional strong points and machine-gun nests made more resolute opposition, but as a rule the resistance was quickly overcome.

Rainy weather had left the ground soft and in poor condition for military operations. The twelfth was cloudy, with squalls of rain; our air observation was deficient and rendered very mediocre assistance.

The tanks got into trouble early in the game, on account of mud, rough country and impassable trenches. The Rupt de Mad proved to be a serious obstacle to those attached to the 1st Division. The tanks fell behind the infantry; many broke down or were stalled in the mud and in the enemy's trenches. A few managed to keep up and rendered valuable assistance in reducing machine guns and in making gaps through the wire; but most of them did not catch up until dark.

The 89th Division had a delicate operation to carry out. Its front was dominated by the Bois de Mort Mare, which was on high ground and presented a strong defensive barrier. Frontal attack would have been difficult and slow, and would have failed to give support to adjoining troops. Hence one brigade turned

the eastern flank of the forest, while the other passed through the western part, as indicated in the corps order. The Germans offered but little opposition and withdrew rapidly to positions in rear. This enabled the brigades to come together again north of the forest, leaving detachments to mop up the interior.

The 42d Division also encountered but slight resistance, except in the Bois de Sonnard. By 8.00 A.M. the assault battalions were between St. Baussant and Maizerais.

Resistance to the 1st Division was rather feeble; wire old and low. German machine guns gave way quickly. By 8.00 A.M. the Division was in the Quart de Reserve. Maizerais was taken a little after 8.00 A.M., and Essey shortly after 11.00, with little opposition. The 1st Division reached the first phase line at 9.30, and the first-day line at 12.30. Corps orders directed the advance to the first phase line of the second day.

The small cavalry squadron attached to the 1st Division was ordered forward at 1.45 P.M. to reconnoiter towards Vigneulles and Heudicourt. The troopers passed through the infantry lines at 4.00 P.M. but soon developed

resistance and did not accomplish much that day, except the capture of some prisoners.

At 7.45 P.M. the infantry of the 1st Division reached the narrow-gauge railroad in the woods two miles north of Nonsard; at midnight it still occupied a general east and west line, about two miles in extent, along the northern edge of the Bois de Nonsard. The rapid advance had disorganized the enemy and hampered his retreat, but he managed to pass many of his troops through Vigneulles on the twelfth and in the early morning of the thirteenth.

In the evening of September 12 a report was received that the retreating German artillery was choking the roads south of Vigneulles and Hattonchâtel. This indicated a good opportunity to make huge captures. Accordingly, the 2d Brigade, with machine guns and cavalry, was ordered to advance in force to the outskirts of Vigneulles and Hattonville, so as to close all roads to the north and east of these towns.

Corps Headquarters succeeded in getting this order through by telephone shortly after midnight; the 2d Brigade advanced at 3.15, and the designated roads were occupied be-

tween 8.00 and 10.00 A.M. of the thirteenth. As a measure of security two battalions of the 42d Division were ordered to be in the vicinity of Lamarche at 4.00 A.M., September 13, as a reserve; these were replaced a little later by the 6th Brigade of the 3d Division. These reinforcements enabled the 1st Division to extend its left, which was secured by its 1st Brigade.

The distance from the northern border of the Bois de Nonsard to the Vigneulles-St. Benoit highway is barely two miles. There are several roads in the intervening Bois de Vigneulles; one of them leads almost due north and comes out on the highway about two miles east of Vigneulles. The rumbling of the retreating German transportation on that highway was audible in the night.

If the 1st Division, even after receipt of the Corps order, had exercised for a short time the energy and skill in night marching and fighting which it exhibited later in the war, the Vigneulles-St. Benoit highway might have been reached from four to six hours sooner, resulting probably in a great increase of prisoners and captured material of war. However, in some of these things even our best

divisions were still lacking in sufficient experience.

The 28th Infantry reached Vigneulles at 8.00 A.M. and established liaison with the 26th Division whose leading elements had entered Vigneulles at 2.15 that morning and soon thereafter established an outpost to the east and south of that town. Complete contact with the 26th Division in the vicinity of Vigneulles was obtained at about 9.00 A.M., September 13, when the provisional squadron of the 2d Cavalry passed through the town for further exploitation.

Troop F, 2d Cavalry, under command of Captain E. N. Harmon, reported the presence of the French in Hannonville; of the Germans in Champlon, Darcort and Jonville; captured a battery of heavy artillery at Viéville, and sent back seventy-three prisoners during the day.

By the evening of September 13 the St. Mihiel operation practically was over. All the exits from the salient had been closed since early morning and the escape of the troops remaining therein cut off. Early in the day the last division had attained the Army Objective, and all divisions were consolidating

their positions and operating towards the Exploitation Line.

The German troops stationed in the angle of the salient had to execute a difficult and dangerous withdrawal. Fortunately for them the French troops failed to exert any great pressure on their front during the afternoon and evening of September 12. Had the Mihiel Group, occupying the town of St. Mihiel and vicinity, been compelled to fight a strong action during the afternoon and early evening of September 12, probably but few of its units would have escaped capture.

September 16 marked the end of the battle of St. Mihiel, the front having become stabilized. The operation was a success in every respect. We captured nearly 16,000 prisoners, 182 guns, hundreds of machine guns, and an immense store of material, supplies and ammunition. The force and speed of our attack had overwhelmed the enemy so that he offered but slight resistance. Our casualties were small, less than 7,000 during the period of advance.

The greatest results of the victory were moral. It raised the morale of our troops and of our Allies; the Germans were correspond-

ingly discouraged and began to realize that final defeat was inevitable. An efficient American army had been developed and its fighting power demonstrated to friend and foe. The victory gave our troops implicit confidence in themselves and a sense of superiority over the enemy. Wire entanglements ceased to be regarded as impassable obstacles, and training for open warfare required no further vindication.

The losses in our divisions had been so small that these units were immediately available for another and greater operation in a new theater of war.

The American army which won this victory numbered a little over 500,000 men. It recovered 200 square miles of territory and freed the Paris-Avrincourt railroad. The enemy withdrew in a disorganized condition to a line of defense only partly completed. Had not the plans of the Allied Command called for a great operation elsewhere, we could doubtless have made a further deep advance in the direction of Briey, with immediate menace to the enemy's line of communications. However, the First American Army was committed to the Meuse-Argonne operation, and many of

the divisions destined for participation therein had been engaged in the St. Mihiel battle; it was necessary to move them to the new theater of operations as quickly as possible. For these reasons the St. Mihiel front was reluctantly permitted to stabilize.

The Secretary of War, Mr. Newton D. Baker, and General McAndrew, came to the IV Corps dugout at Menil-la-Tour on September 12, at 5.30 P.M. The Secretary was greatly pleased with the course of events and personally congratulated me on the fine success of the day.

The road through the wire field north of Flirey was in very bad condition; also the one towards St. Baussant. The Engineers worked on these roads all night. The importance of having Engineer Trains with material and tools for road repair close up behind the advancing infantry lines was emphasized by this experience.

At 6.00 P.M. of the thirteenth the number of prisoners taken by the IV Corps had risen to 3,265. All the prisoners were sent to Pagny-sur-Meuse.

On the fourteenth of September the Presi-

dent of France and Madame Poincaré and a civic delegation were present in St. Mihiel taking part in a celebration of the liberation of that city. No Americans were observed as participating in that function.

On a visit to the 1st Division, on the same day, in the Bois de la Belle Ozière, it was observed that a wonderfully fine spirit prevailed in that command—and justly so, for it had taken a conspicuous part in the reduction of the famous salient. At a later period in its war experience the division would not have been so well satisfied; there would have been some regrets at not achieving more.

On the fifteenth of September M. Clemenceau called at the Headquarters of the IV Corps. He was very cordial and liberal in his congratulations and praise of the American Army.

A visit to the Woivre country is not complete without a trip to the observation posts at Hattonchâtel and on Mont Sec. From the latter the positions held by the IV Corps prior to the battle can be seen spread out as on a map.

VIII

MEUSE-ARGONNE

AFTER completion of the St. Mihiel operation, as planned, by occupation of the Army Line, a lot of work remained to be done to consolidate the position, such as digging of trenches, stretching of wire and establishing of strong points—a general defensive preparation, organized in depth. Moreover, it was necessary to repair or rebuild lines of communication, roads and bridges, remove prisoners and captured material of war, and to make a general clean-up in the liberated territory.

The enemy had received a serious setback, but he still was active in the air and with his artillery. Observing from a balloon, on September 30, that the streets of Dieulouard were filled with American soldiers, the Germans sent over a concentration of artillery fire which caused sixty casualties. The lesson was expensive, but orders and preaching seem to be

useless. Nothing but experience, of a bitter and painful kind, will teach new soldiers to take ordinary precautions.

News from the big operation to the west, in the Argonne country, was not as favorable as at the start. We heard that there was some difficulty with the transportation of supplies and ammunition, on account of the lack of good roads and the large number of troops engaged. But there probably were some other troubles, for seven of our generals were relieved from command. If the young were wise and the old were strong, what a difference it would make in the affairs of love and war! Eros is not more ruthless in discarding the weak than the War Department and G. H. Q. have been in eliminating the senescent and inefficient. *C'est la guerre!*

On a visit to Souilly, the Army Headquarters, on October 5, General Pershing invited me to a luncheon with General Pétain on his special train. Various subjects were discussed, and the information was given out that the Second American Army would begin to function at an early date. All appeared to be satisfied with the progress of American operations, for it was realized that many Ger-

man divisions were being withdrawn from other parts of the general front. The Argonne Forest, the pivot of the German retirement, must be held by them to the utmost, or the door would be closed on their passageway back to Germany.

Even at this stage of the game, after the successful St. Mihiel operation, it seemed to be difficult for the French to relinquish control of all the American troops and accord us complete unity of command, subject only to the directives of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. It was felt that our status in this respect should not be different from that of the British Army. Altogether this was an eventful day; and at 10.00 P.M. we received a detailed report that the Germans had sued for peace, acceding to all of Mr. Wilson's principles.

On October 11, orders directed me to proceed to the I Corps and assume command. At the time of my arrival, October 13, the Command Post of the I Corps was located on the southern slope of a ridge called the Côtes de Forimont, which was about a mile north of Neuilly. The group of dugouts, about 600 yards east of the Marle-Verdun highway,

formed quite a village. These structures, built of logs, were set into the side of the hill and then covered with a deep layer of rock and earth; they were old, evidently had served several years, and were infested with rats. For protection the principal reliance was placed on the hill; it would have required accurate fire at a very high angle to drop projectiles on the roofs. The arrangements for personal comfort in these underground residences were quite limited; however, at times even the most critical occupied them with alacrity and satisfaction. The German bombing planes returning from a raid had a disagreeable habit of dropping what eggs they had left over in the vicinity of our headquarters.

There were indications that the enemy was weakening and that our Allies would not have to spend another winter in the trenches. An official dispatch was received stating that the Germans accepted Mr. Wilson's terms for an armistice and peace negotiations.

In the evening of October 14 our I Corps line ran from Grand Pré east through the northern edge of St. Juvin; the Army line included Romagne and Cunel.

Orders were issued for continuation of the

attack on the fifteenth, the I Corps being directed to gain Imécourt and the northern edge of the Bois des Loges. The enemy made two counter attacks in the forenoon; both were repulsed. In spite of these activities our own attack was pressed, the enemy's defense being mainly with machine guns. His resistance on the whole was effective, and only local successes were gained by the Americans. The greatest progress was made in the center, threatening the capture of Landres et St. Georges. There was severe fighting throughout this day, but the Germans were forced to give way at a number of points. A part of Grand Pré was captured, and although all the prescribed objectives had not been reached, important positions were acquired and the *Kriemhild Stellung* was pierced.

The German positions along this portion of the line were probably as strongly fortified as any on the western front. The fighting had been heavy and continuous for about three weeks. The American forces did not remain sufficiently strong to do other than work forward slowly and improve the general line for another big push. It was necessary to gather fresh forces and launch a new attack on a large



308TH INFANTRY RESTING IN THE ARGONNE FOREST
Lieutenant Stewart (standing)



307TH INFANTRY STARTING A DRIVE IN THE ARGONNE FOREST

scale if the enemy was to be prevented from making an orderly withdrawal from the North of France.

On October 16 the capture of Grand Pré, which had previously been entered by the 77th Division, was completed by the 78th Division.

The Bois des Loges, a square mile of wooded ground rising about two hundred feet above the valley of the Aire, presented a very difficult obstacle in front of the left of the Corps. Surrounded by open fields, all approaches were subjected to flanking fire from the Bois de Bourgogne and the high ground to the north and east of Champigneulles. Local attempts to capture it met with stout resistance from numerous well-placed machine guns. Our observation posts did not discover the fact that many machine guns were located near the center of the forest, where the ground was high enough to enable them to fire over the tops of the trees between them and the open ground. Our artillery concentrations directed at the edge of the forest did not reach these machine guns.

A message from an aviator that American infantry panels were displayed at the northern

border of the woods, was received with much satisfaction at Corps Headquarters. However, the aviator had failed to report other things which he saw, or should have seen, among them that the woods were full of Germans. The panels turned out to have been a ruse, and when an attempt was made to occupy the Bois soon thereafter, it met with repulse and severe loss.

The cold, rainy and foggy days of the latter half of October gave us warning that winter was not far off, though we could still expect occasional days of fine weather.

During a visit at our Post of Command, General Liggett stated that the casualties of the First American Army on the Verdun front, up to this time, had been about one hundred thousand. The nature of the warfare, fighting in the forest and against intrenched and fortified positions, made heavy loss unavoidable. But the enemy also had suffered seriously, as shown by the number of prisoners; and in his general decline these losses told on him with continually increasing force. Many of his units were greatly reduced in numbers; the Austrians were about to quit; Bolshevik poison brought by the troops who had served

[illegible]

FINAL OPERATIONS SOUTH OF SEDAN, NOVEMBER, 1918

in Russia, peace propaganda originating in Germany, as well as in the countries of the Allies and neutrals, and realization of the hopelessness of the struggle—all tended to undermine the morale of the German troops.

The armies continued to harass each other with artillery fire, enfilading whenever practicable. Our position in the southern edge of the Bois des Loges was so difficult that withdrawal and digging in near the Grand Pré-St. Juvin road was authorized.

One of the ominous indications of war, straggling, was beginning to make its appearance, and was seriously complained of in some of the divisions. Permission was granted to help out by utilizing engineer troops as infantry in the occupation of positions.

Throughout the remaining days of October there was no general attack by our First Army. The several corps undertook local operations to improve their positions and devoted their efforts to preparation for a renewed great offensive.

By the twentieth of October the line in the I Corps was everywhere north of the Aire River. The enemy was driven from the southern end of the Bois de Bourgogne, and the

Belle Joyeuse and Talma farms were occupied by the 78th Division. The 82nd Division captured the slopes of the Ravin-aux-Pierres. On the twenty-fifth the line was advanced to Talma, and the wooded crest one mile north of Grand Pré was occupied; there the lines remained until November 1.

On the twenty-seventh we received the news that General Ludendorff's resignation had been accepted; and on the twenty-eighth, that Austria had asked for a separate peace. The big machine appeared to be missing on some of its cylinders.

On the twenty-eighth of October a review was held of the 317th Infantry, of the 80th Division, in honor of the decoration of our Corps Chief of Artillery, General C. Walch, as an officer of the *légion d'honneur*. The honor fell to me of reading the orders of the French Government and of making a brief address of congratulation, in the French language. Of course, no amount of practice could bring my technique in such matters up to that of French experts like General Gouraud, especially as, in deference to the finicky prejudices of my compatriots, an intimate feature of the ceremony has to be omitted.

However, General Walch was kind enough to state in his reply that this was the first time that a French general had been decorated by an American, and that he felt specially honored by the circumstances of the occasion.

On the thirtieth and thirty-first of October the heights and eastern slopes of the Bois de Bourgogne were treated with liberal doses of mustard gas, which were successful in silencing the hostile batteries which had given much trouble.

Returning from a visit to the front line divisions advantage was taken of the opportunity to inspect the fine German dugout at Camp Mahaut, which is a complete residence in concrete, fifty feet under ground. A mile to the south lay No Man's Land, of former years of the war, with square miles of rusty barbed wire, innumerable trenches, and many mine craters, deep enough to bury a house, evidences of the terrible struggle for Verdun, which failed. A pleasant drive through the forest, by way of *La Haute Chevauchée*, brought us to Le Claon and Les Islettes.

In compliance with directives from the High Command, the First Army had drawn up or-

ders¹ for a general attack on October 28, to gain Buzancy and the heights to the east. On October 27 this was changed, conforming to a verbal understanding, so as to bring the attack on the same day as that of the Fourth French Army (on our left), which was not quite ready. The exact date was to be determined later and transmitted by liaison officers.

During the months of September and October orders for operations still assigned definitely limited objectives. This was the inherited form under which trench warfare had been conducted for four years, in which the opposing forces contented themselves with overwhelming definite parts of the enemy's line, and then consolidating the positions

¹ Field Orders No. 85, issued at midnight of October 28, conveyed instructions for the attack by the I Corps. Eastern boundary of the Corps sector: Sommerance—St. Georges (exclusive)—heights north of Imécourt—northeast to Fossé (exclusive). Western boundary: Grand Pré—Belleville-sur-Bar, both inclusive.

Objectives:

1st: Imécourt—Alliépont—northern edge of Bois des Loges.

2d: Malmy—Sivry—Bois des Loges.

Corps Objective: Fontaine des Parades—Hill 278—northern edge Bois des Loges—Grand Pré (incl.)—Talma (incl.).

Subsequent Objective: Fossé—Buzancy—Harriécourt—hill two kilometers north of Briquenay, to connect with the French Army at Boult-aux-Bois.

gained. In the American Army these "objectives" had for some time been regarded merely as "incentives"; battle instructions nearly always referred to them as the *minimum* of achievement expected. But the time had come, now that the troops were out of the woods, to take to "open warfare," so strongly advocated by General Pershing from the time of his landing in France, and finally accepted by the French commanders.

Every effort was made to get ready for the coming attack. Divisions were withdrawn from the line and others put into their places, and supplies of all kinds were brought up.

General Pershing dropped in at our Headquarters on the thirtieth. He stated that the terms of the armistice had been sent to the Germans, and that Turkey had signed up for peace. We reciprocated by telling of our plan to fire 800 shells of 9.2 in., 4,000 155's, and 13,000 75's into the Bois des Loges during the two hours preceding the jump-off at 5.30 in the morning of November 1; that all were keen for the final drive, but that many feared it would be called off by an armistice.

On the thirtieth and thirty-first of October

the 77th Division went back into the line, relieving the 82d Division.

The attack finally was launched on November 1, with troops of the I Corps, from west to east, as follows: In line: 78th, 77th, and 80th Divisions; in reserve: 6th and 82nd Divisions.

THE LAST BATTLE

Comprehensive instructions for the conduct of commanders and troops, embodying the latest developments in open warfare, were issued in connection with the corps order for battle. Three features are deserving of special mention:

(a) The attack should be carried forward, not by thickening the front line, but by passing through of deployed supporting forces.

(b) Reserves should not be piled up against difficult obstacles where the advance has been stopped, but rather go forward to parts of the line where progress is being made.

(c) Along the boundary lines of sectors co-operation should be brought into play. An attack held up on one side of such a line should be assisted by flanking attacks from the neighboring forces, if they have made better progress.

The attack of the I Corps began at 5.30 A.M., November 1, with the 78th Division driving against the Bois des Loges, the 77th against Champigneulles, and the 80th towards Imécourt. At sundown that day the 78th Division still was at the Bois des Loges; the 77th still was at Champigneulles, but part of the division was northeast of that town; the 80th Division was through Imécourt with its right brigade under command of General Lloyd M. Brett. Corps Headquarters arrived at its new Command Post, Châtel Chehéry, at 4.00 P.M. Heavy artillery fire continued all night, without much reaction by the enemy. Although 800 prisoners had been brought in and a number of cannon and machine guns captured, the situation in the I Corps was disappointing and there was gloom at our headquarters.

The orders for November 2 were a repetition of those for the preceding day, and operations were resumed accordingly. At 10.00 A.M. the 80th Division was through the woods between Imécourt and Sivry, with patrols towards Verpel; the 77th Division was north of the Moulin de Champigneulles and going strong; the 78th still was hammering at the

Bois des Loges, being in the eastern border and the northwest corner.

At 11.00 A.M. our troops were through the Bois des Loges and in Verpel; the enemy's whole line was in retreat.

At noon of November 2 the report came that the Kaiser had abdicated. At this time the 80th Division was through Buzancy, the 77th through Verpel, and the 78th through Beffu. Our infantry was ordered to pursue the enemy in trucks, with motorcycles for an advance guard.

The Army Commander, General Liggett, arrived at Châtel Chehéry in the evening. He stated that the I Corps had fully performed its part, that he did not expect much progress on the left of the I Corps on the first day of the battle; this relieved the temporary depression at our Headquarters very much.

The original plan of battle, suggested and urged by the French High Command, contemplated that the main attack be made by the I Corps, the left of the American Army. The plan advocated at the headquarters of the A. E. F. and of the First Army, and which was the one finally adopted, provided for

making the main attack from the center, for the following reasons:

(a) The enemy was in less force and his positions were not so strong opposite our center.

(b) An advance through the enemy's center would deprive him of commanding ground from which his batteries had been delivering an effective fire against the left of our army.

(c) Seizure of the high ground north of our center would deprive the enemy of facilities for organizing and launching a strong counter attack, failing in which the whole right of his army in our front would have to go back.

To these good reasons might be added the fact that an attack proceeding from the center would have the support of American troops on both flanks, and that, as between armies, there could be neither division of credit, in case of success, nor shifting of blame for a possible failure.

Towards the close of this eventful day the suggestion was made to General Liggett that the I Corps be among the troops ordered to march into Germany, with Coblenz or Cologne for its eventual objective.

THE PURSUIT

During the entire day of November 3 there was a vigorous continuation of the pursuit. The enemy was retreating so rapidly that it was difficult to keep up with him and maintain contact; he seemed to be unable to recover from the surprising progress of our attack. The 78th Division reached Boult-aux-Bois, Briulles and Authe on this day. At dusk the I Corps line extended through St. Pierremont and Verrières.²

All roads north of the Aire River, south of our front, were badly congested; conditions were made worse by frequent heavy rains.

Our troops pressed forward through St. Pierremont and Sommauthe during the fourth of November; the corps advance passed Oches.

² The Corps boundaries for November 3 had been prescribed as follows:

Eastern: Sivry—Buzancy—Vaux—Beaumont, exclusive.

Western: Briquenay—Germont—Oches—Stonne—Flaba—Autrecourt, all inclusive.

In orders from the First Army, dated November 3, the western boundary of the I Corps (which was also the western boundary of the First American Army), was changed so as to pass through Briquenay—Germont—Briulles—Les Petites Armoises—Tannay—Chémery (eastern half)—Bulson—Thelennes—Bazeilles, all inclusive, and there it remained until the I Corps was relieved from the front.

The 42nd Division moved to the north of Briquenay; the 80th was in Buzancy.

The enemy bombed Grand Pré, Marcq and Harricourt in the night. A few men were killed, and Major Gray of the 6th Division Staff lost an arm.

Headquarters of the I Corps moved to Harricourt in the forenoon of November 5. Soon after our arrival the enemy sent over a series of artillery concentrations of various calibers, which disturbed us considerably. Several hours later it was discovered that the building occupied for office purposes was heavily mined. The charges of high explosive had been correctly placed but, fortunately, in the hurry of departure, somebody had failed to complete the wiring of the circuits.

The pursuit continued on this day. The 42d Division (replacing the 78th) was north of Tannay; the 77th was north of Besace; and the 80th was going towards Yoncq.

General Pershing arrived at our headquarters at 3.30 P.M. He was much pleased with the progress of the corps, and said that when Raucourt was reached there might be a pause in the operations to enable the supplies and communications to catch up; but he had no

idea of slowing up the operations, and if he considered a delay at all it must have been a very brief one of local character. There was a tremendous amount of traffic on the roads, but road discipline and traffic regulations were so well observed that the General was able to make the trip through Grand Pré, Beffu and Briquenay, and then to the V Corps, without being held up at any point.

The western boundary of the I Corps sector, as prescribed in orders of the First Army since November 3, shut us out from going to Sedan or its immediate vicinity, until the following message was received:

Received, 18.30, Nov. 5, '18.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERALS, 1ST CORPS, 5TH CORPS.


Subject: Message from the Commander-in-Chief.

1. General Pershing desires that the honor of entering Sedan should fall to the 1st American Army. He has every confidence that the troops of the *1st Corps*, assisted on their *right* by the 5th Corps, will enable him to realize this desire.
2. In transmitting the foregoing

message, your attention is invited to the favorable opportunity now existing for pressing our advance throughout the night. Boundaries will not be considered as binding. By command of Lieutenant General Liggett:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

In considering the tenor of this message and its bearing on the question of boundaries, the subordinate commanders could only assume that there was an understanding with the French High Command, in conformity with the spirit of a recent directive from Marshal Pétain, in which he stated: "In its present phase the battle should be conducted with energy, leaving the enemy no respite." And General Maistre, commanding the group of French armies on our left, had stated in a letter that, for some time, more rapid progress could be expected east of the Bar than in the country west of that river, on account of the presence of defensive works confronting the French troops; and he also referred to high ground east of the Bar, the capture of which would provide artillery positions suitable for



MARCH OF THE 1ST DIVISION, NOVEMBER 6-7, 1918

the delivery of an oblique fire on such works.

On November 6 the I Corps continued its advance north, towards Sedan, but with the Chémery—Cheveuges national highway as

the western limit of the 42d Division, which had the left of the Corps. At 4.30 P.M. an airplane reported that our troops were passing Chehéry—two miles beyond our western corps boundary.

At 6.50 P.M. Colonel W. S. Grant of the First Army Staff, arrived and again transmitted orders to make Sedan, regardless of boundaries.

At 7.00 P.M. the Chief of Staff of the First Army came to our headquarters and reiterated the order to advance on Sedan, disregarding bounds.

Then Lieutenant Blanquet, liaison officer at our headquarters, who had been to the French army on our left, stated that Marshal Pétain was then at the headquarters of the IX French Corps, and that they were all very much worried about our encroachment on their sector.

With urging on my right and protesting on my left, this situation, for me in the middle, was decidedly interesting; but presently it became much more so, for at a little after 8.00 P.M. Lieutenant Hull, of the 1st Division, came to our headquarters with the information from his Commanding General that the

1st Division was marching on Sedan. This movement, which necessitated crossing of the entire sector of the I Corps, was so extraordinary that it was felt, at first, that it could only be in obedience to direct orders from the highest authority; and as the troops of the I Corps, then advancing towards Sedan, were without warning of this irruption then under way, it was realized that the danger of encounters, in the dark and rainy night, was imminent. Our staff officers, therefore, without delay, exerted themselves to the utmost to notify all concerned, and to assist in getting forward the artillery, ammunition and supplies of the 1st Division. A wireless message was sent to the Commanding General of the V Corps stating that the I Corps held the line of the Meuse, from south of Sedan to the extreme right of the corps sector.

During the night of November 6-7, the troops of the 1st Division, starting on a broad front extending from near Muzon to La Besace, marched in a general direction of northwest, in five columns, across the entire sector of the I Corps, interrupting the lines of communication, interfering, in a difficult and congested area, with the lines of supply, and

mingling with or passing through our troop formations.

Early in the morning complaints commenced to come in. General Menoher, commanding the 42d Division, reported that troops of the 1st Division mingled with his on the firing line, and that their trains and personnel were complicating his operations in such a way as to make the situation impossible.

A brigade commander of the 42d Division (General MacArthur) was arrested at the point of a pistol by a patrol of the 1st Division and brought into our lines, being taken for a German.

The commander of the 77th Division stated that he had encountered detachments of the 1st Division of various sizes, going in every direction.

Instructions were telephoned to the Commanding General of the 42d Division to take command of all troops in his sector. He issued orders accordingly, but the confusion was so great that it was impossible to exercise efficient control. Meanwhile the 1st Division, undeterred by the havoc it was creating, continued its progression, the 2d Brigade and the 7th

Field Artillery passing into the sector of the Fourth French Army. The 1st Brigade established its Command Post at Bulson; the 2d, at Chehéry; and the 1st Division, also at Chehéry, three kilometers within the French sector. The 2d Brigade then marched north, in the direction of Villers-sur-Bar, by way of Omicourt and Connage; the 26th Infantry (Roosevelt) reached the woods north of St. Aignan, about two miles northwest of Chehéry.

Then the French, through liaison officers and over the telephone, sent in protests. The French 40th Division accompanied its protest with the statement that they would be obliged to fire their artillery in accordance with their own sector limits. (See Appendix VI.)

General Maistre, commanding the Group of Armies of the Center, which included the Fourth French Army on our left, telephoned to the Commanding General, First Army, U. S., that "the progress of the 40th Division (French) is slowed up and rendered almost impossible by the presence of American troops on the road north of Chémery."

General Menoher said in a message:

Situation here as between 1st and 42d Divisions intolerable. Urgently recommend that orders from 1st Army be issued to straighten matters out.

But soon thereafter the following telegram to the Commanding General, V Corps, was repeated to General Menoher:

The Army Commander directs that troops of the 5th Army Corps be withdrawn from the zone of advance of the 1st Army Corps. Report when this is accomplished.—DRUM.

Some time was required to unscramble the complicated situation caused by the columns of the 1st Division and their transportation. With a fine aggressive spirit the troops of the 1st Division had responded to the demands of their chiefs by exertions in marching, night and day, which have had no equal in the American Expeditional Forces; on account of resultant fatigue an equally rapid withdrawal was out of the question.

The next day, November 8, General Menoher reported: "The confusion and congestion in this area continue, but the troops of

the 1st Division are gradually being withdrawn."

The point nearest to Sedan reached by our troops was on the hills overlooking Wadelincourt, a suburb of Sedan on the west bank of the Meuse. At the same time we had a footbridge across the Meuse at Villers-devant-Mouzon, with a battalion of infantry on the farther side. As the French came up, our troops were shifted to places within their sector limits.

Every assistance possible was rendered to the 1st Division in returning to its own corps; issues of 60,000 rations from our corps reserve were made for that purpose.

Major Reginald Kann, chief French liaison officer at our headquarters, was sent to the Commanding General of the Fourth French Army with my apologies for the intrusion of American troops on his sector. The general declined to accept the apology, saying that he knew that none was due from me; and also that he knew other things. What he meant by the last sentence is still a mystery.

The length of the front of the I Corps, along the Meuse on the line Thelonne—Mouzon, was

only six miles. In the evening of November 6 this line was occupied by the 42d and 77th Divisions. A fresh division, the 6th, was near the left, in the region Artaise—Stonne; a rested division, the 80th, was at Sommauthe. There was no room for more divisions in this area, in which roads leading towards the north were poor and scarce. The enemy was retreating in confusion. No assistance was needed by the I Corps, and none was asked for. Although various means of communication were available, no assistance was offered by the V Corps. Not even was inquiry made by telephone or wireless as to the positions of troops of the I Corps. And, as the Commanding General of the 1st Division states in his letter of December 19, 1918, that "the result was no information with reference to either the enemy or friendly troops between our left flank and the country northwest, towards Sedan," no assistance, in a spirit of coöperation, as contemplated by instructions, could ever have been intended. This is quite in agreement with his reported statement that "he had orders to take Sedan, and that he was going ahead, no matter what the 42d did."

Moreover, the fact that notice of the ad-

vance did not reach the headquarters of the I Corps until nearly six hours after the issue of orders therefor, raises the question whether this important information, directly affecting the affairs of the I Corps, was delayed until it would be too late to stop the movement.

It would be quite useless to discuss this affair from a tactical point of view. It requires no military knowledge whatever to realize that in an army, as in any other team, no useful results can be accomplished by disjointed individual efforts.

The enemy, in headlong retreat, could not take advantage of the disorder in our ranks, but there was danger of a serious calamity in another direction. If in that dark and rainy night, or in the foggy morning of November 7, there had been any encounters between the numerous fractions of troops pervading the area of the I Corps, some of them still engaged in mopping up the captured territory, deplorable casualties would have been almost inevitable, and a blot would have been cast upon the reputation of the American Army. Our remarkably fortunate escape from this perilous situation was due to the good sense of our junior officers, who had not lost their

nerve under the strain of battle, and to the efforts of our staff; and, perhaps, as the gifted Colonel A. L. Wagner used to say, during the Spanish-American War, there is a Providence which looks after the United States.

"Helping your neighbor," with temporary crossing of dividing lines, was an established principle in the Allied Armies, and hardly required such instructions as "Boundaries will not be considered as binding." The controlling words of that message (*the italics are mine*), having been completely disregarded, the last sentence was made the untenable excuse for the futile action taken. The fact that this movement was initiated without the knowledge of the Commander of the I Corps and of the French division on our left, gives an unfavorable aspect to the whole affair.

What impression did this demonstration make on the opinion of our Allies concerning loyalty and discipline in the American Army? Did they feel that a year of association had wrought but little change in the characteristics so lucidly set forth by General Ragueneau in his official reports? It is comforting to remember that this is the only incident of its kind

that occurred in the American Army during the entire war.

The Commander of the First Army, General Liggett, characterized the movement of the 1st Division, November 6-7, 1918, as the worst tactical atrocity that had ever come to his knowledge. What the Commander-in-Chief said about it will not be published without his permission; it was not complimentary.

Under date of November 7, 1918, in reply to a protest by General Maistre, our First Army ordered "a thorough investigation into this question and all the circumstances connected therewith." No investigation ever was made, for it soon was called off by a verbal order. The war was over!

In the autumn of 1918 there were no troops in Europe, beside the Americans, who could have forced their way through the fortified fastnesses of the Argonne Forest. During four years of war our Allies had lost such a large percentage of their best men that it is doubtful whether any of their armies would have been capable of the sustained effort necessary to make a serious impression on the formidable defenses.

The battle of November 1 and 2, 1918, is the greatest feat of arms ever performed by an American Army. The plan was purely American, and the tactical execution was the climax of the American fighting spirit.

The battle is a classic, and will forever be recognized as the final blow that drove the hosts of Germany to the very verge of collapse and ended the war.

IX

TO THE RHINE

ON the eighth of November the I Corps began to disappear from the front, the 78th and 80th Divisions being withdrawn towards the south; the 42d and 77th Divisions were assigned to the V Corps. The next day the French took over the entire sector of the I Corps on the Meuse.

The French High Command was not taking any more chances with Sedan but moved the western boundary of our Army seven miles to the east, on the line Mouzon—Stonne, and directed that preparations be made for another advance, east of the Meuse.

Most positive and explicit instructions, concerning the conduct of our troops with reference to the prospective armistice, were received from Army Headquarters on November 8, by telegraph. On the same day a telegram from General Pershing, sent apparently in order to leave no room for misunderstanding about con-

and push him with all energy to secure decisive results.

Long experience with the enemy had taught that it was unwise to allow him to play for time.

On the tenth of November the Headquarters of the I Corps moved from Harricourt back to Châtel Chehéry, and there patiently awaited the dénouement of what was probably the most dramatic situation in the history of the world.

At 7.20 A.M. of November eleventh definite official instructions were received to cease military operations at 11.00 A.M. that day. This put into effect the provisions of the telegraphic orders to Corps Commanders received on the eighth.

The German collapse appeared to be complete. It was at once realized that acceptance of all the drastic terms of the armistice made resumption of hostilities impossible and that final peace was only a question of time.

In the fox holes, trenches and dugouts, in shell-torn villages and dilapidated châteaux, and among the personnel of the never-ceasing war traffic, there came a great feeling of re-

lief: The war actually was over! At the fateful hour of 11, a profound silence pervaded the land; the thunder of the great guns and the nerve-racking rattle of the minor machines of war alike were hushed, and all thoughts turned towards home and country. Then came the reaction. In their exuberance and in the joy of having come safe and sound out of the greatest struggle in history, the soldiers set off all the pyrotechnics within reach; and the most abstemious among the officers sacrificed their last cherished reserves in a heartfelt toast to peace and happiness.

THE THIRD ARMY

The order directing the formation of the Third American Army, with Headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois, was drawn up four days before the armistice, but it was not put into effect until several days later; official notification did not come to me until the thirteenth of November.

The organization of this force of over 200,000 men (Appendix VIII) was effected in less than a week. The staff began to arrive in the forenoon of November 15; at midnight the order for the first march was issued, and all

sections of the staff were sufficiently complete to function satisfactorily.

The divisions designated were those which had rendered the most conspicuous service during the war; the selection was a reward for valor and hard fighting. Of the numerous applicants to accompany the Third Army on this historic march many had to be disappointed.

The duties of the Third Army were to follow the withdrawing German forces, see that the terms of the armistice were complied with, and eventually to occupy bridgeheads on the east bank of the Rhine.

The difficulties of the march of so large a force through devastated or partly exhausted territory, the scarcity of food and forage, and the bad condition of the roads, called for staff work of the highest order.

With the Fifth French Army on the north, and the Tenth French Army on the south, our Third Army began its march to the Rhine at 5.30 A.M., November 17. At this hour the leading divisions crossed the front lines to move into territory which had for four years been under German rule. It was an impres-

sive spectacle as the long lines swept forward across the fields and on the roads, each individual soldier feeling that he was participating in an event that would live long in the history of his country.

All the units of each organization were in place and the march commenced in perfect order. The weather was clear and cool, very comfortable for the exertions of the march.

The engineers made the necessary repairs of roads and bridges for the passage of the troops. The Signal Corps had telephones installed when the various headquarters arrived at their new posts of command, with communication to both flanks and rear. At the end of the first day's march the troops had reached the general line Ecouvieux—Mars-la-Tour.

On November 18 the Army advanced to the line St. Léger—Longwy—Briey; Army Headquarters to Longuyon. The troops of the Third Army were acclaimed as liberators as they passed through the cities and villages of the territory released from German control. The ovation along the line of march was continuous, the people greeting our soldiers with a welcome beyond description.

General Jacobi, the German commander,

had left Longuyon three days before our arrival. We found the town to be clean and otherwise in good condition. We took possession of 200 cannon, 1000 machine guns and a lot of other material of war parked in vacant lots, ready to be surrendered. Increasing numbers of former prisoners—French, English, and some Americans—were coming in. They were all well cared for, the Americans being greeted with demonstrations of joy and then returned to their comrades in the ranks.

The people of Longuyon said that after the disasters resulting from the Chemin-des-Dames drive of the Germans, towards the end of May, they gave up their cause for lost, and that their hopes did not begin to revive until the Americans were heard from.

In the morning of November 19 a group of ladies and young girls of the city of Longuyon awaited me at the municipal building, where they had assembled for the purpose of paying a tribute to the American Army. The *Marseillaise* was sung with deep feeling, addresses were made replete with expressions of gratitude to America and of praise for our soldiers, and then a laurel wreath, tied with the colors of France, was bestowed upon me. In this little

scene there spoke the heart of the people, unspoiled by envy, jealousy or politics. Its effect upon me rendered my reply halting and inadequate; but, although the leaves of the laurel have long since crumbled into dust, the bow of tri-colored ribbons still is treasured, along with the memories of the occasion.

The Burgomaster of Luxemburg called the following day and offered a reception, which was declined. General Pershing came at noon and expressed himself as pleased with the progress of our troops. Formal entry into the city of Luxemburg and review of a regiment was arranged to take place next day. All our divisions had entered Luxemburg territory.

The Third Army continued its triumphal progress on November 21. The advance elements of the III Corps marched through the city of Luxemburg, which was in gala attire, and passed in review before the palace of the Grand Duchess. On the balcony, beside the gracious young lady and her sister, were General Pershing and his Army and Corps Commanders, and some local dignitaries. The troops made a fine appearance and looked the sturdy warriors they were; the people exhib-

ited great enthusiasm. A general holiday had been declared and thousands swarmed in from the surrounding country to see the soldiers from across the sea who had caused the downfall of the Kaiser. The review was followed by a reception with the usual ceremonies, speeches and refreshments.

During the course of the day the Army reached the general line Vichten—Mersch—Schuttrange—Kattenhofen.

The main part of the city of Luxemburg is situated on a rocky plateau—elevation about 1100 feet—and is surrounded on three sides by the valleys of the Pétrusse and the Alzette, which in places have the appearance of true canyons about six hundred feet deep. The seat of the Counts of Luxemburg, the city passed to the Low Countries in 1477. It was an important fortress for centuries and was frequently besieged by French and Spanish armies. In 1815 Luxemburg became connected with Holland as a duchy; since 1890 it has been an independent grand duchy. Propaganda soon after the armistice failed to induce the people to petition for incorporation in the French Republic.

Luxemburg is an attractive and interesting little city of about 25,000 inhabitants. It has many fine buildings and the scenery is highly picturesque. The views are especially good from the viaducts and along the road descending into the valley of the Alzette. The well-kept parks and forests of the city and vicinity furnish a refreshing contrast to the scrubby and mutilated forest growth of the Argonne.

The enemy completed his withdrawal from the territory of Luxemburg on November 22, his rear guard making a clean sweep. On this day our troops of the III, IV and VII Corps were at Junglinster, Hesperange and Dunsur-Meuse, respectively; Third Army Headquarters was established in Hollerich, a suburb of Luxemburg.

The troops of the Third Army reached the Luxemburg-German frontier the next day, with instructions not to cross until further orders. German troops were observed marching at various points beyond the border; some delay on our part therefore was necessary to allow them to get clear.

The territory of Luxemburg, along its eastern and northern limits, is separated from

Germany by the Moselle and the Sauer. Its total area is only about 1000 square miles. The general character of the country is that of a rolling tableland, elevation about one thousand feet, into which the watercourses have made deep cuts. There are no large forests, and the soil appears to be well cultivated. The principal industries are agriculture and mining. Outside of the city of Luxemburg the appearance and language of the natives are German. The names of many of the villages have the German termination "ingen," the French form of which is "ange."

Marshal Foch called on me at the hotel, on November 25, and in the return call was found on his special train at the station. He received me very affably, lit his small straight-stemmed briar, and we engaged in a pleasant half hour of confidential conversation.

He instructed me to secure a list of the German suspects in Luxemburg and to deport them. He said it would be necessary for our armies to occupy positions beyond the Rhine and to prepare them for defense.

He expressed high admiration for the American troops and said that he realized that

hard tasks had been assigned to them in the operations.

Referring to the armistice the Marshal stated that another week of operations would have brought to the German armies the greatest military disaster in history, but that it would have cost 100,000 more casualties, and that for that reason he was satisfied when our drastic terms for an armistice were accepted.

Financial questions came in for serious consideration at this time. The French adopted as a basis of exchange the rate of one mark equal to 70 centimes; but they dropped it in a few hours, for the people of Belgium, Luxemburg, Alsace and Lorraine claimed that they would lose half of their money, which then was current at mark equal franc.

The Minister of Finance of Luxemburg came forward with the proposition that the American paymasters convert their francs into marks at the rate of one franc equal to eight-tenths of a mark and then pay our officers and soldiers in German currency. After the enthusiasm of our reception and the expressions of gratitude so frequently heard, this scheme to unload their German paper at our expense came with a distinct shock; but, apparently,

it was only a forerunner of the multitude of exaggerated claims subsequently preferred against our government. Under this plan the Americans would pay 22 cents for a mark, the nominal purchasing power of which was $171\frac{1}{2}$ cents, but whose actual value was an uncertain and rapidly diminishing quantity. My staff did not pretend to have a knowledge of *haute finance*, but this proposition placed a rather low estimate on our intelligence, and could be justified only on the theory that Uncle Sam would accept any excuse for parting with his money to Europeans. The question was referred to higher authority, with suitable remarks.

It was at about this time that General Schuler, Commander of the 48th French Division, informed me that his division was to form part of the Third American Army. Upon inquiry it developed that the Allied High Command had endeavored to break up the American Army and scatter its divisions among the Allied Corps. This met with a strong protest, under threat to carry the appeal to the President. A break with the War Department might result in withdrawal by the Americans from participation in the occupa-

tion; and while our troops no longer were indispensable to the Allies, they still needed our money. Hence the compromise proposition of assigning two French divisions to the American Army about to march into Germany.

This brought up several important questions. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to exercise full disciplinary control over French troops, their standards being different from ours. On account of differences in the ration there would have to be an independent line of supply. About one-third of General Schuler's division consisted of Senegalese, and this would bring up the color question.

The war had been long and bitter; some retaliation was to be expected. Yet it was felt that if some white woman or child, even if German, were abused by negroes, even if French, in the presence of American soldiers, summary action would probably be taken by the latter, and this might give rise to serious conflicts. The proposition was seen to be loaded with possibilities of far-reaching trouble, and therefore urgent appeal was made to keep the Colonials out of the Third Army.

Several interesting stories were current at this time. One was to the effect that instruc-

tions had been issued to hold the Americans down to the command of divisions. Another that King Albert had assumed direct command of his Army, dismissing General Degoutte from his counsel. Then it was reported that Marshal Foch had ordered that all the American troops back of the first line be set to work repairing French roads and villages. Ever since July it had been noticed that the Paris papers contained very meager, if any, accounts of American battles, and it was suspected that the reporters had instructions to minimize their stories of American participation in operations at the front. Apparently the American newspapers are not the only ones that supply their subscribers with the kind of reading matter they want.

Officers of the French Colonial Division (48th) asserted that they had orders assigning them to the Third Army, but nothing in that line came from our General Headquarters. There was a suggestion that the President take direct command of his Army, placing it on the same footing with the British and Belgian armies.

The situation indicated a general drift towards lack of cordiality between the Allies,

which was deplorable, and for which the Americans did not feel that they were in any way to blame. Americans as a rule are good-natured, but if there is one thing they would resent, it is an air of arrogance or superiority. As they were on pleasant terms with the officers of the Allied Forces at the front, they felt that there must be some sinister political influences at work, and hoped for a modification of intransigent and chauvinistic tendencies and an early return to better mutual understanding.

In its march to the German frontier the Third Army had kept close touch with the retreating forces under von Gallwitz. Supplies and communications had been maintained without a hitch, and each day's objective had been reached at the appointed hour. More difficult marching conditions as to weather, roads and terrain were to be expected in the hill country towards the east and north.

The region between Luxemburg and the Rhine is an upland, with an elevation of from 800 to 1,500 feet above sea level. The Moselle has cut a deep and tortuous channel through this region in a general northeasterly direction, from Wasserbillig to Coblenz. The country to the south of this river is known as

the "Hunsrück"; to the north, as the "Eifel." There are no hill ranges, properly speaking, but erosion by numerous streams tributary to the Moselle and the Rhine has made the country very rough. If the "Hunsrück" is named after a dog's back, as the word would indicate, it must have belonged to a lean and hungry canine, for the ridges are very prominent, as was found by the IV Corps during its march.

In the "Eifel" there are numerous extinct volcanoes, notably between Mayen and Andernach. The cones have nearly all been obliterated, but there are many evidences of volcanic action—lava streams, tufa beds and crater lakes.

These uplands are a poor and cold country, barely supporting a sparse population through cattle raising and mining. In the deep and narrow valleys, however, on account of the lower altitude and sheltered southern exposure, the climate favors the special industry of the country, the production of highly prized wines. The vine is cultivated in the shale detritus of the hillsides held in place by numerous retaining walls forming the picturesque terraces observed along the Moselle and the Rhine. The amount of labor involved, ac-

ording to our western ideas, is enormous, for the only transportation to many of the fields is on the backs of men.

After a delay of more than a week in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, the Third Army crossed the German frontier at 5.30 A.M., December 1, along its whole front, Echternach to Schengen. The Fifth French Army having been pinched out, British forces now joined our left flank during the remainder of the march. All the flags and decorations that had been put up to welcome the German Army home were taken down and removed as the American troops entered the various villages along the line of march. The German civilian population and the returned soldiers received the American entry quietly. They stood at the village street corners and along the roads gazing as the troops passed by; it was the first time in over one hundred years that a hostile flag at the head of foreign troops passed over their soil. There was a mixture of curiosity and stolid indifference in their attitude, but no disturbance of any kind took place. The only armed Germans whom the Third Army met were ex-soldiers serving as policemen or

guards still wearing parts of their uniform, but most of them had white brassards on their arms.

The Headquarters of the III Corps arrived at Echternach, the IV at Grevenmacher, and the VII at Vitron.

The next day the Third Army resumed its march, without encountering any disturbing incident. The troops were in fine spirits and keen to make progress towards the Rhine, considering their arrival on the banks of that river as the concluding demonstration of their victory.

As the troops entered the hilly country which was to extend all the way to the Rhine, marching conditions became more unfavorable. The roads, of inferior construction in the first place, had been subjected to severe service and were badly cut up by the retreating German armies; the direction of the march made it necessary to cross many deep valleys, instead of traveling parallel to water-courses or along the summits of divides. There were many long hills to climb; the horses were unable to drag the heavy guns up the entire length of the slopes and had to be helped by the men.

The food conditions in this part of Germany were better than the advance notices had indicated; there were no evidences of starvation.

As our army advanced, the German Third and Fifth Armies were falling back in good order, excellent discipline being enforced by their rear guards. The terms of the armistice were carried out in full as the German retreat continued.

On December 3 the Third Army Headquarters arrived at Bitburg; III Corps at Kyllburg; IV Corps at Schweich.

My billet at Bitburg was in the fine residence of Mr. Theobald Simon, whose brewery and source of wealth was hard by. Mr. Simon was a veteran of the war of 1870, had traveled extensively in America where he went to pick up new ideas, and appeared to be intelligent and progressive. His two sons had been officers during the war, but now they had their coats off and were scouring kettles in the brewery, preparing to resume business at the old stand. The days of the Empire were over for them, sure enough.

The Army being now well into Germany, steps were taken to carry out the orders which had been issued concerning the treatment to

be accorded to the population. Fraternization and social intimacy were not permitted, but the local authorities were to continue their functions, the personal rights of the people to be respected, and property protected. The Third Army entered the country as a conquering force, but not as a destructive one resorting to deeds of violence.

The Third Army continued its advance and reached the line Berncastel—Wittlich—Oberkehl on December 4.

Several interviews were had with the Burgo-master of Trier. This gentleman was in poor health and appeared to be greatly depressed. He expressed himself as pleased with the conduct of our soldiers and stated that the Americans were the only hope of his people to receive fair treatment.

The cold, drizzling rains of winter had set in, making the roads soft and slippery. The movement of the army transportation became a tremendous task; all hands had to put their shoulders to the wheel. But the spirit of the men was so fine that nobody thought of falling out. They feared that if overcome they would be carried off to some hospital and never see the Rhine!

Berncastel brought back memories of the days, ten years before the war, when the Adjutant at Fort Myer, Virginia, Captain E. B. Cassatt, gave *recherché* luncheons, at which his favorite wine was the *Berncasteler Doctor*. From the best restaurant in Berncastel a special letter was indited to the captain, telling him that the Doctor was as pleasant on his native heath as he used to be in the far-away American garrison. Such are the vicissitudes of a varied army career!

The Army continued its laborious progress towards the Rhine and on the seventh was on the general line Mayen—Simmern. The discipline of the troops had been above criticism; no disagreeable incident of any kind occurred to mar the perfection of the movement. The impression made was so favorable that the authorities of Coblenz requested that the advance of a part of the forces be expedited in order to afford police protection to the city.

A French captain, on duty at our Headquarters as interpreter, attacked a German civilian engaged in distributing the mail, by seizing his ears, shaking his head and striking him in the face. It may be that the captain, or his family, had suffered such loss, or re-

ceived such treatment during the war, that a bit of retaliation was in a measure excusable; but the captain's conduct was an open violation of American orders, and he had to go. His connection with our Headquarters was severed, and he departed at once.

Field orders of this day stated that the German Army had completed its withdrawal across the Rhine, and that the Third Army would continue the advance on the ninth. The III Corps was at Daun; the IV at Zell; and the VII at Grevenmacher.

The 2d Battalion of the 39th Infantry, 4th Division, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Lockett, left Trier at 9.00 A.M., December 8, by rail, and arrived in Coblenz at 2.30. A guard was at once established to tide over the interim between the departure of the last of the German troops and the arrival of the American Army, which was not due until the eleventh. All the war correspondents accredited to the American Army went on this train so as to be able to tell the story of the first American troops to reach the Rhine.

Major Reginald Kann (recently killed in the Riff), Chief French Liaison Officer at our Headquarters, stated that the position of the

French officers and soldiers on duty with the Third Army was becoming intolerable; that there were no restrictions on the German people, who received better treatment from the Americans than from their own Prussian officers.

Evidently the psychological moment had arrived for a straight talk and a show-down on this important question. The French officers were told that the American Army had a larger and more varied experience in the military government of occupied territory than any European army, and that the record made in Cuba, the Philippines and China was creditable to that army and satisfactory to the American people. My remarks then continued about as follows: "The Third Army is not granting exceptional favors to the people of the territory it now occupies, but is only carrying out what has been the policy of the American government for over 100 years. In accordance with this policy, which is traditional with the American Army, prisoners receive humane treatment; women, children and non-combatants in general, are free from molestation; personal rights, including freedom of religion and the right of petition, are respected;

and property of all kinds, public and private, is protected. Local authorities are expected to continue the exercise of their functions, and the demands of our occupying forces are usually limited to measures for protection of the health and the security of the troops. Supplies obtained in the occupied area are paid for at market prices. This policy has remained the same, whether dealing with the savages of the Great West, the Malays of Luzon and the Visayas, the Moro fanatics of Sulu and Mindanao, or the strangely different people of North China, and will not be changed now when we are in a civilized country, unless orders are received to the contrary, which are not expected. There never has been a time when the American people or their government would have tolerated a serious departure from this just and humane policy. While no fraternization with the inhabitants of a country with which, technically, we still are at war, will be permitted, nagging and badgering with a view to stirring up resentment and resistance, and a demand for cringing servility from a defeated people, are considered unsportsmanlike and un-American."

In a personal letter to General Pershing it

was urgently recommended that there be no change in this policy which already was producing excellent results and which could not fail to redound to the credit of the American Army, at home and abroad.

The Headquarters of the Third Army moved to Mayen on December 10, through a picturesque and romantic country, by way of Prüm, Gerolstein and Dockweiler, and made preparations for the final stage of the advance to the Rhine.

The conduct of the troops throughout the now practically completed march had been most gratifying. The inhabitants everywhere conducted themselves in a reserved and dignified manner. There were no complaints from any source.

The coördination of the progress of the units of the Army, and the services of supply and communications, under difficult climatic and road conditions, in a foreign and unfamiliar country, constitute a masterpiece of staff efficiency of which the Army and the American people will long be proud.

X

ON THE RHINE

DURING the final stages of the advance of the Third Army to the Rhine, staff officers were sent forward to study conditions and prepare plans for the crossing of the river and occupation of the Coblenz bridgehead.

On the eleventh of December personal inspection was made of a number of buildings in Coblenz, among them the Kaiser Palast, the General Commando building, the Festhalle and the Regierungsgebäude. The last is a fine, large, and practically new structure situated on the river front and admirably suited to serve as administrative headquarters of an army.

In the meantime the French High Command had experienced a change of mind and reduced the frontage of the Third Army on the Rhine by about forty per cent, the northern extremity remaining at Rolandseck, but the southern being moved up from Bacharach

to Rhens. The reasons for this change are not known; perhaps it was pique at our refusal to have Colonial Troops in the Third Army. Thus, while the American Armies formed fully one-third of the Allied strength, only one-twelfth of the front from Holland to Switzerland was assigned to them. But this occasioned no regrets, for the Americans did not expect to stay there very long anyway, after the signing of a treaty of peace.

Pursuant to orders of December 12 the advance units of the III Corps, under command of Major General J. L. Hines, crossed the Rhine at 7.00 A.M., December 13. In addition to the bridge of boats at Coblenz, three railroad bridges at Coblenz, Engers and Remagen were available, and no difficulty whatever was encountered. The 3d Division, which arrived on the Rhine on December 10, after an arduous trip across the *Hunsrück*, from Schengen to Boppard, resumed its march on the fourteenth, along the left bank, over fine roads and through the most picturesque part of the Rhine valley, and on the seventeenth settled down in Kreis Mayen, the new assignment made after reduction of our front. The 4th Division, also marching across the



THIRD DIVISION PASSING THROUGH COBLENZ



BURG COCHEM
Heraldic Figure and Ancient Gun

Hunsrück, was turned north within thirteen miles of the Rhine, and recrossed the Moselle at Treis and Alf.

The march of the Third Army was the longest ever made by American troops in Europe, the distances for divisions of the III and IV Corps ranging from 225 to 250 miles. In some instances a single day's march exceeded 30 miles. The ability to carry heavy packs over hilly and muddy roads, for such distances, indicates very clearly the superb physical condition the men had attained.

The movement of the command and staff of the Third Army ¹ from Mayen to Coblenz was effected on the 15th of December, and our

¹ By the seventeenth of December the Third Army, henceforth also known as the Army of Occupation, was established in the Rhine Provinces, as follows:

III Corps: Neuwied
(Gen. J. L. Hines)
1st Division: Montabaur
2d Division: Heddesdorf
32d Division: Rengsdorf

IV Corps: Cochem
(Gen. C. H. Muir)
3d Division: Andernach
4th Division: Bad Bertrich
42d Division: Ahrweiler

VII Corps: Wittlich
(Gen. W. G. Haan)
89th Division: Kylburg
90th Division: Berncastel

The lines forming the perimeter of the bridgehead area occupied by our troops were plainly marked and the civil authorities informed of the limits.

Headquarters established in the *Regierungsgebäude*, on the river front. Near by is the broad bridge of boats across the Rhine, which is one of the sights of the city. It carries an immense traffic and is in use day and night all the year round, except for occasional brief intervals on account of ice or high floods.

During a visit to Trier on December 11 pursuant to telegraphic instructions to call on Marshal Foch, inquiry was made as to when it would be convenient to pay my respects. The Marshal said that he would not fix a time but would hunt me up at the *Hotel Porta Nigra*. He called at 2.00 P.M. next day, and we had a pleasant chat of ten minutes. It is presumed that these courtesies were intended to counteract a feeling of resentment against French treatment which had begun to make its appearance in the American Army.

Returning on the thirteenth, a visit was made to the Headquarters of the IV Corps at Cochem. General Muir, the Corps Commander, was found very comfortably installed at *Burg Cochem*, which is situated on a peak on the left bank of the Moselle, about one mile south of the town of Cochem, the prettiest in the Moselle valley.

This old imperial castle formerly belonged to the Archbishops of Trier; it was destroyed by the French in 1689, and restored about 1875. The present owner is a major in the German Army. The castle is in fine condition, and while it contains many well-preserved specimens of ancient arms and armor, wood carvings and tapestries, the household equipment is quite modern. The view of the Moselle valley is unsurpassed.

The inspection necessary to get acquainted with the troops of the Third Army and their locations afforded good opportunities to visit many of the historic points of interest of this part of Germany. One of the first was *Burg Eltz*, by way of Münstermaifeld and Wierschem.

This well-preserved medieval castle dates back more than four hundred years before the landing of the Pilgrims; somehow it escaped destruction during the many wars of the intervening centuries. The ancestral residence of the Counts of Eltz, it is perched on a lofty rock in the heart of a great forest, and with its numerous gables, towers, turrets, buttresses and bastions, forms a most romantic picture. As we approached the massive structure over

a narrow causeway, the view in the failing light of a bleak and blustery December evening, had something mysterious and weird, calling to mind the gnomes and elves of *Grimm's Fairy Tales*. True to this setting, the gatekeeper across the drawbridge was a hunch-backed, hook-nosed dwarf whose likeness may be found on the cover of London *Punch*. A group of long-haired witches, in conical head-dress, scudding across the moon on broom-sticks, would no longer have surprised me, as a final touch to complete the spooky scene.

The proprietor lives in Hungary, but is required to spend two weeks in the castle in August of each year to retain the title. Like many of these ancient structures, the *Burg* has its ghost story. It appears that the young lady of the castle was wooed and won by a neighboring feudal baron. At a great feast in celebration of this event the prospective groom became very drunk, and was refused the customary engagement kiss. The party broke up in a bitter quarrel which involved friends and retainers on both sides. In a subsequent defense of her castle the young mistress donned armor and was killed in single combat by her former lover, who also was killed in the fray,

and ever since, each year at midnight of the fateful day, haunts the castle and is heard to bemoan his folly.

The Rhine at Coblenz is a deep, clear and rapid stream about 400 yards wide. Even in this period of depression, between actual war and settled peace, there is an enormous traffic in both directions. It is the most important waterway of Central Europe, if not of the world, and furnishes cheap transportation for the populous valley of the Rhine, from Switzerland to the North Sea.

On a precipitous cliff on the opposite bank, about 400 feet above the river, stands the Fortress of Ehrenbreitstein. The present structure is only about 100 years old, but it is completely out of date for military purposes. From the ramparts there is a fine view of the river from Andernach to Stolzenfels. The fortress is conspicuous among the picturesque attractions of the noble river; but after we broke out the largest American flag that could be found in the entire A. E. F., from the tallest staff of the fortress, 500 feet above the water, and its folds were straightened out against the eastern sky by a stiff breeze, the sight to the American soldier was the finest in

the world; and many a foreigner gazed upon its beauties with envy.

When the proposition was made to raze the fortress, it was resisted by the Americans, for to them Ehrenbreitstein and Cochem are the outstanding landmarks of the American occupation.

Our treatment of the civilian population was a continuation of the system inaugurated during the march, and may be summed up in two words—firmness and justice. The Germans were made to realize that the American Army came as victors, but without arrogance, brutality or harshness. The people in the main were permitted to continue their former mode of life. Certain regulations were promulgated concerning acts tending to hamper the American administration; unfriendly propaganda in newspapers was prohibited; and persons desiring to leave were required to secure passes. This fair treatment was appreciated, for no disturbing incidents arose.

A second issue of a proclamation to the people, as issued from G.H.Q., was recalled on account of errors in printing and of changes to be made in the hours and rules of circula-

tion. The final reasonable form of these instructions to the people was not adopted without a controversy with those who insisted on drastic regulations. Within a few weeks thereafter a report was received that the British and the French were going to make their regulations more liberal, in fact, were coming around to the system inaugurated by the Third Army.

There was a rumor to the effect that the French were about to revoke the reduction of the American bridgehead. General Mangin, after a review with me of the Moroccan regiment, 48th Division, in front of the Kaiser Palast, stated that the reduction was the result of a tie-up at their General Headquarters. This statement, of course, has to be taken with allowance, but it indicated a drift towards modification of the situation, so that abatement of French arrogance and American assurance could bring about at least a semblance of cordial relationship.

Two French liaison officers were sent away from Coblenz on account of brutality to civilians on the occasion of the review of the Moroccan regiment. There were near riots in Trier and conflicts between American military

police and French soldiers. The wisdom of keeping French and American troops separated became more apparent every day.

Dinner with General Pershing on his train on December 22. He stated that the Luxembourg frontier was to be closed, and requested me to call on General Mangin and report feeling. He was noncommittal on the suggestion that the American divisions be sent home via the Rhine and Antwerp or Rotterdam, utilizing the six big river passenger boats in our possession to float them down to the ocean liners, thus avoiding the tedious journey of a week on the straw, across 500 miles of northern France to Brest, on the cars of the *Karrantumwe-Shvo* (40 hommes, 8 chevaux) lines. Incidentally, this would release a lot of railroad transportation, of which the French claimed to be very short. We had sent across 1,200 new locomotives and about 14,000 new freight cars, of at least double the capacity of European cars; had salvaged about 40,000 cars from the railroad graveyards and put them in running order; and 50,000 cars had come from Germany under the terms of the armistice. Yet in the spring we had difficulty in getting trains to take our troops to points of embarkation.

However, when General W. D. Connor was sent to Antwerp with a staff to look into the establishment of an evacuation base, the French railroad authorities got wind of it, and thereafter we had no trouble in getting all the transportation needed.

It was proposed that supplies of all kinds obtained by the Allies from private persons in the Rhineland on forced requisitions be not paid for, but that receipts be given on which claim for payment could be made to the German government. This plan was strongly opposed and rejected by the Third Army as a hardship on the persons forced to give up their property, and as contrary to the dignity and practice of the American government, which did not depend upon third parties to settle its just debts.

The holiday season found the Rhineland quiet and the people celebrating Christmas in a subdued and orderly way.

On the bank of the historic river, in front of Third Army Headquarters, stood a giant Christmas tree, a blaze of colored lights. Around its base one of our bands played Christmas carols. High above the crowd, between the stately towers of the building, a

great cross shone radiantly, illuminating the broad stretches of the Rhine, a symbol of the American contribution to Peace and Good Will on Earth.

Lunch with General Mangin at Mayence on December 26; guard of honor to receive me. Eight American officers were present, among them Generals Hines and Haan and Colonel T. B. Mott. General Mangin toasted the Third Army, and after many kindly expressions of praise and appreciation, said he hoped that minor differences would not be permitted to disturb the good feeling between the American and French armies.

General Mangin required no hint from higher authority to cultivate the *entente cordiale*: that had always been his practice and was perfectly natural to his frank and generous character. No friction with him ever was heard of; he shared with General Gouraud the unbounded admiration of the American Army, who looked upon them as the finest soldiers of France. The general complimented my reply, which terminated with the remark that "America's affection for France cannot be impaired by trivial incidents and differences of opinion," and said that it is easy to make an

address when you know your subject and speak from the heart.

On the way back to Coblenz the road along the Rhine was found to be badly congested with the transportation of troops moving into the French area. This was due to deficient road discipline and poor staff work; many of the experienced hands had been demobilized or were home on leave. The drivers said they had been on the road two days, and the men and animals showed it.

One of the unhappiest experiences of war, by the way, is to be tied up in a road jam of traffic for hours, utterly unable to resist or evade the attacks of airplanes firing machine guns or dropping bombs.

From the day when the Third Army began its advance, all the enemy's movements were carefully watched by our Intelligence Section. The morale of his troops, the condition of his horses, the processes of demobilization and all other items of useful information were gathered by an efficient secret service from day to day. The Army thus was kept in close touch with the enemy; a daily record was made of his order of battle and the location of his units.

We were at all times informed of the degree of his compliance with the terms of the armistice, and were ready for any eventualities.

A comprehensive schedule was inaugurated for training and preparing the troops for any contingency that might arise, and rigorous adherence was enjoined upon all units of the command. Special attention was devoted to the physical upbuilding of the men, and athletics formed a considerable part of the program.

Public opinion had come to accept the presence of American troops with satisfaction and was greatly impressed with their conduct, discipline and morale. Conditions in the Rhine provinces were in marked contrast to the scene of violence in Berlin and other parts of unoccupied Germany.

My billet in Coblenz was at No. 8 Rhein Anlagen (Rhine Addition), in the palatial residence of Baron von Oswald, a millionaire ironmaster. All the appointments were handsome and modern and afforded excellent facilities for the entertainment of visitors who came to see the Rhine and the Army of Occupation. The social duties resulting from the situation

were part of the game, and our Headquarters did not wish to lag behind in the courtesies expected of the Commanding General.

Lieutenant General R. L. Bullard, Commanding Second Army, arrived on the last day of the year. His visit gave me the impression of a "discreet inspection," which may have been a mistake; anyway, it did not develop anything detrimental to our interest. All the officers at Coblenz were invited to meet him at a reception given in his honor.

Prince Albert of England lunched with us on December 30; the Prince of Wales was entertained on January 11; Lieutenant General Haking, British Army, Mr. C. M. Schwab and Mr. Joseph Reinach called; General Sir Herbert Plumer, Commander of the British Forces on the Rhine, honored us at luncheon; and so on. Everybody seemed to feel that his service over here would not be complete unless able to say that he had been on the Rhine. Visits and entertainments became a daily occurrence.

The evidences of volcanic activity in the Rhine Provinces, especially in the Eifel, aroused the interest of visitors, who did not expect to find them in this part of Europe.

One of the most noted of the small lakes called Maare, formed in the craters of extinct volcanoes, is the *Laacher See*, or Laach Lake, about seven miles west of Andernach. The lake has a circumference of five miles and is surrounded by six other craters; some forty lava streams may be counted in the vicinity. This region evidently was one of great volcanic activity in geologic times. The volcanic ashes from these craters, carried by the prevailing westerly winds, account for the thick beds of grayish deposits between Andernach and Coblenz, from which enough fire brick could be made to supply all Europe. A geyser-like spring on an island in the Rhine, near Narned, is about the last remnant of volcanic activity in this region.

When the lava streams came in contact with the sedimentary rocks, carbonic acid gas was liberated, which impregnated the subterranean waters and supplied the Apollinaris and numerous other sparkling mineral springs, as well as the gas mines in operation to-day.

On the highways through the Eifel, stone guard posts are placed about twenty-five yards apart on the down-hill side of the road, which looked like a good idea; but it was puzzling to

observe that they were painted white or black in alternation. The first fall of snow cleared up the mystery and showed the advantage of the black posts. The posts were of uniform size, and although without marks of the stone cutter's chisel, had a pentagonal cross-section. In a cave near Montabaur we found the long basalt crystals with characteristic pentagonal cross-section, standing like fence rails stacked around a tree on a western farm. Prying them loose with a crowbar and breaking off the desired length with a sledge, provided the posts.

In this same neighborhood we came across the source of the elongated stone jugs, or bottles with a handle, which in pre-Volstead days made their appearance in the United States filled with curaao, maraschino, schnapps or other alcoholic liquor. Here the thrifty women and children make them at odd times, and when a load has accumulated they are carted off to the community kiln for baking.

The deplorable condition of the animals of the Third Army at the time of arrival on the Rhine was a cause for grave concern. Hard work, bad weather and scarcity of forage had reduced them almost to the condition of skele-

tons; all of them were afflicted with mange and lice. The problem before us was attacked with energy, and in a few weeks brilliant results were obtained by the following procedure:

1. All the animals were clipped. This eliminated the habitat of the lice and exposed the mange to efficient treatment.

2. Concrete tanks were constructed, and all the animals were dipped in a solution prepared by the veterinarians. This eventually eradicated the mange.

3. Stringent orders were issued, and followed up, as to feeding, watering, grooming and exercise. The animals were fed five times a day, and soon emerged from the listless stage.

4. Last but not least, competitive exhibitions, called horse shows, were instituted, progressing in a series through regiments, brigades, divisions and corps, and culminating in the Army Carnival in April. The competitive feature was not limited to animals, but included saddlery and harness and all kinds of transportation, artillery carriages, trucks and motor cars. The degree of efficiency attained cast the equipment of some of the Allies in

the shade, though the British still had somewhat the better of us on leather, which has long been their specialty.

After accomplishing the defeat of the Kaiser's armies, the young American soldiers, very naturally, desired to return to their homes at an early date. It was realized that the complicated negotiations for peace, after a war involving practically the whole world, would require a considerable period of time; hence a very reasonable appeal could be made to patience. This was accepted with good grace, but as the negotiations dragged along into the spring it became necessary, after the fatigue of the long march and the novelty of the situation in a foreign country had worn off, to devise means to occupy the soldiers' minds and, in connection with maintenance of physical fitness, preserve their contentment and prevent a decline of that wonderful discipline which was the pride of the Army and the country. For several months this was secured by a strenuous course of drill and training; but the soldiers knew very well that the war was over and that in the slow process of picking Germany's bones there could be no serious re-

sistance. Therefore, to prevent the training from becoming irksome through too much repetition, the working day was reduced and ordered to terminate at noon, leaving the afternoons available for sports, sight-seeing and other diversions.

Athletic sports were developed on a great scale under the direction of divisional athletic officers selected from those well-known in the world of sport in time of peace. Schedules were arranged and contests held, thus arousing a keen spirit of rivalry among players and adherents. The various welfare organizations, through their staffs, got up theatricals, traveling troupes and motion picture entertainments which found great favor throughout the Army.

Two thousand men visited Coblenz each day in motor trucks to attend performances at the Festhalle and other amusements in the city.

The Y.M.C.A., with an unexpended balance of \$35,000,000, took charge of the Festhalle as an amusement center, and provided a variety of entertainments. The canteens of the welfare organizations furnished thousands of meals daily.

As the weather was mild, excursions through the scenic portions of the Rhine valley, from

Mayence to Cologne, were very popular; music was furnished, and refreshments were supplied by the Y.M.C.A. All the soldiers had a chance to view the cities and castles along this great artery of Central Europe and to look for the siren singing a seductive melody and combing her golden hair with a comb of gold on the cliff of Lorelei.

More than one hundred amateur theatrical troupes were organized under expert management, thus giving all the local talent an opportunity to shine.

Schedules of departing divisions were posted from time to time; the others were kept on the tiptoe of expectation by rumors.

Throughout the period of occupation the training of the Third Army was maintained along scheduled lines, and practice marches, maneuvers and target practice were carried out.

The winter and spring thus passed pleasantly, the Army being at all times in a high state of efficiency and ready for any emergency.

The Rhine Fleet of the Third Army was reviewed from the pier at Andernach at 10.00

A.M., February 6, the ships passing up stream in the following order: *Preussen* (flagship), *Borussia*, *Frauenlob*, *Stadt Düsseldorf*, *Albertus Magnus*, *Mosel*, and six smaller vessels. They all passed in fine order, officers and troops saluting, and bands playing. The large excursion boats, numbers 2 to 5, were crowded with soldiers, future members of the American Legion, on their way to "Bingen, fair Bingen on the Rhine."

According to an agreement all the surviving animals of those purchased from the French government at \$400 per head could be turned in at \$90 each when no longer needed. But the French officials heard of the epidemic of mange and lice in the American armies and concluded that as these animals could not pass quarantine we would be obliged to dispose of them at a lower price, or even give them away, and declined to accept any more at the stipulated figure. Our staff then advertised the worst of the animals for sale at public auction. The whole Rhine valley, including Belgium and Holland, was so short of work animals that very high prices were obtained. One poor creature which could hardly stand up during

the sale brought 4,700 marks, or about \$400. It did not take long for the French to have the sales stopped, but it was done by higher authority than mine.

When a platoon of American soldiers, under an officer, was sent to the château of Molsberg, in the Montabaur area, to establish a lookout station, the mistress of the château, Countess von Walderdorff, protested strongly. Alone in the château with four grown daughters and the cellar full of wine, she feared the worst. At the time of my visit, March 4, an American doughboy in full field equipment, was standing as a sentinel on the rocky promontory in front of the château, where many a knight in armor had stood in feudal times, intently watching the broad expanse of territory open to his view. During an interview with the countess she expressed great satisfaction with the situation, and after showing me through the ancestral halls lined with oil paintings, weapons and armor, begged that she be not deprived of the protection afforded by the presence of the American soldiers.

General Winans was very comfortable in the hunting lodge of Frau Bertha Krupp von

Bohlen, near Isenburg, about three miles north of Sayn. With perfect household appointments, deer in the forest and trout in the brooks, this is a place the general will not forget when occupying army quarters at some post on our Mexican frontier.

Washington's birthday was celebrated at my residence by a dinner to twelve French officers of high rank, among them Generals Fayette, Mangin, Paquette and Marchand. Entertainment of a high order was provided by American artists and the function terminated in a dance, with good feeling prevalent throughout.

A similar entertainment was given to British officers and officials on March 12. Mr. Robinson of the London *Times* made the interesting statement next day that England and America had been pouring money into France during the last two years at the rate of \$10,000,000 a day, and that there was more money in France now than before the war.

The Emir of Feisal was with us for luncheon on the fifteenth of March. He spoke no English, but understood French a little; with

the help of an aid he soon made known his desire for American assistance in the government of his country, the Hedjaz in Arabia. This showed that there was at least one place left on this globe which was not receiving help from Uncle Sam. As we had nothing in common, Arabia and its products were the only things available to talk about. A conversation kept going for two hours under these trying circumstances may well be deemed a linguistic feat of the first magnitude. The Emir was an interesting personage. He appeared to be about thirty years of age, five feet ten inches in height, and of rather slender conformation, but active and strong. His oval face, with a long nose, was covered with a short dark beard; he looked like a good sample of the typical Arabian. In manner he was dignified and courteous, and while not a fluent talker, probably on account of difficulty with the French language, was more than willing to converse on subjects brought up.

His headdress consisted of a square crib-work formed of eight rods, about nine inches long, heavily covered with gold. To this was attached a lambrequin of white satin, embroidered in gold, and reaching down to his waist;

this covered the upper part of his body and all but the forward portion of his face, which thus had the appearance of peeking through a crack in the curtains.

One of the points of interest in Coblenz often overlooked by visitors is the Rhine Museum, devoted exclusively to exhibits concerning the Rhine, from Switzerland to the North Sea. Relief maps show the Swiss mountain system and the glaciers which are the source of numerous "wild brooks" or "Rheins" whose confluences form the branches of the upper Rhine and the Aar. Other mountain systems and hill country of the Rhine valley are also shown in relief. There are miniatures of bridges and other structures erected by Cæsar, and of some of the towns of the Middle Ages, as well as a large number of maps and tables full of valuable data relating to the geological origin of the Rhine, its canalization in modern times, and the industrial and commercial development of the Rhine valley.

During the month of March, 1919, the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, General John J. Pershing, made an extended visit to the Third Army.

He inspected every unit of the Army of Occupation, addressed the troops after each inspection, and bestowed the decorations which had been awarded. With an energy and endurance envied by officers half his age, he walked through miles of ranks each day, looked every soldier in the face, and spoke pleasantly to all bearing on the right sleeve the gold chevron indicating a wound in battle. The justified pride of battalion commanders who, in reply to the general's question, stated that there was only one case of preventable disease in their command, received a shock when the general curtly said "One too many."

The opportunity to see their Commander-in-Chief at arm's length made it a great day for the soldiers and aroused their admiration and enthusiasm; and it was evident that the Commander-in-Chief himself received gratifying impressions at nearly all of these reviews and inspections in the Third Army.

An outstanding example of such inspections was that of the 4th Division, commanded by Major General Mark L. Hersey, at Buchel, on March 18. The degree of perfection attained in all the details, in the different component units of the division, left nothing to

criticize and occasioned much praise. After the inspection the division was massed around the reviewing stand so as to bring them all within the reach of the general's voice. He spoke to them of their battle service on the Ourcq, the Vesle, and in the Argonne country, praised their present appearance and their physical and moral condition, and urged them to act as worthy a part in their home communities in peace as they had played in these foreign lands in war. This was the opportunity these soldiers long had wished for; their tribute of admiration and affection for their great commander which reverberated from the surrounding pine-clad hills made an indelible impression on the minds and hearts of all who were privileged to witness the scene.

During the month of April many important visitors were entertained, including the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and Mrs. Daniels, Ambassador and Mme. Jusserand, Mr. Kahn and the Military Committee of the House of Representatives. The conduct of the Third Army and its administration of the Occupation appeared to meet with general approval.



REVIEW, 2D DIVISION, AT VALLENDAR, RHINE PROVINCE,
GERMANY, MARCH 14, 1919
(Left to Right) General Hines, General Pershing and
General Dickman



GENERAL PLUMER, BRITISH ARMY, DECORATING COLONEL
WILLIAMS, THIRD ARMY STAFF

On April 13 a letter from General Pershing indicated that Lieutenant General Hunter Liggett would soon be sent to command the Third Army and all the troops remaining in this part of Europe. My detail at Chaumont as President of a Board of Officers on the lessons of the war and proposed organization looked like an intermediary step to departure for the United States. The Commander-in-Chief praised my management of the Occupation and of the command of the Third Army. Conditions were at the peak of excellence; the psychological moment for a change seemed to be at hand. Prolongation of the exasperating delay in the peace negotiations, weariness of the occupation, and impatience of the troops to go home, all were factors that might make it difficult to maintain the standard achieved. In any event, with the rapid repatriation of divisions hoped for, it would not be long before

*The glory that was Greece,
And the grandeur that was Rome*

would go into a decline. The bloom would soon be off the rye!

Lieutenant General Liggett was in com-

mand of the Third Army on the twenty-eighth of April, 1919. During my incumbency of that position, for more than five months, the services of a loyal, harmonious and highly efficient staff, many of whom had served with me in the I Corps, under the able supervision of their chief, General Malin Craig, smoothed my path, oiled the wheels of administration, relieved my mind of worry over details, and enabled me to devote myself to the study of the larger problems confronting us and the cultivation of cordial relations with the adjoining Allied Armies.

Duties on the Board required my presence at Chaumont, Trier and Coblenz. On May 19 the Board settled down at Trier, where the residence reserved for General Pershing was assigned for my use. The labors of the Board proved to be more extensive than had been anticipated, but no time was lost, for the drag in the peace negotiations kept everything waiting. Intervals in the sessions were utilized in visiting friends and points of interest.

At Oberwesel on the Rhine, Mlle. Louise Dury was managing a *Foyer du Soldat*, corresponding to our Y hut. After a conversa-

tion about her sister, who was a governess at St. Albans, Vermont, she said that she hated the Boches, but that two dances a week were given at the hut, in which natives participated. Fraternization seemed to be quite free in the territory occupied by the French. Americans were the only ones to adhere to the original regulations. British and French drummers, the former in uniform, were hustling for business in advance of the conclusion of peace, and shipments into German territory did not seem to be hampered by rules about trading with the enemy.

In Trier, said to be the oldest town in Germany, there are many ruins of Roman times, the most noted being the Porta Nigra (in fair state of preservation) the Igel Column, the Kaiser Palast, the arena, and the Baths. Most of them are in poor condition; the museum struck me as mediocre.

On a visit to the principal tailoring establishment in Trier, the proprietor, a demobilized captain of the Prussian Army, told me that ten thousand American officers and soldiers had been in his establishment in the last

four months; that he never received a disagreeable word from any of them; that the soldiers were respectful towards their officers, and that the officers treated their men with consideration; and concluded with the statement that he believed the discipline of the American Army to be the best in the world. This praise from a former exponent of Prussian militarism was most gratifying, and confirmed me in the conviction that better results can be obtained by a rule of reason than by the employment of brute force and caste government.

An excursion to the *Kochelsberg*, a country place across the Moselle, turned out to be disappointing in one respect. The famous German beer had degenerated into brown water with a little gas, much less palatable than our "near beer." While sitting in the park, some boys were observed making a stealthy approach from an adjoining forest; they were playing at "Sleich Patrouille." From children carrying school books in a knapsack and adopting elementary military instruction in their games, we get an idea of the extent to which preparation for war was carried in this country.

The news came on June 28 that the Peace Treaty had been signed. There were no demonstrations in the Rhine Provinces, but the opinion seemed to be general that the terms of the treaty would never be fully carried out.

The Board of Officers completed its labors on July 1 and signed the report on "Tactics and Organization," in connection with the lessons of the war.

On July 2 the Third Army and Army of Occupation passed into history. The American troops still in the Rhineland no longer constituted an army, but were thereafter to be known as the "American Forces in Germany."

On a trip of five days through Belgium and Holland by way of Brussels. Antwerp, The Hague, Amerongen (his late Imperial Majesty could not be seen) and Nijmegen, the principal feature of interest not found in the guide books, was the remains of Fort Lonçin. The explosion of the powder magazine by a German 38 cm. shell had left an impressive crater. The flames and gases of the explosion penetrated the galleries and blew the heavy steel cupolas with guns off their bearings. One cupola was turned over like a pancake in the

making, and fell back into place, upside down. The 345 members of the garrison are still there, walled in.

On the way to Paris a final glance was taken at the battle fields; there was not much going on in the way of reconstruction.

Arriving at Brest on July 12, embarkation on the *Aquitania* next day terminated my experiences in the Great War.

XI

COMMENTS

ORGANIZATION

THE plan proposed by our Allies for utilizing American troops in their armies first came to my knowledge upon landing in England, March 13, 1918; but, it seems, the question then already was a year old. General Pershing, who had known of the "Plan de Nivelle" broached by the French mission in Washington soon after our entry into the war, met with it again, in a slightly modified form, after arrival in France in June, 1917. According to the original plan we were to send over thousands of expert workmen to labor for the French; and such soldiers as we might send were to be put into French battalions, losing their identity as Americans and being controlled entirely by French officers. The British held much the same view and requested large assignments to their forces.

These remarkable propositions received some support in our country, for a while; large numbers of experts were culled from our regiments in the fall of 1917. We felt the loss of these men keenly and realized that it reduced the efficiency of our divisions. At one time a high military authority of the American Army, then in Paris, had all but committed us to this scheme, when General Pershing heard of it and caused better counsel to prevail.

The British General Staff must have known that our Regular Army, though small, had been in existence for more than 100 years, and that it had a history, traditions and spirit of its own; that we had a system of military schools, one of which, West Point, had been rated by General Kitchener as among the best in the world; and that we had examinations for the promotion of officers, a War College, and a General Staff. The most noted British writer on the campaigns of our Civil War had been an instructor in their War College. A member of Parliament had observed the fighting of our troops at Santiago. British and American troops had campaigned side by side in the China Relief Expedition only seventeen years before. Both the British and French

had kept military observers in Washington for years. Ignorance of the fighting qualities of the Americans, the descendants of the war-like peoples of Europe, can not be pleaded as an excuse.

As we look back on this proposition it assumes more and more the appearance of a lack of respect for the dignity of the American nation and of an imposition on our good nature. To suppose that liberty-loving Americans would take kindly to serving in a subordinate capacity in a foreign country, in a foreign uniform and under a foreign flag, with foreign officers commanding them in an unknown language, was going far. Vast financial and material assistance had already been rendered to the Allies under a very "benevolent" neutrality. Although thus encouraged, it still required a good deal of assurance to make a proposal so far from flattering to our national pride, especially on the part of the British, who did not use soldiers from other parts of their Empire, as little prepared for war as we were, namely, Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders, to fill up the depleted ranks of their Tommies.

General Pershing pleaded most earnestly

for the organization of an American Army; his arguments could not be refuted by the Allied Commanders. His plans, however, were interrupted by a succession of German drives, beginning March 21, 1918. While bowing to the necessities of the situation he nevertheless announced the fixed policy of resuming his plan of organization upon the passing of the emergency, and on April 24 secured the "London Agreement":

"That it is contemplated that American divisions and corps, when trained and organized, shall be utilized under an American Commander-in-Chief, in an American group."

At a conference at Abbeville a further discussion revolved around the proposition of allotting small American units to the Allies, but our Commander-in-Chief could not be driven from his position.

In a remarkable report, dated March 6, 1918, General Ragueneau, Chief of the French Mission with the American Army, had sounded a warning:

"Another consequence of this state of mind is that all the Americans contemplate the formation of an army purely American, without mixture with the other Allies. They are unani-

mous on this point, from the Commander-in-Chief to the lowest officer who discusses it. They do not wish to hear any talk about an amalgamation in which the American Army would lose its personality. They are all opposed to it and are supported by American public opinion. . . .

“In any event, I believe that we shall have to abandon, henceforth, the idea of forming a systematic amalgamation in our commands, with American units or individual soldiers. The last instructions received from Washington are too positive, and correspond too closely to the unanimous sentiment of the American people and their Army, for us to be able to gain anything by insisting: we would only develop a useless tension.”

This report probably had made some impression, for in the end the conference stated, as a principle:

“It is the opinion of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry the war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be formed as early as possible under its own commander and under its own flag.”

On May 19 it was agreed that “As soon as circumstances permit, the American Army will

take complete charge of the sector of the Woivre." The 26th Division, then in the Toul sector, was to be the nucleus of this development. Complete control of the sector was to be turned over when six divisions were available.

The Chemin des Dames disaster, near the end of May, delayed the working out of this plan of organization. Great numbers of people were again leaving Paris, and preparations for departure were made by the banks and officials of the government. All the American divisions available, including many that were incompletely trained, were turned over to General Foch, without reservation.

The Allied Commanders were so determined in their opposition that they went over General Pershing's head to their governments, and thence to Washington. There also was a movement on foot to have General Pershing relieved from command. To the everlasting credit of our President and Secretary of War be it said that they stood by the Chief they themselves had selected.

Having been balked in their intentions as to the method in which American troops were to be employed, one would think that the logical

thing for the Allied High Command to do was to accept the decision of the American government gracefully and make the best use possible of the means for defense placed at their disposal. On the contrary, they seemed to be more intent upon carrying their point of the argument than upon defeating the enemy, for taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the emergency, they immediately broke up the new American divisions and scattered them for miles among their own troops, with no possible benefit in the way of example or instruction.

The 1st and 2d Divisions, kept intact, soon exhibited wonderful fighting qualities at Cantigny and Belleau Wood; but some of the later divisions fought under the additional handicap of previous dispersion. The battle of July 15 therefore was a test, and a severe one, of the soundness of General Pershing's contention. The way in which the young American soldiers, in their first battle, responded to the confidence reposed in them, must have been most gratifying. They not only blocked the great German drive on Paris, but confirmed General Pershing's views and consolidated his position as Commander-in-Chief for the rest

of the war. The presumed American inferiority vanished in the morning hours of that great day.

So tenacious were our Allies in their views that after the convincing demonstration of American efficiency at St. Mihiel, they still tried to hold on to the American divisions serving with them, and it was only by persistent and energetic protestation that General Pershing finally succeeded in getting all but a few of them into his army. And even after the Armistice the idea of composite commands persisted in the attempt to put two French divisions into the Third American Army for the occupation of the bridgeheads on the Rhine.

The motives which actuated our Allies in their attitude towards American organizations are difficult for us to understand. It may be that in their extremity, early in 1918, they thought that they had hit upon the quickest and best plan for bracing up their depleted ranks; but after repeated demonstration of American fighting efficiency they ought to have been satisfied to "let George do it" in his own way. There is good ground for the conviction entertained by many American officers that the basis for the persistent attitude

of the Allied High Command was political, quite in harmony with the policy of the Press to minimize accounts of American participation in battle, and that the ulterior purpose of the diplomats in attempting to hold the Americans down was to keep them from acquiring too much prestige at the Peace Conference. In the atmosphere of European diplomacy they could not dream how little influence American prestige, including that gained on the battlefields of the Argonne Forest, was to exercise on the outcome of the Peace Negotiations.

General Pershing's vigorous and uncompromising defense of the self-respect of the American soldier, and of the dignity of our country as a great nation, under most trying conditions, will go down in history as the outstanding feature of his service in the World War.

DISCIPLINE

The most wonderful thing in the World War was the discipline of the American soldiers. Their conduct not only surprised the Europeans but exceeded the expectations of our best-informed officers. From the moment of their enrolment they exhibited a degree of

willingness, loyalty and devotion to duty that was beyond praise and was of inestimable value during the formative period of their careers. They took up the work of instruction and training with enthusiasm, and all seemed to be keen for self-improvement.

The necessary restrictions imposed by camp life and deference to superiors were accepted without question as part of the game. They responded with alacrity to demands which many an officer of the old army would have hesitated to exact from regular troops. They bore cheerfully the hardships of winter camps, the voyage on a crowded ship, and the long journey across France in cattle cars, lacking in the most elementary comforts of travel.

In the field they performed astounding feats of endurance, possible only when a fine and hardened physique is sustained by exalted patriotism and spurred on by the spirit of the thoroughbred.

In the supreme test of battle no case came to my knowledge of American soldiers refusing to follow where their officers were willing to lead. Their initiative in the offensive, as well as their staying qualities in the defensive, aroused the admiration of the Allied officers

who observed them. The principal fault found with them was their disregard of personal safety.

However, when not engaged in the grim business of war, in the training areas and rest billets of France, on the march through Luxemburg and Germany, and in the occupation of the Rhine Provinces, these young Americans were found to be healthy and clean, orderly and polite, just and generous; the children flocked to them and the women honored them with the greatest confidence. The impression they made in countries torn by centuries of passion will persist for generations. As Ibañez says: "The boys of to-day, converted into old men, will tell each other of how they learned to play ball from soldiers who had come from a land of prodigies beyond the seas; the girls, become grandmothers, will hold in fond remembrance the American sweethearts they used to have."

It is a record that should be the pride of the American people for all time.

Whence came this remarkable discipline?

The disposition, intelligence, ideals and spirit of adventure of young Americans, all favored the development of a discipline of the

highest order. The first and foremost step taken was the selection of a Commander-in-Chief who, on the border and in Mexico, had himself recently established an enviable record for personal discipline, under very difficult conditions.

The division commanders charged with the organization, instruction and training of the contingents of draftees, were all experienced officers, with reputations established in many years of service; they performed their duties with firmness, impartiality and efficiency.

As the people came into contact with the Army, to a much greater extent than ever before, they realized that the stories of bygone days concerning snobs and gilded satraps, martinets and militarism, were but the myths of the stump and the yellow press. In every community near camps or cantonments, the local authorities and influential citizens co-operated with commanding officers in the establishment of mutual good feeling and the encouragement of the young men who were going to fight the battles of the Nation.

After the divisions arrived in France, the example and precepts of the Commander-in-Chief, and the courses drawn up and super-


vised by the training section of his staff, contributed powerfully to developing the finished article of American discipline.

The general participation of American youth in sports and games of all kinds produced a frame of mind favorable to discipline. All good players know that there must be leadership and loyal compliance with orders to secure results in any performance except a solo. Capable officers working diligently on intelligent material to develop a "discipline of reason," had little difficulty in achieving admirable results.

BELLEAU WOOD

The 2d Division, which had been in reserve northwest of Paris, was hurried to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, 1918, and on June 1 reached Montreuil-aux-Lions, on the Paris road, about ten miles west of Château-Thierry; it then came under the command of the XXI Corps of the Sixth French Army. The arrival of the division was most opportune; it stopped the disorganized retreat of the French troops.

On June 2 the Corps Commander stated: "Thanks to the arrival of the 2d Division, U. S., it has been possible to support the en-



THE STRUGGLE FOR BELLEAU WOOD, JUNE, 1918

tire front of the Corps with a solid line, occupied from now on by American regiments."

In the evening of June 3 the enemy advanced and captured Bussièrès, Belleau Wood and Torcy.

On June 6 the German line extended from Essômes on the Marne, along the northern edges of the Bois de la Maretté and the Bois des Clerembauts, the southern edge of Belleau Wood, and on over Hill 142, south of Torcy;

the Americans faced them at short distance, with General Bundy in command of that portion of the front. The French troops when forced back passed through the American lines, reorganized, and for a time acted as a reserve.

The German drive being pretty well spent, the lines, ordinarily, would have become stabilized in these positions; but the French generals, whose troops had just been rescued from a disastrous retreat, were not satisfied with the stopping of the enemy's advance on Paris, but immediately pushed the American troops, who had never been in battle before, into a series of offensive operations in a difficult and unfamiliar country, against a victorious enemy; this in spite of instructions from higher authority to be saving with their infantry forces.

General Michel, whose command, the 43d French Division, had been forced out of Belleau Wood on the third of June, had a plan for the immediate recapture of the ground lost; but he was induced to forego this honor, and by orders of the Corps Commander the job was turned over to the 2d Division, to be undertaken after preliminary capture of Hill 142 to the west.

Belleau Wood is a bit of wooded and very rough hill country, about five miles west by north of Château-Thierry, and admirably adapted to defense by machine guns. It is not on or near any important roads, is not a key point, and there is much higher ground, with an open field of fire and better suited for defensive purposes, in the immediate vicinity, to the west and southwest. The wood was of no special value to us as part of a general line of defense.

The assumption of the local offensive ordered by the commander of the XXI French Corps involved the Americans in three weeks of intermittent fighting, June 6 to 26, the severity of which may be judged by the fact that one American brigade had to be withdrawn for about a week for recuperation and incorporation of replacements. The capture of Belleau Wood was completed on June 26 by the Brigade of Marines under command of General James G. Harbord. Our line in some places had been advanced as much as one mile, and the total area of the ground captured was about three square miles.

The strip of territory thus taken over was of no strategical importance whatever. When

the great and successful counter-offensive at Soissons was launched a few weeks later, the tip of the Château-Thierry salient became untenable; Belleau Wood undoubtedly would have been vacated, probably without a show of resistance, as soon as the progress of the battle to the north became evident. In a similar situation on a larger scale, at St. Mihiel in September, the Germans made no defense of their strongly fortified positions at Camp des Romains and St. Mihiel, after their flanks had been turned.

The operations did show that American Regulars would obey orders, no matter how difficult the undertaking, and that they were sturdy fighters who did not shrink from sacrifices; all of which required no demonstration.

The cost of these minor successes must be considered as excessive. There were 9,412 casualties, of whom 1,862 were killed. The losses of the Marines were considerably more than one-half of what they suffered during the rest of the entire war—and they took a prominent part in every major operation.

It was magnificent fighting, but not modern war.

To persist in an unnecessary attack simply because it is difficult, and to pile up reserves in repeated assaults, is very erroneous tactics. The French generals, with more than three years of war experience, must have known better; it was, in fact, contrary to the instructions of Generals Foch and Pétain on the use of troops in battle. Belleau Wood was one huge machine-gun nest!

To quote from General Hunter Liggett, page 37 of his book:

"The attack made by the 1st American Corps on July 18th was successful, moving in accordance with the general plan, keeping in alignment with the advance made farther north and pivoting on Bouresches. From the very beginning of the fighting all commanders were warned about the futility of making the front lines too heavy, and *all were enjoined to attack machine gun by envelopment, and never directly.*"

Belleau Wood was a glorious, but an unnecessary sacrifice!

SEDAN

Both in strategical conception and tactical execution the operations of the First American

Army in the battles of November 1 and 2, 1918, and in the subsequent drive on Sedan, must be counted among the finest achievements of the World War.

After three weeks of bitter fighting against a succession of defensive positions in a hilly and wooded country, strengthened during years of occupation by the highest refinements of the modern art of field fortification, the American Army had passed through the Argonne Forest and reached the open country north of the Aire river; and the Americans were the only troops in Europe who could have performed this arduous task.

Every step northward of the American divisions meant increased danger to the German lines of communication passing south of the Holland frontier. The American Army was in the strategically critical portion of the general line of battle, and this explains why nearly every day we obtained identifications of new German divisions, or of parts of such units, in our front. As relatively fresh, or even partially rested German divisions became available, they were directed against the Americans; and when the last of them had

been thrown in and defeated there was nothing but an armistice to prevent a general collapse.

As the First American Army tightened its grip on the enemy's throat he was forced to let go his positions on the Channel Coast and in Flanders and Picardy, and to begin a retreat in order to escape the danger of being completely cut off. The successes of the Americans greatly facilitated the operations of their allies; in fact, German withdrawal had become imperative, whether the British and French brought any pressure against them or not. If the Americans could not be stopped, all the positions of the general line to the west of them would become untenable. The powerful thrust of the V American Corps on the first and second of November furnished convincing evidence that the American Army was still going strong and that the game was up for the Kaiser.

Future generations of students of the Art of War will appreciate the strategical bearing of the American advance through the Argonne Forest and on Sedan; but it is perhaps too much to expect that writers of countries under financial obligation to us will attribute the

German withdrawal to anything but a succession of British and French victories.

FUTURE EMERGENCIES

The Great War furnished a convincing demonstration of the influence of money and supplies on the outcome of an international conflict. The vast resources of the British Empire, even with control of all the seas, were not sufficient to win in a test of endurance; but the addition of our own financial and material equipment cast a deciding weight into the scales. When it became evident that the undersea boats could not stop the shipment of stores and soldiers, it was a lost war for Germany; she could not find the money and supplies necessary for a prolongation of the struggle.

Nations carrying a heavy debt are not in good condition for war; those mortgaged to the limit will have difficulty in borrowing money for war purposes; and those that have repudiated their debts can raise money only by confiscation. Every reduction of the national debt adds to our financial reserve strength. This is a form of preparation for war which our pacifists have overlooked. Will they ad-

vocate that all nations be kept so sick financially that they have to be good and cannot go to war?

At the present rate of debt reduction our financial strength in twenty years will be so great that no combination of nations will venture an attack. Barring accidents, therefore, we may count on a period of peace much longer than our average, heretofore, of one generation. For us the question of preparation for war is reduced to the maintenance of an efficient Navy, and an Army adequate for national police purposes, the protection of critical points against a sudden stroke, and the continuous education of a sufficient number of teachers to train and command our enormous levies in case of a great war.

THE GREAT CRUSADE

General de Mondesir referred to the arrival of American divisions in France as "this new crusade." The two million American soldiers transferred to the fields of Northern Europe constituted the greatest trans-oceanic expeditionary force of which there is a record in history. But, the dangers, hardships and losses incident to the transit on ocean steamers and

railroad trains, in a few weeks, were not equal to those which must have been imposed by the lack of transport facilities of the Middle Ages, in connection with months, and even years, of effort.

The results, also, were very different, for the seven crusades, from 1096 to 1270 A.D., left the Holy Land in the possession of the infidel, whereas our crusade helped to complete the overthrow of the most powerful autocracy the world has ever known.

The title "crusade" applied to the American Expeditionary Forces is not entirely idealistic, but has a more practical meaning than our genial French general had in mind, for the ultimate fate of Palestine was decided on the Western Front. Who can doubt that but for the great expedition from beyond the Western Ocean the Holy Sepulcher would now be in the hands of the Turk?

As in the other crusades, we had the experience of disillusionment. The American soldier was surprised to find how far the Latin countries of Europe were behind the times in the developments of modern civilization. Intercourse with the people was pleasant, and the same, on the whole, may be said of their

armies; but the official and political classes were—and continue to be—disappointing. It seemed to be difficult for them to accord us a recognition of perfect equality, and they did not come up to our expectations of cordiality, frankness and coöperation in the pursuit of the ideals of our people.

APPENDIX I

REVIEW OF JULY 4, 1918

ADDRESS OF M. PHILIPPE CHOCARNE
PREFECT OF THE AISNE

GENERAL:

I bring the greetings of the French Republic to you and the superb troops who here represent so heroically the Great Republic of the United States of America.

You will permit me to convey at the same time the grateful greetings of the people of the Department of the Aisne whose territory has been efficiently defended by the brave troops who have just passed in review.

General, a few days ago, while carrying out the evacuation of a village which the inhabitants abandoned with profound sorrow, some American soldiers approached and said to me these simple, touching words: "Sir, is there anything we can do to alleviate their grief?"

This phrase seemed to me to symbolize the noble sentiment of America for her suffering sister, France.

We knew that as faithful heirs of the great principles enunciated by Washington and Lincoln, America and President Wilson desired to secure the liberty of the nations as of the individuals of this world. But we also knew of the deep affection retained by America for France, and we have never ceased, from the beginning of this war imposed by a robber nation on others whose sole object was the development of civilization, to receive proofs thereof.

To help us and to soften the sufferings and the sorrow which for four years have accompanied the glorious hours of our defense, you sent us, at first, your women, your doctors and supplies of all kinds. And after German folly committed outrages against you also, you gave us, and continue to give freely the entire strength of your youth.

On these battlefields where blood is mingled, fraternity is renewed and a new world is created. I salute, general, the greatness and nobility of the American troops who heroically came to take their part in the struggle which will definitely assure the victory of Right.

APPENDIX II

REVUE DU 4 JUILLET, 1918

SPEECH DU GÉNÉRAL J. T. DICKMAN REMER- CIANT M. LE PRÉFET DU DÉPARTEMENT DE L' AISNE

Il y a aujourd'hui cent-quarante-deux ans que les coloniaux américains, après une longue série d'injustices, se révoltèrent et firent leur déclaration d'indépendence. Cette déclaration fit époque dans l'histoire de la civilisation. Les ci-devant coloniaux y firent l'énumération des torts commis envers eux, et prononcèrent à haute voix le droit de l'homme à la vie, la liberté, et la poursuite du bonheur. Le résultat de cette déclaration fut une guerre acharnée. C'était à la crise de cette lutte de sept ans que la France nous a porté le puissant secours qui nous a sauvé. Et c'est en reconnaissance pour ce fait, qu'il n'y a pas en Amérique, ni un arrondissement ni une ville où l'on ne voit pas les noms de Washington, de Lafayette, et de Rochambeau à côté l'un de l'autre.

Cent-quarante ans, ce n'est pas long dans la vie d'une nation, certes pas assez long pour nous faire oublier ce que nous devons à la France. Le souvenir en est très vif chez nous; les enfants à l'école l'apprennent dans leurs premières leçons d'histoire.

L'empereur d'Allemagne a outragé les droits souverain de notre peuple, ce qui était une cause presque irrévocable de guerre. Mais je suis sûr que la raison suprême de notre entrée en lice fut notre admiration et notre amour pour la France; cette chère France qui a soutenu presque seule les premiers grands chocs de la guerre; cette France héroïque qui a versé tant de sang pendant les quatre ans passés, et qui a sacrifié tant de ses braves fils sur l'autel de la Patrie. Ah, ma belle amie, c'est que votre grand frère d'Amerique est arrivé, qu'il n'a pas oublié, et qu'il va donner de rudes coups pour chasser les hordes de l'envahisseur d'outre-Rhin loin de la terre sacrée de la France.

Nous y sommes et nous y resterons jusqu'à la fin.

Je vous remercie de tout cœur, M. le Préfet, pour les beaux sentiments que vous avez eu la bonté d'exprimer à notre égard.

APPENDIX III

ORGANIZATION FOR THE ST. MIHIEL OPERATION

FIRST AMERICAN ARMY

	LINE (East to West) <i>Headquarters</i>	CORPS RESERVE <i>Headquarters</i>
I Corps Headquarters: Saizerais	{ 82d Div.—Marbach 90th Div.—Villers-en-Haye 5th Div.—Neuviller-sur- Moselle 2d Div.—Colombey-les-Belles	78th Div. Bourmont
IV Corps Headquarters: Toul	{ 89th Div.—Lucey 42d Div.—Châtenois 1st Div.—Vaucouleurs	3d Div. Gondrecourt
II French Colonial Corps Headquarters: Ernecourt	{ 39th Div., Fr.—near St. Mihiel 26th Div., Fr.—south of St. Mihiel 2d Dism. Cav. Div., Fr.— north of St. Mihiel	
V Corps Headquarters: Benoitevaux	{ 26th Div.—Sommedieue 15th Div.—Fr. Colonial 4th Div. (part)—Andelot	4th Div. (part) Andelot

ARMY RESERVE

35th Div.—Gérardmer

91st Div.—Montigny-le-Roi

80th Div.—Aigny-le-Duc (available, not designated)

33d Div.—Tronville-en-Barrois (available, not designated)

APPENDIX IV

DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 5, 1918, WITH REFERENCE TO ADVANCE ON SEDAN

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

Third Section

November 8, 1918

Memorandum for: Records of G—3 Section.
Subject: Operations of the 1st Army in the
direction of Sedan.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a memorandum for the Commanding Generals, 1st Corps and 5th Corps, dated November 5th, 1918 (G—3 A-137) which was issued about 18:30 hours on November 5th. It was dispatched in written form by the ordinary courier service and was telephoned direct to the 1st and 5th Corps between 18:30 hours and 19 hours on November 5th.

2. Also attached hereto is a memorandum

from the Chief of Staff, 1st Army, dated November 7th, regarding the above subject.

3. On November 5th at about 17:30 hours the Assistant Chief of Staff, G—3, G.H.Q. (General Conner) came to the office of the undersigned. He gave to me a message from the Commander-in-Chief, which is stated in paragraph 1, G—3, Memorandum No. A-137 referred to in Paragraph 1 above. The message was verbal and was dictated to me by General Conner.

Paragraph 2 of the above referred to G—3 Memorandum A-137, was drafted by me, excepting the last sentence. General Conner was furnished a draft of the memorandum as it then existed. Neither the Army Commander nor Chief of Staff were in their office at this time. About 18 hours the Chief of Staff returned to his office from the front and I presented to him the draft of the memorandum. He directed the addition of the last sentence of paragraph 2. The memorandum was then rewritten, telephoned and dispatched as recited in paragraph 1 above.

G. C. MARSHALL, JR.

A. C. OF S., G—3

APPENDIX V

MEMORANDUM WITH REFERENCE TO BOUNDARIES ON NOVEMBER 6, 1918

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES, FRANCE

Office of the Chief of Staff

November 7, 1918

Memorandum for: A. C. of S., G—3, First
Army.

In connection with the letter of instructions sent to the 1st and 5th Corps relating to the advance on Sedan I desire to have the following made a record in your office.

Instructions received by me in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, transmitted by the A. C. of S. G—3, G.H.Q., General Conner, were to the following effect:

Irrespective of boundaries, the 1st Army will advance on Sedan. I was informed that it was very desirable that the First Army

reach that vicinity in advance of any other troops. I was also informed that the question of boundaries between the 4th French Army and the First American Army had been arranged between the C.inC. and General Maître, Commander of the G. A. C. which included the 4th French Army at this time.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX VI

PROTEST BY GENERAL LAIGUELOT, FRENCH ARMY

From General Laiguelot,
To Lieutenant Maudet, Liaison Officer,
for transmission to Infantry Division
and Army Corps, U. S.

Translation

The boundary line between the 40th Infantry Division and the American Brigade, as given by the High Command, is not on the national highway but, after leaving Chémery, lies on the road Chémery—Bulson—Thelonne.

I am obliged to use my artillery in that region.

Ask my brave neighbors to refer the matter to their Corps Headquarters, which must have made a mistake.

(*Signed*) GENERAL LAIGUELOT

APPENDIX VII

TELEGRAMS REFERRING TO ARMISTICE

November 8, 1918

Under instructions from Marshal Foch transmitted by the C.inC. you are informed that hostilities will cease along the whole front beginning at a date and hour not yet determined, Paris time, and concerning which you will be notified later. The Allied Troops will not pass the line reached by that hour on that date until they receive further orders. Corps Commanders will report by telegraph to these headquarters the exact front line held by their troops at the hour and date for the termination of hostilities which is to be communicated to them. Special care will be taken to locate the lines accurately. All communication with enemy is forbidden both before and after the termination of hostilities until further instructions are received from these headquarters. The fact must be emphasized that

the proposed arrangement is an armistice only and not a peace and that there must be no relaxation of vigilance on the part of all concerned. Troops must be prepared at any time for further operations. Special steps will be taken by all commanders to insure the strictest discipline and the early preparedness for any eventuality. All troops will be held well in hand and higher commanders will personally inspect all organizations with the foregoing in view.

DRUM

November 8, 1918

COMMANDING GENERAL, FIRST ARMY:

Reference message regarding armistice, transmitted by Colonel Mott and sent by me to Army Commanders this afternoon, you are hereby informed that armistice has not yet been signed. Message above referred to sent by Colonel Mott in anticipation of signing of armistice and does not take effect until then. You will not act upon former message until further orders are received from these headquarters to do so. You will continue and push to the limit any operations you had in prospect.

PERSHING

APPENDIX VIII

ORGANIZATION OF THE THIRD ARMY

Army Commander.....Major General Joseph T. Dickman
Chief of Staff.....Brigadier General Malin Craig
Deputy Chief of Staff....Lieutenant Colonel George Grunert
SecretaryLieutenant C. C. Colburn

CHIEFS OF SECTIONS

G—1Colonel James A. Logan, Jr.
G—2Colonel R. H. Williams
G—3Colonel J. C. Montgomery
G—4Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Perkins
G—5Colonel W. C. Short
Adjutant GeneralLieutenant Colonel W. A. Haverfield
Chief EngineerColonel George R. Spaulding
Chief Signal OfficerColonel A. C. Voris
Chief of Air Service.....Brigadier General Wm. Mitchell

TROOPS

III Corps

Headquarters: Dun-sur-Meuse
General J. L. Hines

2d Division, Gen. J. A. Lejeune
32d Division, Gen. Wm. Lassiter
42d Division, Gen. C. A. Flagler

IV Corps

Headquarters: Woinville

General C. H. Muir

1st Division, Gen. E. F. McGlachlin

3d Division, Gen. R. L. Howze

4th Division, Gen. M. L. Hersey

The following addition was made to the Third Army on November 22d, 1918.

VII Corps

Headquarters: Dun-sur-Meuse

General W. G. Haan

5th Division, Gen. H. E. Ely

89th Division, Gen. F. L. Winn

90th Division, Gen. H. T. Allen

The 5th Division, and the 33d Division (General George Bell, Jr.) which was temporarily assigned, were relieved before completion of the march into Germany.

APPENDIX IX

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT OF GENERAL RAGUENEAU

March 6, 1918

I believe it my duty to present some observations which I have been able to make since the beginning of my mission, on the subject of the American mind, observations resulting from daily relations with our Allies and confirmed by numerous conversations with our liaison officers and with officers who know the Americans well. Certain features of this state of mind are so pronounced and positive that it is impossible not to take them into account, lest a strained feeling be created, misunderstandings brought on, and we expose ourselves to mistakes and actual failures.

The outstanding features of the American mind are an extremely developed national pride and a very great spirit of independence. These feelings are common to all Americans. All have the deep conviction of the superiority

of their country which, in the present circumstances they consider the arbiter of the situation by reason of their enormous resources in men, money and supplies of all kinds, as compared with the other nations of the Entente, more or less exhausted by the duration of the war. As a rule they do not express these feelings, and no conceit is apparent in their intercourse, which is cordial; but these feelings influence all their acts and all their decisions.

Under these circumstances they are not prepared to accept a subordinate position in any way but expect to be treated on a footing of perfect equality. They regret their inability to put a greater number of men into the fight at present and to increase this number with less delay; but they consider this quite a temporary situation and have complete confidence in the rapid organization of a numerous and powerful army, and are proud of that effort. They believe that from now on the assistance furnished to the Allies in the way of funds and supplies, entitles them to a voice in the Council. It is to be observed that President Wilson, while desirous of acting in harmony with the other Allies, reserves his liberty of action, has no intention whatever of accepting the war

aims of the Entente without discussion, follows his own idea and policy, and in his decisions, apparently, is guided solely by his own views and the interests of his country. This fact should be noted, for it is not a trait peculiar to President Wilson, but is common to all Americans. . . .

We would therefore deceive ourselves completely if we hoped, even in the strictly military sphere, to make our advice and suggestions prevail. America willingly recognizes our worth, gives credit for our efforts, admires France, the exploits of our armies, as well as the conduct and spirit of sacrifice of our people. These feelings are sincere with the Americans, but it does not follow by any means that they are ready to accept blindly our advice and adopt our plans. They intend to weigh our recommendations, retain what suits them, adapt them to their state of mind, and when it comes to making decisions, very rarely conform exactly to the proposals submitted. . . .

Further evidence of this spirit of independence is the large part taken in their scheme of instruction by what they call "open warfare," as distinguished from "trench warfare." The

first is to be understood as American, and the second as British or French, as you please, but in any case quite inferior to the first which will resume its full value after the breaking of the line which the American Army will help to produce, and in the subsequent exploitation. . . .

Another consequence of this state of mind is that all the Americans contemplate the formation of an army purely American, without mixture with the other Allies. They are unanimous on this point, from the Commander-in-Chief to the lowest officer who discusses it. They do not wish to hear any talk about an amalgamation in which the American Army would lose its personality. They are all opposed to it and are supported by American public opinion. Their entry, provisionally, into our French divisions to become initiated in the present war, should not deceive us nor lead to a general conclusion. It is accepted because it has been freely consented to and above all, because the Americans are well aware that the situation is quite temporary. Their chiefs are impatient to take command themselves, and as soon as they are convinced that they can get along without our assistance,

they will no longer consent to being kept in leading strings. . . .

In any event, I believe that we shall have to abandon, henceforth, the idea of forming a systematic amalgamation in our commands, with American units or individual soldiers. The last instructions received from Washington are too positive and correspond too closely to the unanimous sentiment of the American people and their army, for us to be able to gain anything by insisting: we would only develop a useless tension. In making an appeal to their sentiment of solidarity in case of urgent necessity, we shall secure their assistance more readily and in a much larger measure if we do not claim to fix the exact forms in which that assistance is to be rendered. . . .

Would we gain anything by a change in command, and could we hope to find Chiefs more docile to our influence? I have the most serious doubts on this subject, so general are the characteristics above described. It must not be forgotten that the present chiefs of the American Army in France enjoy the complete confidence of President Wilson, whose power is more absolute than that of any other Chief of State. It is to be feared that any attempt

we might desire to make in that direction would be looked upon as a criticism of the selection of the President, perhaps even as an affront to the American Nation.

It is nevertheless true that if we can not expect that all our hopes will be realized, nor that all our views will be accepted, the importance of American help is becoming pronounced, as well in the matter of finances and supplies as in the military line. The first American units have shown themselves to be vigorous, eager and well disciplined. They make very rapid progress, and their officers, who are constantly subjected to a rigorous selection, have real qualities of character and command, though deficient in the knowledge and experience which can only be acquired gradually.

On the other hand, if all our advice is not followed, our influence already is real and productive of results, the officers of this Mission, in particular, having access to all the American departments. Our informing or liaison officers are in all the schools (except those of the 1st Corps which were established before the formation of this Mission), in all the staffs, and in all the commands. Received at first

with a certain reserve and sometimes with coolness and indifference, they have, little by little, gained confidence and acquired real influence; many of them are already indispensable. The American has not the persistent coldness of the Englishman, and the American officers maintain relations of real and substantial friendship with a goodly number of our officers.

We should therefore continue our work, guarding against excessive doubt as well as exaggerated hopes as to results, but with the certainty that these results will be positive. The danger lies in misconstruing the characteristics of the mind and spirit of the Americans; we would then be headed straight for failure.

I conclude, on the contrary, that if we know how to utilize their sincere desire to coöperate in the struggle to the full extent of their means, we can count upon their most complete assistance, especially in case of urgency, provided we consult with them as to the form in which it shall be rendered and do not insist upon the rigid application of all our methods.

(Signed) RAGUENEAU

INDEX

- Abbeville, 258
- Adams, Lieut. Col. Frank H.,
56, 100
- Adirondacks, 1
- Adrian Barracks, 37
- Ahrweiler, 223
- Air Service, 149
- Aire river, 179, 273
- Aire valley, 167
- Albertus Magnus*, 242
- Alerte, 61, 72, 75
- Alf, 223
- Allied Armies, 79
- Allied Forces, 39
- Allied High Command, 145
- Alliépoint, 173
- Allies, 39, 74, 79, 116, 138,
139, 193, 255
attitude towards American
organization, 262
- Alsace, 35, 206
- Alzette, 203, 204
- Amalgamation, 259
- Ambulance Companies, 19
- American Army, 37, 128, 138,
139, 159, 161
- American flag, 227
- American Forces in Germany,
253
- American infantry panels, 167
- American prestige, 263
- American Red Cross, 48
- American Regulars, 271
- American riflemen, 74
- American sector, 140
- American soldiers, 65, 66, 261
- Americans, 32, 34, 39, 140,
193, 263
- Amerongen, 253
- Ammunition Train, 19
- Ancemont, 149
- Andernach, 211, 223, 227, 236
- Anderson, Col. Thomas M., 89
- Anglure, 47
- Animals, 237, 242
- Anti-aircraft artillery, 143
- Antoine, M. Pol, 41
- Antwerp, 230, 231, 253
- Aqueduct Line, 70, 99, 106
- Aquitania*, 254
- Arc-en-Barrois, 36
- Arcis, 47
- Argentol, 119, 124
- Argonne, 193
- Argonne Forest, 110, 164, 174,
273
- Armistice, 206
- Army Carnival, 238
- Army Headquarters, 149
- Army Line, 70, 165
- Army Objective, 157
- Army of Occupation, 223, 234,
247, 253
- Artaise, 190
- Artillery, 149
railroad, 124
- Athletic sports, 239
- Attila, 48

- Aube, 36, 46
 Augusta, Mich., 14
 Aujon, 36, 42
 Australians, 257
 Austria, 4, 177
 Austrians, 168
 Authe, 179
 Autrecourt, 179
 Autreville, 141
 Aviation, 4
- Bacharach, 221
 Ead Bertrich, 223
 Baker, Lieut. A. H., 87, 91
 Baker, Newton D., Secretary of War, 36, 160
 Bar-sur-Aube, 47
 Barrage, 73
 Barzy, 96, 124
 Basel, 79
 Bastille Day, 76
 Battle Creek, Mich., 14
 Battle, day of, 86
 Bazeilles, 179
 Beaumont, 179
 Beffu, 177, 181
 Belgium, 35, 206, 242, 253
 Belle Joyeuse farm, 171
 Belleau Wood, 56, 57, 65, 261, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272
 Belleville-sur-Bar, 173
 Berncastel, 215, 223
 Bethune, 79
 Bilange, Mme., 133
 Bingen, 242
 Bissell, Lieutenant, 49, 50
 Bitburg, 214
 Blanquet, Lieutenant, 184
 Blesmes, 86
 Board of Officers, 249, 253
 Bochage, 70, 71
- Bois d'Aigremont, 59, 62, 86, 88, 94, 115
 Bois de Barbillon, 103, 122
 Bois de Belleau, 55
 Bois de Bourgogne, 170, 172
 Bois de Grimpette, 126
 Bois de Jaulgonne, 103
 Bois de la Belle Osière, 161
 Bois de la Jute, 62
 Bois de la Marette, 268
 Bois de Mort Mare, 151, 153, 155
 Bois de Nonsard, 156
 Bois de Sonnard, 154
 Bois de Vigneulles, 156
 Bois des Clerembauts, 52, 268
 Bois des Loges, 166, 167, 173, 176, 177
 Bois le Prêtre, 150
 Bois Raté, 149
 Bolshevist, 168
 Bombon, 138
 Boppard, 222
 Borussia, 242
 Boucq, 47, 151
 Bouillonville, 151
 Boulogne, 34
 Bulson, 179
 Boulton-aux-Bois, 173, 179
 Boundaries, 181
 Bouresches, 55
 Bourges, 145
 Boyer, M., 54
 Brasles, 51
 Bravado, 74
 Brent, Bishop, 131
 Brest, 230
 Bretelle, 70
 Brett, Gen. Lloyd M., 176
 Bricon, 47
 Brienne, 47
 Briouilles, 179
 Briey, 140, 200

Brigade of Marines, 270
 Brigham, Captain, 103
 Briquenay, 173, 179, 180, 181
 British, 32, 35, 39, 138, 140,
 227, 255
 British Army, 33
 British currency, 33
 British General Staff, 256
 British Staff, 40
 Browning Automatic Rifle,
 10, 142
 Browning Machine Gun, 10
 Bruant, Major, 68
 Brussels, 253
 Buchel, 247
 Bullard, Lieut. Gen. R. L.,
 126, 130, 235
 Bundy, Gen. Omar, 269
Burg Cochem, 224
Burg Eltz, 225
 Burlington, Vt., 2
 Bussières, 268
 Butcher, Lieut. R. G., 88, 91
 Butts, Col. E. L., 94, 95
 Buzancy, 173, 177, 179, 180

 Cæsar, 38
Camaraderie, 20
 Camp Custer, Mich., construc-
 tion of, 14, 15
 Camp des Romains, 137, 271
 Camp Greene, N. C., 16, 17, 30
 Camp Mahaut, 172
 Camp sites, 17
 Canadians, 257
 Cantigny, 53, 65, 261
 Cantonment, 18
 Car shortage, 230
 Carter, Gen. W. H., 16
 Cassatt, Captain E. B., 216
 Casualties, 95
 Belleau Wood, 271

Cavalry, 4, 142, 154
Cave voûtée, 38
 Celles-les Condé, 98
 Central Powers, 9
 Champigneulle, 167, 176
 Charlotte, N. C., 17
Charlotte News and Observer,
 20, 21
 Chartèves, 61, 62, 84, 122
 Château la Doultre, 60
 Château-Thierry, 47, 49, 53,
 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 67, 79, 80,
 110, 120, 121, 132, 139, 267,
 271
 Châteauvillain, 31, 36, 38, 42
 Châtel Chehéry, 176, 177, 197
 Chaumont, 35, 36, 37, 250
 Chehéry, 184, 187
 Chémery, 179, 183
 Chemin des Dames, 46, 138,
 201, 260
 Cheveuges, 183
 Chicago, 16, 133
 Chickamauga Park, 19
 Chierry, 122, 126
 China, 48
 China Relief Expedition, 256
 Chocarne, Philippe, 279
 Christmas tree, 231
 Circulars, German, 69
 Citation, 7th M. G. Battalion,
 51
 Citation, 30th Infantry, 96
 Citation, 38th Infantry, 101
 Civil War, 256
 Clemenceau, M., 161
 Cobbey, Lieutenant, 51
 Coblenz, 178, 210, 216, 221,
 222, 223, 227, 229, 233, 234,
 236, 250
 Cochem, 223, 224, 228
 Cologne, 178, 241
 Colonial troops, 127, 222

- Colonials, 32, 65
 Combres group, 147
 Command Post, 124, 164, 176
 Commander-in-Chief, 193
 Condé-en-Brie, 47, 48, 49, 53,
 54, 55, 62, 63, 64, 105
 Conflans, 135, 136
 Connage, 187
 Connigis, 96
 Connor, Gen. W. D., 230
 Cordiality, lack of, 209
 Côtes de Forimont, 164
 Côtes de Meuse, 135, 136, 137
 Coufremaux, 70
 Counter attack, 108, 116
 Cour L'Évêque, 100
 Courboin, 70, 82, 86, 116
 Courboin, Colonel, 134
 Courtelin, 96
 Courthiézy, 54
 Cousin, M., 42
 Craig, Gen. Malin, 250
 Cramer, Lieutenant, 98
 Crawford, Gen. Charles, 57,
 129
 Crezancy, 65, 86, 89, 92
 Crossing German frontier, 212
 Crossing of the Marne, 85, 122
 Crossing of the Marne, Ger-
 man account of, 92
 Cruikshank, General, 71, 104
 Crusades, 276
 Cuba, 37
 Cunel, 165
 Currency, 206
 Custom of the Service, 20, 27

 Damremont Barracks, 37
 Daun, 217
 Davidson, Major, 68
 De Mondesir, General, 54, 65,
 66, 67, 116, 118, 276

 De Poumayrac, Colonel, 68
 Defeat, heaviest, 111
 Defensive organization, 3d
 Div., 70
 Defensive warfare, 19
 Defensive works, 72, 75
 Degoutte, General, 73, 209
 Denis, M., 132
 Departure, 249
 Dieulouard, 162
 Dinteville, 46
 Discipline, 4, 19, 28, 29, 58,
 65, 216, 239, 252, 263, 264
 Division Headquarters, 3d
 Div., 105
 Dockweiler, 220
 Dommartin, 142
 Dormans, 63, 139
 Douglas, Ariz., 19
 Draft of Memorandum of Nov.
 5th, '18, App. IV.
 Drum, Gen. H. A., 182
 Dual Alliance, 4
 Duchesne, General, 58
 Dun-sur-Meuse, 204
 Dunkirk, 79
 Dury, Mlle. Louise, 250

 Eberlin, Lieutenant, 98
 Echternach, 212, 213
 Écouvriez, 200
 Ehrenbreitstein, 227
 Eifel, 211, 235, 236
 18th Cavalry, 13
 18th Field Artillery, 19, 71,
 102
 8th M. G. Battalion, 18
 80th Division, 170, 171, 175,
 176, 177, 180, 195
 85th Division, 14, 16
 89th Division, 150, 151, 153,
 223

- 82d Division, 175
- Engers, 222
- Engineer Trains, 160
- Engineers, 200
- England, 4, 32
- English, 32
- Eros, 163
- Essey, 151
- Essômes, 268
- étain, 136
- Euvezin, 151
- Excursions, 240
- Exploitation Line, 158
- Exposure, 143

- Fayolle, General, 244
- Feisal, Emir, 244
- Fère-en-Tardenois, 84
- Ferme les Alloix, 58
- Festhalle, 221, 240
- Field Artillery, 4
- Field Exercises, 46
- Field Hospitals, 19
- Field service, 47
- 5th Corps, 149, 181, 185, 188, 190, 195, 274
- 5th French Army, 199
- 5th Grenadiers, 83, 86, 99
- 5th Infantry Brigade, 18
- 5th Signal Battalion, 19
- Fighting qualities, 39
- Fighting theories, 140
- 1st Army, 140, 146, 159, 168, 172, 181, 273, 274
- 1st Army organization for St. Mihiel operation, App. III
- 1st Corps, 149, 164, 170, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 185, 189, 190, 195, 197
- 1st Division, 116, 128, 150, 151, 154, 156, 161, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 223, 261

- Flaba, 179
- Flanders, 274
- Flannery, Lieut. W. R., 61
- Flavigny, 133
- Flirey, 146, 151, 160
- Foch, Marshal, 80, 112, 120, 138, 205, 224, 260, 272
- Fontaine des Parades, 173
- Forêt de Barbillon, 63
- Forêt de Fère, 118
- Forêt de la Reine, 148, 151
- Forêt de Ris, 124
- Forêts domaniales, 41
- Fort Bliss, Tex., 19
- Fort Clark, Tex., 19
- Fort Douaumont, 136
- Fort Ethan Allen, Vt., 6
- Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 19
- Fort Loncin, 253
- 40th Division, French, 187
- 48th Division, French, 227
- 42d Division, 128, 150, 151, 154, 180, 184, 188, 195, 223
- 47th Infantry, German, 83, 86
- 43d Division, French, 269
- Fossé, 173
- Fossoy, 59, 62, 86, 87, 88, 111, 115, 123
- Fournier, M., 60
- 4th Corps, 132, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150, 213, 214, 217, 223, 224
- 4th Division, 18, 129, 217, 223, 247
- 4th French Army, 107, 173, 187, 189
- 4th Infantry, 18, 44, 54, 59, 64, 87, 106, 122, 124, 125
- Fourth of July, 67, 76
- France, 3, 4, 15, 30, 37, 41, 42
- Fraternization, 215, 218
- Frau Bertha Krupp von Bohlen, 244

- Frauenlob*, 242
 Freight cars, 230
 French, 34, 35, 39, 44, 46,
 117, 138, 140, 229
 French Colonials, 109, 149
 French High Command, 182,
 221
 French Mission, 255
 French people, 41, 42
 French policy, 54
 French tanks, 141
 Friedenssturm, 80, 107
 Frossard, Mme., 42
 Funston, General, 10
 Future emergencies, 275
- Game, 41
 Gay, Lieutenant, 89, 93
 General Staff, 16, 256
 Gérard, General, 133
 German attack, 106
 German bombardment, 81, 82
 German maps, 69
 German offensive, 81
 German plan, 5
 Germans, 6, 35, 38, 39, 46,
 48, 50, 52, 53, 80, 83, 97,
 110, 115, 125, 138, 139, 146,
 147, 152, 165, 168, 179, 228
 Germany, 178
 Gerolstein, 220
 Gland, 61, 76
 Gondrecourt, 8, 132
 Gorze Group, 147
 Gouraud, General, 73, 171, 232
 Governor's Island, 7
 Grand Pré, 165, 166, 170, 171,
 181, 184, 186
 Grande Heurtebise, 70
 Grant, Col. W. S., 184
 Gray, Lieut. E. W., 87, 91
 Gray, Major, 180
- Great Crusade, the, 118, 276
 Green Mountains, 1
 Grevenmacher, 213, 217
 Grèves, 71, 104
 Grèves farm, 104
 Guard posts, 236
- Haan, General W. G., 45, 125,
 223
 Haking, General, 235
 Hanonville, 157
 Harbord, Gen. James G., 270
 Harmon, Captain E. N., 157
 Harricourt, 173, 180, 197
 Hattiesburg, Miss., 19
 Hattonchâtel, 155, 161
 Hattonville, 150, 155
 Haute-Marne, 36, 37
 Haynes, Lieut. W. H., 61,
 100
 Hays, Lieut. Geo. P., 104
 Heddesdorf, 223
 Heintzelman, Col. Stuart, 141
 Hensley, Clarence, 87
 Hersey, General Mark L., 247
 Hesperange, 204
 Hesse, Kurt, Lieut., Adj., 111
 Heudicourt, 154
 Hines, General J. L., 222, 223,
 232
 Hitt, Lieut. Col., 64
 Holland, 139, 145, 203, 204,
 222, 238, 242, 253, 273
 Holy Land, 277
 Holy Sepulcher, 277
 Horses, condition and train-
 ing, 45, 237
 Hotel Rubens, 33
 Houghton, Captain Charles F.,
 53
 Hull, Lieutenant, 184
 Hunsrück, 211, 222, 223

- Ibañez, author, 265
- Imécourt, 166, 173, 176
- Inspections, 247
- Intelligence section, 233
- Ireland, 31
- Isenburg, 244

- Jacobi, General, 200
- Janvier farm, 103
- Jaulgonne, 61, 62, 118, 119, 124
- Jaulney, 149
- Jewish Welfare Board, 24
- Jonville, 157
- Julius Cæsar, 38, 46
- Junglinster, 204
- Jusserand, Ambassador, 248

- Kahn, Member of Congress, 248
- Kaiser, 5, 7, 34, 74, 133, 177, 239
- Kaiser Palast, 221, 229, 251
- Kalamazoo, Mich., 14
- Kann, Major Reginald, 187, 217
- Kansas, 38
- Karrantum-we-shvo*, 230
- Kattenhofen, 203
- Keely, Major Harry J., 99
- Kelton, Col. Robt. H. C., 118
- King Albert, 209
- Kingery, Lieutenant, 89, 92
- Kitchener, General, 256
- Knights of Columbus, 24
- Kochelsberg*, 252
- Koehler, Captain, 8
- Kreis Mayen, 222
- Kriemhild Stellung*, 166
- Kylburg, 214, 223

- La Besace, 185
- La Bretonnerie, 89
- La Chapelle, 116
- La Chaussée, 136
- La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, 54
- La Ferté-sur-Aube, 53
- La Grande Forêt, 67
- La Malmaison, 59
- La Théodorie, 123
- La Tieulerie, 123
- Laach Lake, 236
- Lacolle, 8
- Laiguelot, General, protest of, App. VI
- Lake Champplain, 1, 8
- Lamarche, 156
- Landres et St. Georges, 166
- Langres, 36, 37, 46
- Language lessons, 12
- Las dos Estrellas, 60
- Lasseigne, Captain F. M., 61
- Last battle, instructions for, 175
- Latrécéy, 47
- Launay, 96, 99
- Le Charmel, 118, 119, 123, 124
- Le Claon, 172
- Le Mousset, 71
- Le Rocq, 59, 62, 63, 70, 71, 87, 116, 131
- Le Rû Chailly, 86, 89, 91
- Leon Springs, Tex., 19
- Les éparges, 136, 146
- Les Etangs farm, 104
- Les Franquets, 123, 124
- Les Grands Bordeaux, 58
- Les Islettes, 172
- Les Jardinets, 55
- Les Petites Armoises, 179
- Leviathan*, 31
- Lewis, Gen. E. M., Provost Marshal, 35

- Liggett, Lieut. Gen. Hunter,
 168, 177, 178, 182, 242, 249
 Ligny-en-Barrois, 149, 198
 Limey, 146, 150, 151
 Limited Objectives, 174
 Little, Bascom, 11
 Liverpool, 31
 Lockett, Lieut. Col., 217
 Locomotives, 230
 London, 33, 35
 London Agreement, 258
 Longuyon, 200, 201
 Longwy, 200
 Lorelei, 241
 Lorraine, 35, 139, 206
 Lough, Major, 99
 Loupmont, 147
 Lucy-le-Bocage, 52
 Ludendorff, General, 171
 Lundh, Norwegian Secretary,
 34
Lusitania, 2
 Luxemburg, 202, 203, 204,
 206, 212

 McAlexander, Colonel U. G.,
 77, 100, 106
 McAndrew, General, 160
 McElligot, Lieutenant, 91
 McNinch, F. R., 18, 30
 MacArthur, General, 186
 Madine brook, 149, 150
 Maistre, General, 182, 187,
 193
 Maizerais, 154
 Malmy, 173
 Man power, 39
 Mangin, General, 229, 232, 244
 Marbache, 143
 March of the 3d Army, 223
 Marchand, General, 244
 Marching, 19

 Marcq, 180
 Marigny, 52
 Marine Corps, 52
 Marines, 52, 55, 271
 Marne, 49, 55, 59, 61, 75, 81,
 96, 115, 118, 124
 Mars-la-Tour, 200
 Marsh, Lieutenant, 89, 90
 Mayen, 211, 216, 220, 223
 Mayence, 232, 241
 Meaux, 267
 Memorandum, Nov. 5th, 1918,
 181, App. V
 Menil-la-Tour, 149, 160
 Menoher, General, 186, 188
 Mersch, 203
 Message, July 14th, 1918, 81
 Metz, 135, 136, 145
 Mexicans, 2
 Mexico, 60, 266
 Mézy, 59, 62, 89, 90, 96, 97,
 122, 123, 124
 Michel, General, 269
 Michigan, 46
 Mihiel Group, 147
 Military courtesy, 20, 43
 Military Government, 218
 Military Police, 19
 Molsberg, 243
 Mont de Bonneil, 59
 Mont St. Père, 122, 124
 Mont Sec, 135, 136, 149, 161
 Montabaur, 223, 237
 Montbazin, 60
 Montdidier, 79, 139
 Montmirail, 47, 62, 120
 Montreuil-aux-Lions, 267
 Morale, 25
 Moroccan Division, 120
 Moroccan Regiment, 229
 Mosel, 242
 Moselle, 136, 147, 205, 223
 Mott, Colonel T. B., 232

Mouilly, 146
 Moulin de Champigneulles,
 176
 Moulin Ruiné, 99
 Moulins, 107
 Mouzon, 185, 189
 Muir, General C. H., 223, 224
 Münstermaifeld, 225

Namedy, 236
 Nancy, 133, 145
 Nanteuil, 55
 National Guard, 22
 Nesles, 49
 Netherlands, 37
 Neufchâteau, 141, 145
 Neuville, 164
 Neuwied, 223
 New Crusade, 67
 New Zealanders, 257
 Nijmegen, 253
 19th Cavalry, 13
 90th Division, 223
 9th Corps, French, 184
 9th M. G. Battalion, 18, 60
 Nonsard, 137, 149, 150
 Norroy, 137
 North Hero, 8
 North Sea, 227
 Noyon, 139

Oberkehl, 215
 Oberwesel, 250
 Oches, 179
 Omicourt, 187
 111th Infantry, 115
 175th Infantry, German, 83,
 86, 103
 128th Infantry, German, 83
 125th Division, French, 72,
 97, 115
 Open warfare, 159, 174

Organization of the 3d Army,
 App. VIII
 Oudin, M., 127
 Ourcq, 125
 Owens, Lieut. F. A., 61

Pacifism, 10
 Pacifists, 77
 Pack trains, 17
 Pagny-sur-Meuse, 160
 Palestine, 277
 Pannes, 146, 151
 Paquette, General, 244
 Paris, 34, 35, 43, 46, 52, 53,
 63, 79, 81, 88, 139, 267
 Paris-Avrincourt railroad, 159
 Paris-Nancy railroad, 62, 139
 Paroy, 96, 107
 Passaga, General, 133
 Peace Conference, 263
 Péron, M., 42
 Pershing, General John J., 36,
 46, 169, 174, 180, 181, 195,
 202, 230, 246, 249, 255, 257,
 260, 261, 262, 263
 Pétain, Marshal, 51, 163, 182,
 184, 272
 Petites Bordeaux, 71
 Pétrusse, 203
 Philippines, 37
 Phillips, Lieutenant, 97
 Picardy, 274
 Pigeons, 40
 Plan de Nivelles, 255
 Plan for operations in the
 Toul sector, original, 145
 Plan of final attack, 177
 Plans of the 4th Corps, 150
 Plattsburg, N. Y., 7
 Plattsburg idea, 7, 8
 Plumer, General Sir Herbert,
 235

- Pont-à-Mousson, 135, 136
 Population, treatment of, 228
 Porquerolles, 60
 Porta Nigra, 224, 251
 Pougin, General, 120
 Prauthoy, 45
 Predictions, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
 Preparation, 275
 President, 28
 President of France, 161
 Prestige, American, 263
Preussen, 242
 Prince Albert, 234
 Prisoners, 57, 109, 157, 160, 176, 201
 Proclamation, 228
 Propaganda, 110
 Prüm, 220
 Prussia, 3
 Public opinion, 234
 Pursuit, the, 179
 Pursuit message, 196

 Quart de Reserve, 154

 Ragueneau, General, 192, 258
 report of, App. IX
 Railroad Line, 70
 Raucourt, 180
 Ravin-aux-Pierres, 171
 Red Cross, 24, 48
 Refugees, 48
 Regierungsgebäude, 221
 Regimental sectors, 64
 Regniéville, 146
 Reid, Captain Thomas C., 98
 Reims, 79, 107, 168
 Reinach, Joseph, 235
 Remagen, 222
 Remount Depot, 131

 Rengsdorf, 223
 Renouard, General, 49
 Reuilly, 61
 Rhens, 222
 Rhine, 221, 222, 223, 227, 230
 Rhine fleet, 241
 Rhine Museum, 246
 Rhine Provinces, 235
 Rhine Valley, 242
 Rhineland, 231
 Richecourt, 150, 151
 Road discipline, 78, 181, 233
 Rock of the Marne, 102
 Rolandseck, 221
 Romagne, 165
 Ronchères, 125
 Roosevelt, Colonel, 187
 Rotterdam, 230
 Rouse's Point, 8
 Rowe, Major Guy I., 96, 100
 Royer, Captain Henri, 115, 126
 Rupt de Mad, 135, 146, 149, 150, 153
 Russia, 4, 35, 170
 Ryan, Lieutenant, 91

 Saacy, 55
 St. Aignan, 109, 187
 St. Baussant, 154, 166
 St. Benoit, 146, 149, 150, 156
 St. Dié, 47, 79
 St. Eugène, 103
 St. Georges, 173
 St. Juvin, 165, 170
 St. Léger, 200
 St. Michel, Fort, 133, 134
 St. Mihiel, 79, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 149, 150, 157, 160, 161, 271
 St. Pierremont, 179
 Saizerais, 149

Salvation Army, 24
 Sanitary Train, 19
 Sauer, 205
 Saulchery, 120
 Savage, Lieutenant, 89, 90
 Sayn, 244
 Schengen, 212
 Schleichpatrouille, 252
 Schuler, General, 207, 208
 Schutränge, 203
 Schwab, C. M., 235
 Schweich, 214
 2d American Army, 163
 2d Cavalry, 10, 13, 157
 2d Division, 52, 55, 72, 116,
 128, 139, 142, 186, 223, 261,
 267, 269
 Secretary of the Navy, 248
 Secretary of War, 11, 30,
 160
 Sedan, 181, 183, 184, 185, 189,
 190, 195, 273, 274
 Seicheprey, 146, 151
 Seine, 53
 Selwyn Hotel, Charlotte, N.
 C., 24
 Sencgalese, 208
 Servia, 5
 7th Corps, 213, 223
 7th Field Artillery, 187
 7th Infantry, 18, 44, 54, 55,
 56, 57, 64, 71, 87, 91, 106,
 115, 123, 124
 7th M. G. Battalion, 47, 49,
 53, 64, 67
 78th Division, 167, 175, 176,
 177, 179, 195
 77th Division, 167, 175, 176,
 177, 180, 186, 190, 195
 77th Field Artillery, 13
 76th Field Artillery, 19, 71,
 102
 73d Division, French, 108

Sézanne, 47
 Shipping Board, 32
 Shortage of ammunition, 103
 Signal Corps, 200
 Simmern, 216
 Simon, Theobald, 214
 Sivry, 173, 176, 179
 6th Division, 132, 175, 190
 6th Engineers, 19, 60, 115,
 122, 124
 6th French Army, 58, 267
 6th Grenadiers, 83, 86, 88,
 90
 6th Infantry Brigade, 18, 57,
 129
 Sladen, General, 125
 Smith, Captain E. F., 77
 Social intercourse, 20
 Soissons, 116, 120
 Sommauthe, 190
 Sommerance, 173
 Spain, 37
 Speech, Gen. Dickman's, 280
 Spencer, Major, 64
 Springfield, Mass., 11
 Squiers, Mrs. H. G., 48
 Stacey, Colonel Cromwell, 19,
 94
Stadt Düsseldorf, 242
 Staff of 3d Army, 250
 Staff School at Langres, 69
 Stolzenfels, 227
 Stonne, 179, 190
 Storm position, 86
 Summer Palace, Empress
 Dowager's, 48
 Sunny South, 18
 Supplies, 231
 Supply Train, 19
 Supreme War Council, 259
 Surmelin, 59, 62, 63, 86, 106,
 107, 116, 120
 Switzerland, 222, 227

- Talma, 171, 173
 Talma farm, 171
 Tanks, 153
 Tannay, 179, 180
 Target practice, 19
 Telegrams, 112, App. VII
 Tennessee, 78
 10th Field Artillery, 19, 71, 103
 10th French Army, 199
 10th Landwehr Division, 84
 Texas, 15
 Texas City, 17
 Thann, 47
 The Hague, 253
 Theatrical troupes, 241
 Theatricals, 240
 Thelennes, 179, 189
 Thiaucourt, 135, 146
 3d Army, 207, 221, 222, 223, 231, 233, 241, 248, 253
 3d American Army, 198, 199, 232, 263
 3d Corps, 213, 214, 217, 222, 223
 3d Division, 16, 18, 30, 38, 45, 46, 47, 49, 54, 58, 81, 106, 107, 115, 124, 128, 131, 139, 151, 156, 222, 223
 3d Division, scattering of, 57
 3d Field Artillery Brigade, 19, 102, 104
 30th Infantry, 18, 44, 64, 89, 90, 94, 95, 106, 109, 111, 123, 124, 130
 38th Infantry, 18, 44, 64, 90, 96, 109, 111, 115, 123, 130
 39th Infantry, 217
 32d Division, 15, 45, 125, 223
 36th Division, German, 98
 398th Infantry, German, 83, 86
 317th Infantry, 171
 Time table of German attack, 84
 Tommies, 32, 257
 Torcy, 55, 267
 Toul, 46, 132, 135, 136, 145, 260
 Tours, 145
 Traffic regulations, 78, 181
 Training, 19, 234, 239, 241
 Training schedule, 46
 Treis, 223
 Tresauvaux, 150
 Trier, 215, 224, 229, 250, 251
 Triple Entente, 4
 Tuckaseegee road, 18
 Turner, Lieutenant, 92
 Turkey, 174
 28th Division, 115
 21st French Corps, 267, 270
 27th Ambulance Company, 128
 26th Division, 47, 129, 157
 26th Infantry, 187
 Varennes, 58, 62, 96, 98, 104
 Vaterland, 31, 32
 Vaucouleurs, 141
 Vaux, 179
 Vercingetorix, 46
 Verdun, 79, 135, 136
 Verdun front, 168
 Vermont, preparations, 12
 Verpel, 176, 177
 Verrières, 179
 Vesle, 84, 129
 Vichten, 203
 Victory, effect of, 113
 Victory, results of, 158
 rising sun of, 113
 Viels-Maisons, 54, 57, 67
 Viéville, 157
 Vifort, 60, 71, 116

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>Vigneulles, 146, 150, 151,
154, 155, 156, 157</p> <p>Vilcey, 149</p> <p>Villers-devant-Mouzon, 189</p> <p>Villers-sur-Bar, 187</p> <p>Vitron, 213</p> <p>Volcanic activities, 236</p> <p>Volunteers, 22</p> <p>Von Gallwitz, 210</p> <p>Von Oswald, Baron, 234</p> <p>Von Walderdorff, Countess,
243</p> <p>Vosges, 47</p>

<p>Wadelincourt, 189</p> <p>Wagner, Colonel A. L., 191</p> <p>Walch, General C., 171, 172</p> <p>War College, 256</p> <p>War Plans Division, 9</p> <p>Washington Barracks, D. C.,
19</p> <p>Wasserbillig, 210</p> <p>Welfare organizations, 240</p> <p>West Point, N. Y., 8, 20, 256</p> | <p>Western Front, 39, 277</p> <p>Wiborg, Miss, 48</p> <p>Wierschem, 225</p> <p>Winans, General, 125, 243</p> <p>Wire entanglements, 159</p> <p>Wire matting, 141</p> <p>Wisconsin, 46</p> <p>Wittlich, 215, 223</p> <p>Woivre, 135, 141, 161, 260</p> <p>Wood, General Leonard, 7</p> <p>Wood, Lieutenant, 100</p> <p>Woods Line, 70, 99</p> <p>Wooldridge, Captain, 90, 97,
100</p>

<p>Xammes, 149, 150, 151</p>

<p>Yoncq, 180</p> <p>Y. M. C. A., 24, 44, 240</p> <p>Younger, Lieutenant, 100</p>

<p>Zell, 217</p> |
|---|---|

3 5282 00260 6476

~~940.4~~

~~D553~~

STACKS D572.3 3dD4

Dickman, J. T.

The great crusade



3 5282 00260 6476